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in their school yard, we find forms of  political 
engagement which are fluid, dynamic and may 
have unexpected ripple effects.’
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Introduction: Eight Myths of 
Conflict and Development in the 
Middle East
Jan Selby and Mariz Tadros
Abstract In this introductory article we identify eight myths of conflict 
and development related to the Middle East region. Some of these myths, 
which cut across academia, foreign policy and development interventions, 
are specific to the Middle East; others are ‘global’ myths that regional 
developments contradict. We do not claim to be the first to identify 
all these myths; many of our arguments are indebted to a long history 
of critical scholarship. The articles in this IDS Bulletin all speak to the 
disconnects, disjunctures and misconceptions highlighted here.
Perhaps more than any other region or in any period of  post-Cold War 
history, the Middle East since the Arab Spring constitutes a significant 
challenge to established ideas about development and its relationship 
with conflict. The struggles of  democracy movements, the resilience and 
rebirth of  authoritarian regimes, the regional conflagration around Syria, 
new experiments with Islamism, and the return of  geopolitics all, in one 
way or another, challenge these established ideas. The Middle East has 
always been something of  an outlier within development thinking and 
practice: development policy and the discipline of  development studies 
have always taken sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America 
as their central reference points, not the Middle East. But with so much 
international attention currently on the Middle East, it is worthwhile 
examining what trends and events there tell us about development and 
the role of  conflict therein. This is what we try to do in this article. 
In what follows, we identify eight myths of  conflict and development 
related to the Middle East region. Some of  these myths are specific to 
the Middle East; others are ‘global’ myths that regional developments 
contradict. We do not claim to be the first to identify all these myths; 
many of  our arguments are indebted to a long history of  critical 
scholarship. Moreover, we should emphasise that we do not mean to 
suggest that these myths are adhered to all of  the time: a diversity of  
views about development and the ‘development–security nexus’ of  
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course exists. However, we think that these myths cut across a great 
deal of  academia, policy and practice, and provide underpinning 
assumptions for development thinking and interventions, even when 
they are only implicit. Myth number one is a clear case in point.
Myth number 1: that there is a unilinear model of development
The idea that development is a linear process, whereby societies progress 
through a series of  steps from ‘low’ to ‘high’ development, or from 
‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ forms, is one of  the hallmarks of  modern 
development thinking. So also is the assumption that just one overall 
form or direction of  this process exists, whatever the minor or temporary 
deviations from it. Such assumptions were explicit in classical early 
‘modernisation theory’, in which, at least by Rostow’s account, societies 
were understood to develop through five stages of  economic growth, 
from ‘tradition’ to ‘maturity’ and ‘high consumption’, with different 
societies being at different stages of  this process (Rostow 1960). Few now 
understand development in such explicitly unilinear terms. Nevertheless, 
at a more implicit level, the belief  in the existence of  a single linear model 
of  development continues to underpin much development thinking and 
practice. It is implicit in the oft-voiced claim that there is a direct positive 
relationship between economic and political liberalisation – that is, in 
claims that economic growth, commercial interests, trade and investment 
interdependencies, and consumer power naturally build up pressure 
for democratisation. It is no less implicit in the standard modernist 
dictum that modernisation is associated with the decline of  religion and 
weakening of  communal and sectarian identities, as politics and identities 
realign around the de-secularised national state (see e.g. Berger 1999). 
It was assumed by the ‘end of  history’ mentality that characterised the 
early post-Cold War years (Fukuyama 1992). And it is implicit, too, in the 
notion of  ‘transition’, whereby ‘countries in transition’ are assumed to be 
transitioning from some abnormal to a normal liberal development path. 
In reality, of  course, there is no unilinear model of  development: there 
is neither a single direction nor a single destination, nor even a single 
route towards it. In this broadest of  senses no correlates of  development 
exist – as the Middle East, more strikingly than any other region, makes 
clear. Thus, on the Arabian Peninsula, in particular, rapid economic 
development, urbanisation, global economic integration and, more 
recently, financialisation have been associated not with the withering 
of  authoritarian regimes, but with their entrenchment. Across the 
Middle East – as also elsewhere – modernisation has been associated 
not with the weakening of  religious, communal and sectarian identities, 
but with their consolidation and reinvention. Contra Fukuyama, 
no post-ideological or post-historical convergence has occurred, but 
rather an explosion of  political projects and forces, most obviously on 
the Islamist side but also including, for instance, anti-capitalist and 
anarchist movements (Cemgil and Hoffmann, this IDS Bulletin). What 
we see in the contemporary Middle East, in sum, is not a region that is 
transitioning from tradition to modernity, but one where rapid economic 
and social change, and politically inspired ‘revolutions of  backwardness’ 
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(Matin 2013), have produced strikingly hybrid social and political 
structures, in which ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ forms are juxtaposed, and 
from which the direction of  future development is far from clear.
Myth number 2: that low development and violent conflict are natural 
bedfellows
Nothing illustrates the continuing allure of  the unilinear model of  
development better than the widely held assumption that there is a clear 
correlation as well as causal relationship between low development and 
violent conflict. The belief  in such a linkage almost goes without saying 
in post-Cold War development thinking and policy, and is the founding 
assumption of  the very idea of  the ‘security–development nexus’: that 
under-development is a central motor of  conflict, which in turn is an 
obstacle to development, trapping poor societies in a vicious cycle of  
poverty and violence. Kofi Annan’s contention that ‘there can be no 
long-term security without development; there can be no long-term 
development without security’ (quoted in Allouche and Lind 2013: 1); a 
former UK International Development Secretary’s claim that ‘the higher 
a country’s GDP per capita, the lower the risk of  internal war’ (Mitchell 
2010); Paul Collier’s characterisation of  war as ‘development in reverse’ 
(Collier 2003); Shimon Peres’ claim that ‘poverty and distress’ in the 
Middle East’ have given rise to ‘fanaticism, fundamentalism and false 
messianism’ (Peres 1993: 45–6); and Thomas Friedman’s thesis that once 
a country has a middle class large enough to support a MacDonald’s 
franchise, or an industrial base large enough to provide parts for his 
laptop computer, it will no longer go to war (Friedman 1999: 195; 2005: 
ch. 12) all illustrate this line of  thinking. The contemporary post-conflict 
‘peace-building’ project does the same, its fundamental rationale and 
overall objective being to transform vicious cycles of  under-development 
and conflict into virtuous cycles of  peace and prosperity. The guiding 
premise is that all bad things go together, as do all good things. 
For most of  the period after the collapse of  the Berlin wall, the 
concentration of  the world’s civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa at least 
lent the myth of  security and development some superficial plausibility. 
Even during this period, however, it should have been evident that low 
development and conflict were unlikely to remain so tightly correlated. 
Historically, large-scale violence has been a universal and therefore 
arguably necessary feature of  the transition to capitalist modernity, 
among early and later developing societies alike (Moore 1967; Cramer 
2006); and historically, also, for the majority of  the twentieth century 
nothing even close to a positive relationship between high development 
and peace existed. Indeed, if  anything the relationship was negative, 
with the industrial powers of  Europe, the United States (US), the Soviet 
Union and Japan being the leading practitioners and exporters of  war. 
These historical patterns alone undercut the cosy assumption that 
under-development and violent conflict are natural bedfellows. But the 
Arab Spring and its aftermath have completely blown it apart. Since 
2011, large-scale civil violence has rocked Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, 
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Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Palestine and Yemen – all, with the exception 
of  Palestine and Yemen, being middle-income countries with largely 
urban and quite highly educated populations (and Palestine would fit this 
description too, were it a state). These conflicts, in turn, have reversed a 
long-term downturn in the worldwide incidence of  civil war (Pettersson 
and Wallensteen 2015). Economic dislocation was of  course an important 
factor behind these uprisings and ensuing violence, including impacts 
resulting from economic liberalisation (as in Syria: Dahi and Munif  
2011; Hinnebusch 2012) and the global financial crisis of  2007–8 (Dahi 
2012). But they cannot be explained by such economic factors alone, 
much less by ‘low development’: they were fundamentally political in 
their causes and aims, rooted in the political structures and contradictions 
of  incumbent regimes. Regionally and globally, economic development 
continues apace – however disfunctionally in many states – but this is not 
translating into greater social or political peace. The correlation between 
low development and conflict has, in short, clearly been broken. 
Myth number 3: that there is an alternative rentier path of development
Rentier state theory provides an important counter-argument to the above, 
essentially suggesting that the Middle East’s modern development path, 
though deviating from the standard liberal model of  development, has 
nevertheless been determined by economic forces in a quite predictable 
way. In the classical liberal model, growing economic productivity in society 
unleashes political change, as the state, fiscally reliant as it is on taxation, 
becomes hostage to demands for representation. In the rentier variation 
of  this model, by contrast, the state has a high degree of  fiscal autonomy 
from society, courtesy of  its access to international rents – whether from 
hydrocarbon or mineral production, transit fees, international aid, or global 
investments. As a result, rentier theorists claim, such states are less reliant 
on taxation, are not so vulnerable to demands for ‘no taxation without 
representation’, and are in turn far less likely to develop strong democracy 
movements or democratic institutions. On the contrary, the theorists claim, 
such states assume an autonomy from and power over society, are essentially 
‘distributive’ rather than ‘productive’, and thus become characterised not 
just by deepening authoritarianism, but also by patronage, clientelism, 
and the construction of  powerful internal security apparatuses (for classic 
statements, see e.g. Beblawi and Luciani 1987). From this perspective, there 
is thus a natural correspondence between high hydrocarbon production and 
export dependence on the one hand, and illiberal politics on the other. The 
Middle East’s supposedly exceptional development path can be summed up 
in a single three-letter word: oil.
The attractiveness of  this theory lies in its parsimony and superficial 
empirical plausibility. It provides an easy way of  explaining, for instance, 
why the Gulf  emirates have achieved such rapid economic development 
without political liberalisation, and have become home to such striking 
juxtapositions of  modernity and tradition. Simultaneously, it also 
functions as the exception that proves the rule, in effect assuming and 
affirming the myth of  unilinear development discussed above. Yet 
for all this, rentier state accounts of  Middle Eastern development are 
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deeply flawed. Rent-dependent states, including oil-producing ones, 
have always been characterised by a wide variety of  political systems 
and forms, from the liberal democratic (e.g. Norway), to the centralised 
authoritarian (e.g. the Gulf  emirates), through to the chaotically and 
violently decentralised (e.g. Nigeria). And context-specific historical 
and political factors explain these differences, not the simple formula 
of  access to external rents – just as also applies in relation to the 
‘developmental state’ (see e.g. Kohli 2004). 
Moreover, as developments since 2011 have shown, the supposed 
authoritarian ‘resilience’ (Anderson 1991) of  the Middle East’s rentier 
states is a myth. Libya, a classical authoritarian rentier state, has collapsed 
into civil war with little prospect of  reconsolidation. Neighbouring Egypt, 
by contrast, has displayed striking ‘authoritarian resilience’ – indeed, an 
authoritarian return – despite its much lighter dependence on external 
rents. The resilience of  Bahsar al-Assad’s regime in Syria owes little to 
oil production, because most of  this has been lost to the opposition. And 
the Middle East region as a whole, which for so long was characterised 
by retarded political development, but nonetheless regime durability and 
‘stability’, is clearly no longer thus. The reason is clear: Middle Eastern 
states are not following a single or set development path, not even one 
that is determined by hydrocarbon resources (Beilin 2012).
Myth number 4: that fragile statehood is the main institutional cause 
of violence
The institutional corollary of  the thesis that low development causes 
violent conflict is the claim that weak, failed or fragile statehood does 
too. The United Kingdom (UK)’s first National Security Strategy 
summed up this view well:
In the past, most violent conflicts and significant threats to global 
security came from strong states. Currently, most of  the major threats 
and risks emanate from failed or fragile states. A failed state is one 
whose government is not effective or legitimate enough to maintain 
the rule of  law, protect itself, its citizens or its borders, or provide the 
most basic services. A fragile state is one in which those problems are 
likely to arise (UK Cabinet Office 2008: 14).
Although the term ‘failed state’ has since fallen out of  favour, the concept 
of  ‘fragile state’, which is now preferred, does not constitute a significant 
departure from it – as the above quote makes clear. Today, state ‘fragility’ 
is understood as the central institutional conflict-development problem, 
and state ‘resilience’, its opposite, as the solution; but both are essentially 
understood as being about (actual or potential) state weakness. 
Putting to one side the fact that, historically in the Middle East, the 
concept of  ‘resilience’ has been applied to many authoritarian rentier 
states that have imploded; and putting aside also the frequent circularity 
of  fragile state reasoning – fragile statehood contributes to violence, 
and we know which states are fragile because they are home to high 
levels of  violence – the broader problem with the focus on weak or 
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fragile states is that it is utterly inattentive to, and obscures, the abiding 
centrality of  state actions and state power in practising, facilitating and 
otherwise causing political violence. The fragile state thesis boils down, 
in essence, to a claim that deficits of  state capacity, legitimacy and 
authority, and the absence of  the state in ‘ungoverned spaces’, underpin 
internal violence. But such deficits are typically accompanied by, and 
a consequence of, the powerful presence of  state and state-backed 
forces, and their preparation for and resort to violence. In countries 
from Colombia to Sri Lanka to Sudan, it is not simply the weakness or 
fragility of  the state that has been the problem, but the combination 
of  internal legitimacy deficits (and not nationwide: only within certain 
regions, or among certain groups) and state militarism and repression 
(Stavrianakis and Selby 2013). Geopolitical dynamics – state-on-state 
diplomatic and economic support, plus the training and arming of  
state and paramilitary forces – are of  course a key element in this. So 
far, so obvious. Indeed, the only thing that is surprising here is that 
contemporary conflict–security discourse, obsessed as it is with state 
‘weakness’ and ‘fragility’, continues to be so blind to these issues. 
Nowhere illustrates this better than the contemporary Middle East, where 
the post-2011 upsurge in political violence has been state, military (formal 
and informal) and geopolitically dominated. Here we must mention: 
the violent repression of  the initial Arab Spring uprisings by military, 
security and police forces in most of  the region’s states; the overthrow of  
democratically elected regimes; the aerial bombing and mass displacement 
of  populations not only in Syria, but also in Gaza, Iraq, Libya, Turkey 
and Yemen; renewed regional geopolitical machinations (which have 
involved, for instance, the Saudi state waging war directly in Yemen, 
while fighting local proxies in Syria and supporting the overthrow of  the 
Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, all as part of  its struggle for 
regional hegemony with Iran; and Turkey facilitating the rise of  Islamic 
State (IS), while waging war against its own Kurdish population and using 
its Syrian refugees as a bargaining chip with Europe (Reuters 2016)); and, 
for all its supposed ‘anti-interventionism’, the West’s wide-ranging military 
involvement in the region, as indicated by the fact that the US currently has 
military forces based in at least ten Middle Eastern states (see e.g. Heritage 
Foundation 2015: 103–4, whose list of  eight does not include Israel and 
Turkey), and that the UK continues to arm the region’s states, contravening 
the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty (Wintour 2014). It is hard but to conclude, 
given all this, that regional and international state actions and state power 
are the central motor of  political violence in the contemporary Middle 
East. Yet no one would guess this from the language of  state fragility.
Myth number 5: that environmental scarcities are an increasingly 
important contributor to conflict
A further recurring if  secondary theme in contemporary conflict-
development thinking is the belief  that environmental pressures 
are an increasingly important backdrop and contributor to conflict. 
Population growth, combined with rising consumer demand and the 
ceaseless intensification of  resource exploitation, is without doubt 
(Endnotes)
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placing growing pressures on land, water and other ‘ecosystem services’; 
and for many, the inevitable upshot of  this is mounting societal and 
international competition over scarce resources, increasing vulnerability 
to environmental shocks, and in turn proliferating impacts on 
livelihoods and stability. Global anthropogenic climate change is widely 
identified as an additional concern, one that will – or may already be – 
be acting as a ‘threat multiplier’ to conflict in some of  the most unstable 
parts of  the world (CNA Military Advisory Board 2007). This thesis, 
far from marginal, has found its way into the national security strategies 
and development policies of  most Western states, and United Nations 
(UN) bodies have widely adopted it too (see e.g. Selby and Hoffmann 
2014b). Moreover, it is invoked more than anywhere else in relation to 
the Middle East, and to Syria in particular. The Syrian civil war, so the 
story goes, was in part sparked off by a severe climate change-induced 
drought that caused mass internal displacement, growing pressures on 
host communities, and in turn political protests, repression and war 
(Femia and Werrell 2012; Kelley et al. 2015). For its proponents, Syria 
is only the most conspicuous example of  a broader trend and offers a 
glimpse of  what is to come as the planet steadily warms. 
Again, there is without doubt much superficial plausibility to this thesis, 
buttressed as it is by fears about the very sustainability – the resilience – 
of  our resource- and energy-intensive global hydrocarbon civilisation. 
And yet, it has shortcomings. For one, there is no consistent or reliable 
evidence of  environmental pressures and shocks significantly contributing 
to any recent mass political violence. Quantitative studies are deeply 
divided on the issue, and their findings – whether positive or negative – 
are in any case mostly statistical artefacts (Selby 2014). The 2003–5 war in 
Darfur, which was described as the ‘first climate change war’ (Mjøs 2007; 
Mazo 2010: 73–86), was, it is now widely acknowledge, nothing of  the 
sort (Selby and Hoffmann 2014a). And the evidence that climate change, 
drought and ensuing migration played a significant contributory role in 
Syria’s civil war is frankly derisory: among other problems, there is no 
evidence at all that drought migrants were either heavily involved in, or 
were targets of, any of  Syria’s early protests (Selby and Hulme 2015). 
Such case evidence aside, there are broader reasons why environmental 
pressures do not inexorably translate into or exacerbate conflicts. Local 
environmental resource ‘carrying capacities’ are not set by nature alone, but 
also by technology and society, with new understandings and new technical 
interventions repeatedly making new resources available (in relation to 
water, for example: from far-away surface sources, to groundwater, to 
recycled wastewater, to the sea). And environmental resources are, in 
economic and political terms, of  generally declining relative importance. 
Land and water, for example, are used above all for agriculture; and the 
relative decline in the economic and political value of  agriculture, as shown 
by its generally declining contribution to GDP and employment, and the 
increasingly urban bases of  political regimes, means that the economic 
and political value of  water is in turn declining (Selby 2005). Such counter-
tendencies make environmental conflicts less likely, not more. 
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Myth number 6: that countries need to pass a number of milestones on 
a democratisation pathway 
The twists and turns of  political transformation in Arab countries where 
revolts have occurred, such as Egypt and Tunisia, profoundly contest 
Western theories of  democratisation. Many of  the earlier theories 
assumed that countries emerging from authoritarian regimes needed to 
achieve a number of  milestones to make the bridge from democratic 
transition to democratic consolidation (Rustow 1970). Many more 
recent studies suggest the contrary, however. For instance, Carothers’ 
study of  twentieth-century regime changes in seven regions of  the 
world contests a series of  assumptions about democratic transitions: 
that regime change necessarily shifts towards democracy; that 
democracy evolves through phases (from breakthrough to transition to 
consolidation); that elections are of  determinative importance; that elite 
pacts are crucial to the arrival of  new governance strategies; and that 
democracy- and state-building are mutually re-enforcing endeavours 
(Carothers 2002). Carothers suggests that countries typically assume 
political pathways and outcomes that are in the ‘grey zones’, involving 
all kinds of  configurations of  power that do not fit into pre-conceived 
democracy-promoting models.
Yet since 2011, faith in a linear pathway to democracy has continued 
to inform the policy prescriptions of  most Western academics and 
policymakers. This was very much captured in the language of  
‘democratic transition’ that characterised Western policy debates in 
2011–13. In practice, this concern with ‘a transition to democracy’ 
became heavily associated with processes of  holding and monitoring 
elections. Rather than seeing elections as one of  many important 
proxies for the people’s expression of  voice, they became a synonym 
for democracy itself. For example, after the Muslim Brotherhood came 
to power in Egypt in 2012, citizens continued to express their voice 
through – among other means – demonstrations, marches and sit-ins to 
protest against economic hardship, monopolisation of  political power, 
and the absence of  personal and public safety. 
Concurrently, the revolutionary forces never stopped proclaiming 
that ‘the revolution is ongoing’. Ali Bakr shows in his article in this 
IDS Bulletin that the Muslim Brotherhood’s assumption of  power did 
not herald the adoption of  progressive pro-social justice policies in 
Egypt, a finding that parallels Dalacoura (2016)’s comparison of  the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Al-Nahda’s policies in Tunisia. Rezk 
captures the sentiment in 2012, showing how citizens’ high aspirations 
that the government that assumed power after the ousting of  president 
Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011) would be pro-poor and pro-youth were 
disappointed. Rezk argues that the replacement of  Mubarak’s crony 
entourage with yet another business elite, this time affiliated to the 
Brotherhood, plus the governance challenges that the new leadership 
faced, led to widespread dissillusionment and fuelled the angry 
protests that resulted in the collapse of  Mohamed Morsi (2012–13)’s 
government in June 2013. 
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Yet much of  the Western academic and policy analysis from that 
period focused on elections as the appropriate pathway by which 
revolutionaries should endeavour to achieve their goals, citizens 
express their voice, and elites challenge the new configuration of  
power (Carothers 2013; Lynch 2012; Ottaway 2013; Stepan 2012). 
Democracy, in such a narrow, linear framing, was reduced, in the eyes 
of  one Egyptian analyst, to a ‘boxocracy’ (Ezzat 2013). The outcome 
of  framing democracy from a Western perspective produced new 
disconnects in understanding why people joined a mass uprising in 2013 
in even larger numbers than in 2011. 
A new round of  legislative elections took place in Egypt in December 
2015–early 2016, and once again the ballot box proved to be redundant 
in capturing the pulse of  the citizenry in terms of  the changing political 
preferences of  populations across time. Ten years earlier, former US 
secretary of  state Condoleezza Rice praised the ‘democratic transition’ 
in Iraq where citizens had participated in three national elections 
(CNN 2005). Elections were once again used as a proxy for democracy, 
even when they entailed high levels of  violence and produced highly 
exclusionary outcomes for parts of  the citizenry. Clearly the privileging 
of  elections as a proxy for citizen voice can be dangerous and 
disconnected from contexts in which people are resorting to a myriad of  
ways of  expressing their agency, both violent and non-violent. Whatever 
the political predicament of  the Syrian civil war, let us hope that 
building an inclusive, stable political order is not reduced once more to 
confusing a ‘ballotocracy’ for democracy.
Myth number 7: that more humanitarian aid will contain the Syrian 
refugee crisis
At the top of  Amnesty International’s eight-point plan to address the 
global refugee situation is ‘continuous, sufficient and predictable funding 
for refugee crises’. In Amnesty’s view ‘all humanitarian appeals for 
refugee crises must be fully funded, in addition to providing meaningful 
financial support to countries that host large numbers of  refugees to 
help them provide services to refugees and their host communities’ 
(Amnesty International 2015). A major conference held in London 
in February 2016, hosted by the UK government, urged wealthy 
countries to commit to increase aid for the Syrian humanitarian crisis 
(see Deane, this IDS Bulletin). It is unquestionnable that funding is 
urgently needed to address humanitarian needs, but ultimately there is 
a need to understand that the humanitarian regime is deeply flawed in 
fundamental ways. 
How geopolitical interests systematically trump the wellbeing of  civilians 
lies at the heart of  the redundancy and sometimes harm associated 
with humanitarian policy. Since the beginning of  the Syrian civil war, 
Western actors have time and again prioritised geostrategic interest 
over humanitarian policy, even when humanitarian disasters could 
have been mitigated or addressed in a way that would have benefitted 
the populations in question the most. Former president of  Finland and 
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Nobel Peace Prize winner Martti Ahtisaari argued that the Western 
powers failed to engage with a Russian proposal in 2012 for Assad step 
aside as part of  a peace deal because they were so convinced that the 
Syrian president was about to be toppled. At that time, around 7,500 
people had been killed in the Syrian conflict; by early 2016, the number 
was more than 470,000 (Borger and Inzaurralde 2015; Barnard 2016). 
A high-level official for a multilateral agency that was managing one 
part of  the relief  operation in Syria at the time said that in 2012 he had 
proposed to Western powers that the humanitarian aid effort should 
focus on resettling Syrians who were fleeing the war zone in parts of  
the country where there was no fighting. He explained that investing 
in income-generating opportunities and expanding the capacity of  
local education and health systems in the non-war zones would have 
been far less traumatic for them than to become refugees outside their 
country. However, he said that the Western donors would hear none 
of  it because they feared that investing in regime-held territories would 
strengthen Assad; and besides, they were confident that it was only a 
matter of  months before he was gone.
The Syrian regime has unquestionably committed atrocities that 
amount to crimes against humanity; however, the point here is that the 
execution of  a foreign policy premised on Assad’s overthrow rather than 
a political settlement has not only led to a serious threat to the territorial 
integrity of  the country – parts of  which are under IS control – but 
also the escalation of  a humanitarian disaster unprecedented since 
the Second World War. At a civil society conference that was held in 
parallel to the London conference, the director of  advocacy group The 
Syria Campaign, James Sadri, said: 
Donors are being asked to give [US]$9bn and not a penny of  
that will reach the most vulnerable people in the besieged areas. 
That’s the elephant in the room. If  the biggest UN aid operation in 
history is happening while people are starving to death something is 
fundamentally wrong (Wintour and Black 2016).
The problem is not only that geostrategic priorities trump a people-
centered policy, or that the humanitarian regime needs to be well 
funded, but that it also needs to be fundamentally reconfigured. In this 
IDS Bulletin, Dawn Chatty argues that in establishng refugee camps 
and channelling assistance through these the humanitarian regime only 
reaches a minority of  displaced and dispossesed people, a situation that 
the UN has acknowledged in its estimates that ‘over 70 per cent of  the 
Syrian refugee flow across international borders is self-settling in cities, 
towns and villages where they have long-established social networks. 
Many refuse to register as refugees and so are “invisible” to aid 
agencies.’ Chatty also notes that in the neighbouring countries that are 
hosting the majority of  Syrian refugees – Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey 
– the message that participants in the research conveyed was clear: self-
settlement was far better than encampment. 
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In many of  these surrounding countries, some Syrian families have 
social networks that they can rely on to access income-generating 
activities to survive temporarily until they can return home. The policy 
of  containment in camps that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) manages in Jordan has led to the increased impoverishment 
of  Syrians as it has deprived them of  opportunites to earn a living or 
rely on their networks outside the camps. The refugee containment 
process was so unpopular with refugees, notes Chatty, that UNHCR 
early on resorted to separating extended families to minimise the 
prospects of  protest, waiting until it was dark to allocate tents to them in 
different parts the camp. 
The application of  humanitarian blueprints in Syria based on 
experiences from other parts of  the world has rendered aspects of  the 
aid administration entirely disconnected from the lived realities of  the 
refugees. The Syrians fleeing the crisis are part of  a complex ethno-
religious, middle-income region of  the world, yet the humanitarian 
operations have assumed they have the same background and needs as, 
for example, refugees in sub-Saharan Africa, whose social and economic 
profile is very different. Chatty argues that if  the humanitarian 
regime had listened to the priority needs that dispossessed Syrians 
expressed, it could have adopted measures that made a meaningful 
difference. Undoubtedly some humanitarian actors have listened, but 
Chatty’s analysis shows that where Western humanitarian assistance 
programmes were set up as they were in Jordan and Lebanon, they 
were disconnected from Syrians’ needs and priorities – which is not 
surprising, because they were rarely ever consulted. 
Shelley Deane’s article in this IDS Bulletin on Syria’s lost generation 
notes that the international humanitarian regime has failed to address 
the educational needs of  the 5.4 million children inside Syria, of  whom 
2.1 million are not in school; and, ‘[of] the 1.4 million Syrian refugee 
children in Syria’s neighbouring host states 50 per cent are not in 
school.’ Deane identifies several factors that have contributed to this, 
such as state incapacity to absorb large numbers in host countries, boys 
dropping out of  school (to work to earn a living) and girls also (to marry, 
relieving their families of  an additional mouth to feed and to protect the 
girls’ honour by having a second family that is concerned for their safety 
and security). 
Generations are losing out on schooling, in stark contrast to the pre-war 
education system where 93 per cent of  children in Syria were enrolled 
in schools. Informal educational opportunities and standardised 
curricula, language and leadership training are all needed to address 
the educational gap. However, educational services are piecemeal, 
sometimes inaccessible and often ill fitted to the needs of  Syrian 
children. Moreover, international support for young people to enrol 
in higher education is absent, because it is deemed a low priority for 
humanitarian aid interventions, which focus more on what they perceive 
as the ‘basics’. 
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Myth number 8: that, following the Arab Spring, people’s agency has 
been defeated 
Against the backdrop of  civil wars (Libya and Syria), IS occupation 
(Iraq, Syria), threat of  famine (Yemen), severe encroachments on 
freedoms (Egypt, Turkey), the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict (Palestine), 
and strong ripple effects on neighbouring countries (Lebanon), the 
mood of  optimism around the 2011 ‘Arab awakening’ has waned. In 
Western media, academia and policy circles, talk of  a perpetual ‘Arab 
Winter’ (The Economist 2016; Hinnebusch 2012) has replaced the Arab 
Spring rhetoric. As Jessica Winegar has written in a powerful and 
reflective piece, the Western media currently portrays the region as 
‘just one miserable homogeneous place of  violence, terror, religious 
fanaticism and authoritarianism’. And yet, she adds, ‘what is missing in 
these portrayals is the fact that in an area of  the world with 350 million 
individuals spread across nearly 25 countries, there is not one story. In 
fact, there are positive events everywhere’ (Winegar 2016).
A number of  complex reasons account for the absence of  nuanced 
representations of  the multiple forms of  positive agency that Winegar 
speaks of, and the implications are grave. The negation of  the agency 
of  the multitude has a serious bearing on our understanding of  
pathways of  change, the pulse of  the citizenry, and the dynamism and 
myriad faces of  resistance and defiance. Underpinning the negation 
of  some forms of  citizen agency is a narrow focus only on those forms 
of  activism that directly contest the authority of  regimes and employ 
accepted modalities of  resistance (especially movements that press for 
democracy by holding protests and marches). 
In contrast, when citizens repeatedly organise around issues of  
economic wellbeing and personal safety by blocking roads, refusing to 
leave government premises until their grievances are taken seriously 
or standing silently in front of  their syndicates and unions, holding 
placards with their demands, these forms of  contentious politics are 
often dismissed as irrelevant to processes of  political transformation. 
For example, before the January 2011 uprising in Egypt, much of  the 
literature spoke of  the inertia that characterised Egyptian political 
culture – despite being at a time when people were publicly and 
collectively defying norms of  compliance and subservience (Tadros 2012; 
Ali 2012). If  we examine the plurality of  expressions of  dissent from 
Syrians’ protests in the refugee camps in Atimeh on the Syria–Turkey 
border, to secondary students protesting over educational policies in 
Egypt, we find forms of  political engagement that are fluid, dynamic and 
may have unexpected ripple effects. 
A second important factor contributing to the negation of  citizen 
expressions is normative: when citizens protest against regimes that 
Western democracy ‘experts’ and academics have deemed to be bad, 
their agency is celebrated; whereas when citizens rise up against regimes 
that they consider to be illegitimate, but which in the eyes of  the West 
are ‘democratic’, then the citizens are either condemned or made 
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invisible. Irrespective of  the outcome of  the uprising of  June 2013 
against the Egyptian regime, people had in effect gone out in the hope 
that, by bringing down a president who had failed to deliver on his 
promises, they would bring an end to their deteriorating circumstances. 
Clearly, the political configuration of  power that emerged was hardly 
conducive to the achievement of  the 2011 January uprising’s calls for 
‘bread, freedom and social justice’ – and so much less so the highly 
authoritarian regime that holds power now. 
However, it was a people’s uprising that reinforced Egyptians’ belief  
that they need not acquiesce to a ruler they did not want. Yet because 
the 2013 uprising occurred against a ruler who came to office through 
procedural democracy (elections), the way that many represented the 
revolt against the Muslim Brotherhood emphasised that it was anti-
democratic and had destroyed any prospect of  genuine democracy 
(Fadel 2014). The same normative judgement is at work when Western 
experts criticise Egyptians for not pursuing the path prescribed 
for them; for example, in the claim that ‘the problem with Egypt’s 
revolution is not that it is eating its children; instead many of  its children 
are devouring it’ (Brown 2014). 
A distinct but related myth is that the conspiracy to bring down 
a democratically elected regime that heralded a unique Islamist 
democratic experiment in Egypt has ignited Islamist jihadi activism 
in the region. Such a myth is premised on the notion that by Islamists 
participating in and gaining victory at the ballot box, there was a 
genuine opportunity for democratising radicals who would have faith in 
the system and abandon violence. According to this myth, the sudden 
overthrow of  the Morsi regime catalysed Islamists to pick up arms. 
Ali Bakr’s article in this IDS Bulletin points to the increase in violence 
in 2013 after the demise of  Morsi’s government; however, its detailed 
mapping of  radical Islamist activism shows that movements began 
to flourish as far back as 2011. Following the Arab revolts in 2011, 
against the backdrop of  relaxed border controls, the breakdown of  the 
security apparatus and increased political opportunities for activism, 
radical Islamist movements began to build up their recruits and acquire 
weapons. In other words, it was not in reaction to the downfall of  the 
Morsi regime that jihadists became active; it was at that critical juncture 
when society and politics were being re-ordered that radical Islamists 
sought to instate their own rule and governance. 
At a historical moment when counter-revolutionary forces wish to make 
people’s uprisings invisible, it is critically important to resist defeatist 
narratives that deny the power of  the multitude to challenge political 
orders. The notion of  ‘prefiguration’ is important here. Grounded in 
anarchist theory, prefiguration refers to ‘a political action, practice, 
movement, moment or development in which certain political ideals 
are experimentally actualised, in the “here” and “now”’ (Van De Sande 
2013: 23). Prefiguration offers a lens through which to resist counter-
revolutionary narratives by deconstructing them but also by creating 
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alternative ones. The case of  Rojava is not without its weaknesses, 
problematics and inequalities; however, as Cemgil and Hoffmann 
describe in their article in this IDS Bulletin, it represents a case of  
experimentation with an alternative social, political and economic 
order that seeks to establish more participatory, egalitarian forms of  
governance. By emphasising the power of  people’s ability to challenge 
red lines, and to collectively engage in a common struggle of  liberation, 
the idea of  prefiguration can help us to ‘recognise the value and 
significance of  certain practices which when seen from a ‘chessboard-
perspective’ may not be deemed ‘successful’ or ‘important’ or significant 
at all’ (ibid.: 238); in other words, one of  appraising an action exclusively 
in terms of  its ability to achieve an immediate desired reaction. 
The value of  prefiguration lies not only in challenging counter-
revolutionary narratives, but also in challenging the internalisation 
of  power, empowerment and powerlessness. When citizens see and 
experience the ability to bring down the status quo through mass 
mobilisation, and from that, recognise their own power, it fundamentally 
changes the way they engage with oppression. They may not necessarily 
always revolt through mass demonstrations and protests, but they can 
strategically choose means of  resistance that allow them to transgress 
and defy red lines in significant ways. 
Akram Alfy in this IDS Bulletin exposes ways that youth movements have 
tactically used violence in Egypt since the January 25, 2011 uprising to 
challenge the status quo that has been unresponsive to their demands 
for political and economic reform. He argues that it is not so much 
the existence of  a youth bulge that is a predictor of  violent expressions 
of  agency, but a constellation of  factors, which include the very high 
level of  education that characterises their profile, that is important. 
The structural problem that pre-dates the uprising persists to this day: 
a youth cohort educated to tertiary level is unable to find adequate 
employment in a context where few channels exist by which to hold the 
government to account. They are sure to continue to create their own 
channels to express grievances, even if  they do not necessarily resort to 
violence in the future. 
Authoritarianism may reproduce itself  through the reconfiguration of  
discourses and practices that instil terror and oppression. However, when 
people revolt and bring down political orders, something happens to 
them and this ‘something’ needs to be kept alive because it can serve as a 
perpetual reservoir of  resistance. Without romanticising people’s power, 
there is ultimately a need to challenge the myth that people have reverted 
to complacency, apathy and apolitical engagement, just because they do 
not do politics the way Western democracy experts expect them to. 
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The Syrian Humanitarian Disaster: 
Disparities in Perceptions, 
Aspirations, and Behaviour in 
Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey
Dawn Chatty 
Abstract Humanitarian assistance coupled with an unsustainable policy 
of regional containment have only created greater poverty and misery 
for Syrians fleeing civil war. How this has been allowed to happen on 
the southern shores of the Mediterranean – where extraordinary social 
linkages and networks have existed for centuries – lies mainly in the 
disparities between perceptions, aspirations and behaviour among refugees, 
practitioners and policymakers in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. This article 
highlights in particular three such disconnects: the ahistorical approach 
to engaging with displaced people in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, which 
has led to the implementation of international blueprints of humanitarian 
support that are disconnected from people’s needs; the imposition of an 
encampment policy at odds with displaced people’s need for temporary 
settlement enabled through their own social networks; the redundancy of 
humanitarian practitioners’ background and experience in dealing with the 
particularities of displaced populations in the Eastern Mediterranean, and 
the failure to build on practices that work.
1 From a refuge state to a Syrian mass exodus
In the 100 years between 1850 and 1950 Syria received several million 
forced migrants from the contested borderlands between the Imperial 
Russian and Ottoman Empires. Following three Ottoman-Russian wars 
between the 1850s and 1880s, more than 3 million forced migrants from 
Crimea, the Caucasus and the Balkans entered the Ottoman provinces of  
Anatolia; many continued on their journeys to the Arab regions of  Greater 
Syria. The Ottoman administration established a special commission 
to address the needs of  these forcibly displaced Tatars, Circassians, 
Chechnyans, Abkhaza, Abaza, and other related ethnic groups. 
This ‘Refugee Commission’ – the first of  its kind in contemporary 
Western history – offered incoming forced migrants agricultural land, 
draught animals, seeds, and other support in the form of  tax relief  for 
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a decade, and exemptions from military service (Chatty 2010). Every 
effort was made to help these settlers become self-sufficient in as short 
a time as possible. The administration encouraged integration into 
numerous ethnically mixed settlements of  Greater Syria to promote 
and preserve the cosmopolitan and convivial nature of  urban and rural 
communities in the late Ottoman Empire. By the end of  the nineteenth 
century, Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Hamid II and his subjects came to 
regard providing refuge as not only a social and compassionate gesture, 
but also a religious and moral duty (Chatty 2013).
Then, as the First World War drew to a close, as many as half  a million 
Armenian Christians found refuge in Syria, settling among their 
co-religionists in Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut. When the modern 
Republic of  Turkey was established in 1923, 10,000 Kurds from Turkey 
fled across the border into Syria, choosing to escape from the forced 
secularism of  Kemal Atatürk’s new Turkey. The inter-war French 
mandate over Syria saw a continuation of  these processes, with waves of  
Assyrian Christians entering the country in the 1930s, seeking asylum 
and safety from conditions in Iraq when Great Britain returned its 
mandate to the League of  Nations,1 having failed to secure peace and 
security in the country on its own terms. 
All these forced migrants were granted citizenship in the new Syrian 
state. And then in the late 1940s, Syria became a safe haven for over 
100,000 Palestinians fleeing the Nakba, which was concurrent with the 
creation of  the state of  Israel. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that 
the population of  the modern Syrian state provided refuge for hundreds 
of  thousands, if  not millions, of  ethno-religious minorities uprooted 
from their homelands. Consequently, strong social and economic ties 
were maintained broadly within the region and throughout the Balkans, 
Eastern Europe and borderlands with Russia.
A decade into the twenty-first century, Syria has disintegrated into 
extreme violence, which has triggered a displacement crisis of  massive 
proportions. The speed at which Syria has been emptied of  nearly 
20 per cent of  its population has shocked the world and left the 
humanitarian aid regime in turmoil as agencies struggle to respond to 
the growing displacement crisis on its borders. 
Each state bordering Syria has responded differently to this complex 
emergency: Turkey rushed to set up its own refugee camps for the most 
vulnerable groups, but generally supported people finding their own way 
and ‘self-settling’ in rural areas and urban centres; Lebanon refused to 
allow international humanitarian aid agencies to set up formal refugee 
camps, assuming that the Syrians would self-settle among ‘kith and kin’ or 
use social and economic contacts to find refuge; and Jordan prevaricated 
for nearly a year, before insisting on the establishment of  a massive United 
Nations (UN) refugee camp in the desert borderland between the two 
countries. To be fair, all the states neighbouring Syria assumed this would 
be a short crisis, with the Syrians’ return likely in months rather than years.
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Turkey and Lebanon initially permitted Syrians to enter as temporary 
‘guests’. Lebanon closed this door in 2015, while Turkey has continued 
to allow Syrians to enter the country. Jordan hoped to contain the flow 
of  people seeking refuge far from any urban centre and has insisted 
that all Syrians that the security services intercept crossing the border 
must go to the UN refugee border camp at Za’tari. Failing in that it 
has returned some categories of  people fleeing from Syria (specifically, 
Palestinian refugees from Syria), contrary to international legal 
principles of  non-refoulement.2 
Lebanon and Jordan have not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention that 
sets out principles and responsibilities of  states in providing protection 
and asylum for those deemed to fit the definition of  ‘refugee’ according 
to the 1951 Statutes and the 1967 Protocol. And although Turkey has 
signed the 1951 Convention, it has reserved its interpretation of  it to 
apply only to Europeans who are seeking refuge or asylum in Turkey. 
Hence, refuge in the region is not ‘rights based’, but rather is at the 
mercy of  local cultural notions (institutions) of  hospitality and duties of  
generosity. These customs are known – over time – to also raise parallel 
notions of  hostility and parsimony. Hospitality at either individual or 
state level is never open-ended. 
According to UN estimates, over 70 per cent of  Syrian refugees who 
cross international borders self-settle in cities, towns and villages where 
they have long-established social networks. Many refuse to register as 
refugees and so are ‘invisible’ to aid agencies. This population is not 
served by the international humanitarian aid regime, which is focused 
almost entirely on the camps the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) set 
up in Jordan, and on the larger informal settlements in Lebanon; in 
particular, the Bekaa Valley where the majority of  Syrians previously 
worked as seasonal agricultural labourers. 
The UN does not run any refugee camps in Turkey, although it provides 
some support through partner agencies such as UNICEF and the World 
Food Programme. This is in part political. Previous crises in the region 
have been managed through government structures and without setting 
up refugee camps. For example, with the Iraqi crisis in Syria, the Syrian 
government insisted that all international aid came through government 
channels – and not through the few non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) permitted to operate in the country – and was used for Syrians 
and Iraqis alike. Given that Iraqis refused to go into refugee camps – and 
the Syrian regime did not want to set any up – UNHCR was forced to 
deal with self-settled refugees and members of  their hosting communities 
on an equal basis, which it did well. However, subsequently that has not 
been the case with Jordan, which insisted on setting up camps for Syrians 
– and handing over their administration to UNHCR – fearing that 
otherwise Syrians would self-settle around the country. 
In Turkey, most refugees are clustered in the southern region of  the 
country, including the Hatay, which borders Syria. Some 25–30 per cent 
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of  the Syrian refugee flow into Turkey is directed into camps. The general 
management of  these Turkish government camps is such that a waiting list 
exists for refugees who wish to avail themselves of  the five-star service that 
is reputed to be on offer. In Lebanon, informal settlements – often based on 
pre-existing relationships and ‘gang master’ (shawish) agricultural hierarchies 
– are proliferating, with accompanying patron–client relationships 
overshadowing more participatory and transparent management of  
humanitarian aid. In Jordan, self-settled refugees from Syria are increasingly 
looking for work as they exhaust their savings. Those that the Jordanian 
security services find to be working illegally are deported to Syria or sent to 
the UN-managed refugee camps at Za’tari or Azraq, from which there is no 
escape other than paying to be ‘sponsored’ by a Jordanian, or smuggled out, 
re-entering the liminal state of  irregular status.
2 Mass influx, regionally contained?
Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan have each established a variety of  
temporary measures to deal with the crisis. However, in no case have 
displaced people or host communities been consulted. Discrepancies are 
rapidly becoming visible and tensions and protests have emerged among 
host communities, displaced Syrians and humanitarian policymakers. 
Humanitarian assistance templates created in other regions of  the 
world during waves of  crises in the six decades that UNHCR has been 
operating have not been well received in the region. 
Figure 1 Syrian refugee density and camps in neighbouring host countries
Source Redrawn from http://data.unhcr.org.
Iraq
246,836
Jordan
627,295
Egypt
133,619
Lebanon
1,191,451
Syrian Arab 
Republic
Turkey
1,738,448
Ankara
• Baghdad
Cairo
Beirut
Amman
Less than 500
500–5,000
5,000–15,000
15,000–45,000
45,000–135,000
135,000–415,000
Refugee camp
3,932,931
Refugees and those awaiting registration.
Total includes 24,055 in North Africa.
As at 1 April 2015.
Syrian refugee population density
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 3 May 2016: ‘Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and Beyond’ 19–34 | 23
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Angry demonstrations in Jordan against rules and operating practices 
in Za’tari camp in 2012 led staff to restrict tent distribution until it was 
dark, to disperse extended families widely around the massive camp and 
hence reduce the level of  protest. In fact, UN camps have been rejected 
outright by the majority of  the Syrians fleeing the armed conflict, as 
well as by several neighbouring states. 
As time passes and savings are used up, many of  these Syrians face 
impoverishment. Their added immobility and lack of  local alternatives 
are rapidly creating an unsustainable situation that threatens to test the 
West’s preferred ‘solution’ of  regionally containing the crisis. Without 
significant changes in policy and practice throughout the region, larger 
numbers of  Syria’s forced migrants will shortly leave the region in search 
of  protection – albeit temporary – elsewhere. Unable to work or provide 
their children with an education, they will risk their lives in dangerous 
sea crossings and exhausting land marches led by people smugglers.
3 Research questions
This study sets out to understand the disparity in perceptions, 
aspirations, and behaviour of  refugees from Syria, members of  host 
communities, and practitioners in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. It also 
seeks to identify what measures, if  any, are regarded as important by 
the three target communities for return and reintegration in Syria when 
conditions permit.
3.1 Methodology and methods
The study is based on a multi-site, 12-month qualitative and participatory 
study, which was conducted between October 2014 and September 2015 in 
Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Interviews were conducted in Arabic and in 
English, and interpretation was only required in Turkey when interviewing 
members of  local communities that were hosting refugees from Syria. 
After selecting initial key informants using a purposive sampling approach, 
a snowballing technique was used to identify further participants for 
interview,3 paying attention to representativeness in terms of  gender, class, 
education, ethnicity and origin. A qualitative and interpretive approach, 
alongside a participant observation strategy, also defined this study. 
The study initiated a consultative engagement between practitioners, 
representatives of  hosting communities and the refugees themselves. It 
began with in-country recruitment of  researchers in collaboration with 
the facilitating research institutions: the Swedish Institute of  Istanbul 
in Turkey, American University of  Beirut in Lebanon, and Council for 
British Research in the Levant in Jordan. Fieldwork was divided into 
three phases in each country, each phase one month long: October 
2014 in Istanbul, Ankara and Gaziantep, Turkey; December 2014 in 
Beirut and the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon; and February 2015 in Amman 
and Irbid, Jordan. Each field trip included exploratory informal and 
focused discussions, as well as semi-structured interviews with national 
and international practitioners, self-settled refugees and host community 
members, as well as refugees in camps.
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4 A precarious containment policy and its implications 
4.1 Lebanon
Many Syrians in Lebanon who have been displaced by the conflict in 
Syria do not feel that they are refugees. However, they sense a growing 
level of  social discrimination, especially in Beirut. In addition, they 
expressed their fear that the Lebanese associate them with a rise in 
criminality. Many of  the Syrians in Lebanon were not new to the 
country, but had been working there for many years in the construction 
and agriculture sectors. The conflict in Syria means that many of  these 
workers’ wives and children have fled Syria to join men who have 
been working in Lebanon for some time. They have largely made their 
journeys in stages, first arriving in Akkar or the Wadi Khalid region in 
north Lebanon and gradually making their way to join their spouses in 
the Bekaa Valley, Tripoli and Beirut. Syrian workers fear losing their 
jobs once it becomes known that their families have joined them, and 
this contributes to the fear, distress, and isolation many experience.
My husband came to Lebanon a long time ago, even before the war 
in Syria. He has been coming over since he was 17, therefore he 
knows Lebanon very well. He used come and go, stay for a while 
[working as a carpenter] and then go back to Syria. In 2011 he was 
in Lebanon; then the situation was very bad in Syria, so I came to 
Lebanon… my husband had a job and we stayed at his boss’s house. 
Back then I couldn’t go back to Hama. My husband had no intention 
of  bringing me to Lebanon, for him it was settled that he worked in 
Lebanon and I stayed in Syria. But after all the explosions in Hama, 
I couldn’t protect my kids. I decided to come and stay in Lebanon. 
My husband is always afraid he might be fired [if  the children get 
into any trouble] (Reem, Beirut, 2014). 
Arbitrary curfews – illegal under national and international law – in 
over 40 municipalities have meant that many Syrians are afraid to 
go out at night, work overtime or mix in any way with the Lebanese 
population. For many skilled and unskilled Syrians in Lebanon, the 
curfews have meant that older children and adolescents are taken out of  
school to work during daylight hours with their fathers.
My son should be in ninth grade, but he works in a supermarket now. 
But people tell me that it is a waste that my son is not in school. He 
will have no future without education. But our situation is very bad, 
I really want to send him to school, but at the same time we are in 
deep need and of  his financial help (Layla, Beirut, 2014). 
In the Bekaa Valley, Syrians who have no savings work for very low wages 
to provide their families with food. This has created hostility among local 
Lebanese who see Syrian workers as a threat to their own livelihoods, 
which has resulted in increased social discrimination and vigilantism. 
Many Syrians, despite their long association with Lebanon over decades 
and often close kinship ties, feel frightened and cut off from Lebanese 
(Endnotes)
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society. Although a number of  international and national and local 
NGOs operate in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley to provide basic needs, 
there is little interaction with Lebanese host communities. Very little 
evidence emerged from the interviews of  host community involvement 
in any ‘survival in dignity’4 activity on an individual basis; NGO activity 
was limited to more ‘distant and distancing’ charity work or local 
civil-society efforts in Beirut that middle-class Lebanese and Syrians 
resident in the country organised. 
UNHCR’s very slow response in providing cash assistance to the most 
needy and vulnerable Syrians in Lebanon has led to large numbers 
of  women and children begging in Beirut, something that Lebanese 
generally scorn and regard with little sympathy. UNHCR has expressed 
concern over the rise in begging and has identified it as a ‘negative 
coping strategy’, but UN agencies have made little effort to understand 
how this could be altered through changes in humanitarian policy 
and practice. Many refugees have exhausted their savings and have no 
opportunities to work. Thus, street begging, which is preferred to asking 
for charity, becomes the only way for people to feed their families. 
The consociational5 shape of  government in Lebanon, and the long 
period during the crisis when there was in effect ‘no government’, led to 
a period of  paralysis in the UN humanitarian aid system. Thus, effective 
relief  programmes for the poorest and most vulnerable Syrians – such 
as cash transfers – were very late in getting started, which resulted in 
an exponential rise in begging and other negative coping strategies 
(for example taking young children out of  school to work, moving into 
buildings unfit for human habitation, and relying on former agricultural 
gang masters to be the interface between the UN humanitarian relief  
system and refugees themselves). 
All these factors, with the close ties and often extended family networks 
among the very poor across the two countries, have led to significant 
social discrimination and an unwillingness or inability – at local level 
– to help Syrians with basic health and education needs. The lack 
of  education opportunities for nearly 50 per cent of  Syrian refugee 
children in Lebanon weighs heavily on their families. Some may 
pick a young family member to be smuggled out of  the region where 
employment or education may be possible.
4.2 Jordan
Most Syrians regard Jordan’s initial response to the humanitarian crisis 
and mass influx of  people from the Der’aa region of  Syria into the 
country as open and generous. Most of  these Syrians had kinship ties 
in northern Jordan or well-established social networks, and the hosting 
of  this initial influx was regarded as hospitable. However, over time the 
Jordanian government has restricted access to the country and actively 
prevented some from entering (e.g. young single men) and returned 
others (e.g. Palestinian refugees from Syria). 
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At the beginning you had a refugee crisis with a security component 
and it has become a security crisis with a refugee component. So 
in the early days it was ‘these are our brothers’ and so the natural 
generosity has now give way to more suspicion about who these 
people are and the security cared is played all the time now (Senior 
international practitioner, Amman, 2015). 
A discrepancy has emerged between what local media widely report 
– that Syrians are a burden on the Jordanian economy – and what 
policymakers and practitioners feel is actually occurring. The host 
community in Jordan is bombarded with information about the 
negative influence of  Syrian refugees in the country, but studies are 
emerging that do not back this up. Many policymakers believe that 
Syrians contribute far more to the Jordanian economy than is reported 
or spoken of  in society. Some point to an International Labour 
Organization report6 that suggested that unemployment of  Jordanians 
had not risen since the start of  the Syrian crisis, but actually dropped 
somewhat following the opening of  200 Syrian-owned factories, which 
employed an estimated 6,000 Jordanians.
Syrian refugees are skilled craftsmen, especially carpenters, we all 
know that. Jordanians are not skilled carpenters. Syrians are not 
taking jobs from Jordanians; but they may be taking jobs from 
Egyptians. They are working informally, but that puts a lot of  stress 
on them because they can be arrested and deported if  they are found 
out (Senior Jordanian policymaker, Amman 2015). 
Some social discrimination is aimed at Syrians in Jordan, but it is 
muted compared with that in Lebanon. Jordanians are quieter about 
negative social attitudes they may hold. This may be associated with 
tribal custom and general conceptual concerns related to the social 
requirement to show hospitality to strangers. 
However, Jordanian sensitivity to the presence of  Palestinian refugees 
from Syria has led to draconian surveillance to identify such refugees, a 
dragnet that often pulls in non-Palestinian refugees from Syria. Those 
found to be working illegally are either deported across the border – if  
Palestinian refugees from Syria – or sent to the Azraq or Za’tari camps, 
which creates greater mistrust and suspicion of  the host government 
among refugees.
Jordanians generally recognise that their country benefits from international 
aid from for refugees and that a significant percentage goes into direct 
government projects to assist Jordanians; for example, between 2016–19 
a joint US-Jordanian project will spend US$1bn on infrastructure 
development and the construction of  50 high schools for Jordanians. But 
despite the growing recognition of  the contribution refugees in Jordan make 
to the economy, this is not being translated into policy changes. 
Many Syrians feel pushed into either working illegally and facing 
deportation if  caught, or making the decision to leave Jordan. 
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Education opportunities for refugees are limited, and many Syrian 
children can only attend second-shift schools with inferior curricula 
and reduced hours. Some Syrians consider the situation in Jordan so 
dire that they are preparing to return to Syria rather than live in what 
they consider ‘inhuman conditions’ any longer. According to Andrew 
Harper, a senior UNHCR humanitarian aid practitioner in Jordan, by 
September 2015 at some points nearly 200 Syrians a day were returning 
to Syria (Naylor and Luck 2015). Many travel through Syria to Turkey 
in the hope of  finding a way to Europe where they might be able to 
work, send remittances to their families and educate their children. 
4.3 Turkey
Syrians in Turkey come from a variety of  backgrounds and social 
classes. Many Syrians are concerned with the negative images of  
‘dirty’ and ‘uncouth’ Arabs that middle-class Turks commonly express. 
Furthermore, Syrians have remarked that many Turkish observers have 
difficulty differentiating between the general Syrian refugee population 
and the nawaar (Gypsies).7 The Syrian crisis has displaced Gypsy 
communities in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, and they are commonly seen 
begging on the streets of  Istanbul and elsewhere. Largely unrecognised, 
the armed conflicts in Iraq and Syria have disrupted the peripatetic 
and seasonal economy of  the Gypsies of  south-west Asia, who have 
gravitated to Turkey for its greater security.
Recognition of  the needs of  Syrian refugees was widespread among 
members of  host Turkish communities. But they and Syrian refugees 
themselves widely condemned begging. In the words of  one interviewee: 
‘I don’t like to give money to beggars because it just encourages them’ 
(Turkish practitioner, Istanbul, 2014). 
Lack of  communication and poor understanding of  the situation of  
Syrians led to demonstrations, arrests and the deaths of  around a dozen 
Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees in October 2014. Many Turkish 
citizens felt that greater transparency on the part of  the government over 
what Syrians were entitled to would have relieved a critical situation and 
the growing discrimination. Many thought that the government was giving 
Syrian refugees salaries; others felt that Syrians worked for lower wages – 
their Turkish employers did not have to pay taxes because the Syrians were 
not ‘on the books’ – and this was driving out unskilled Turkish workers, 
who had no safety net when they lost their jobs to Syrians.
Widespread support in the third sector was especially noticeable among 
established NGOs, and Sufi-based civil-society organisations, rather 
than religious ones, which mainly provided hot meals and community-
supported accommodation. In Istanbul as well as Gaziantep, it was 
common for neighbourhood public kitchens to provide free meals and 
bread to the poor, as well as refugees living in the area.
My husband came first and then I joined him eight months later with 
our baby. At first we went to Mersin, but my husband couldn’t find 
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a job. When we ran out of  money we came to Gaziantep, because 
the Syrian Interim Government was here. We figured there would 
be more jobs here. So we came here and two months later we met 
this nice man who found a job for my husband and rented us these 
two rooms. Our neighbours gave us some mattresses and a TV 
to watch Syrian television. There is also a mosque nearby where 
I go and the people there give me diapers [nappies] for the baby, 
bread and daily hot meals, as well as supplies of  sugar, pasta and oil 
(Hala, Gaziantep, 2014). 
Lack of  a common language may have divided people at other 
times, but in the present crisis language seems to be less significant. 
For unskilled work, which is largely what Syrians are engaging in, 
language is not a barrier. Professionals and skilled workers, however, 
have found that it is not language but accreditation that is a barrier 
to working. Many have been unable to practise their professions, in 
particular doctors and health-care specialists until they have proved 
that they qualified outside Syria. But in other cases, being very different 
seems to have bred greater sympathy and general support at the local 
community level. 
In Turkey, lessons learned have been more widely implemented in 
response to critical events, such as the October 2014 demonstrations 
and criticism of  the government’s lack of  transparency. According to an 
International Crisis Group report in April 2013, international experts 
had described the camps that Turkish emergency relief  organisation 
IFAD has set up since in 2012 – without the assistance of  UN experts 
or their camp templates – as ‘five-star’.8 These settlements are open and 
refugees may enter and leave on a daily basis. Absences of  more than 
three weeks at a time are not tolerated, however, because of  the long 
waiting list of  Syrian refugees. 
Interviews in Turkey took place before the government in January 
2015 announced a law to issue Syrians with formal identity cards and 
provide temporary protection, including rights to health and education 
opportunities and permission to apply for work permits. But it was 
clear that Turkey was far more humane and practical in its approach to 
the mass influx of  Syrian refugees than Jordan or Lebanon, and social 
discrimination was at its lowest; and this despite a language barrier that 
does not exist in Lebanon or Jordan. 
Members of  Sufi-based organisations said that it was a religious and 
ethical duty to provide refuge for Syrians in their country. Much of  their 
activity has permitted a form of  local accommodation in Turkey, which 
has not happened in Lebanon or Jordan, despite the closer linguistic 
and social ties. Social cohesion has been strong, which bodes well in 
the event of  the local integration of  Syrians in Turkey, or as a friendly 
and supportive neighbouring state if  refugees ultimately return home, 
depending on the political solution that finally emerges. 
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5 Disconnects, redundant development models and ripple effects
The disparity in perceptions among refugees, members of  local hosting 
communities and practitioners is especially pronounced in Lebanon 
and Jordan, where the international humanitarian aid regime is the 
most active.
5.1 Humanitarian practitioners and the Syrian refugee population profile
Many young international staff have no experience of  the region, some 
coming, for example, from a single previous assignment in Africa. 
The cosmopolitan nature and generally high levels of  education and 
skills of  many of  the Syrians they encounter come as a surprise. The 
engagement of  UN humanitarian frameworks – an architecture of  
assistance – is built on templates developed over the past four decades, 
largely among agrarian and poor developing countries. Thus the 
populations these young international practitioners are used to dealing 
with tend to be largely uneducated and unskilled. Treating them as 
powerless victims of  a catastrophe and setting out the rules for receiving 
assistance generally goes unchallenged. 
Such policy and practice does not fit easily into the countries of  the 
Eastern Mediterranean among a refugee population that is largely 
educated and middle class, and people determined to maintain their 
agency, who prefer, for example, to receive cash assistance, rather than 
food aid. The disbelief  with which young international aid workers 
respond on learning that Syrian refugees are selling their food parcels, 
and the aid workers’ perception of  ‘ingratitude’, can only be explained 
in terms of  this cultural misunderstanding. They expect refugees to be 
passive recipients of  aid, and when they are not the aid workers respond 
negatively towards their efforts to do what they know is best for their 
families. Without a serious effort to make humanitarian ‘solutions’ fit the 
Middle Eastern context, success will continue to be muted at best and 
damaging at worst.
5.2 Temporary protection, not resettlement
It has become clear to most humanitarian aid workers that that self-
settlement is emerging as preferable to encampment. Encampment was 
seen as creating conditions for local accommodation, and potentially a 
return and re-integration into Syria’s many social communities. Lessons 
learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1992–95 war support 
this position (Blitz 2015), when large numbers of  Bosnians were offered 
protection in Europe, and were widely dispersed among local communities 
rather than being enclosed in refugee camps until the crisis was resolved. 
Self-settlement and dispersal throughout Europe on a temporary basis – 
until conditions for return were right – meant that more countries stepped 
forward to take this temporary population. The UK alone took over 
75,000 Bosnians in one year and dispersed them across its cities.
There is a need for local community drop-in centres in the region that 
offer opportunities for non-formal education and technical training. 
Practitioners and refugees regularly suggested skills development, 
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psycho-social support and language instruction as measures to help local 
accommodation and provide a lost generation of  young people with 
a future. Policymakers and humanitarian aid practitioners referred to 
lessons learned from the practice of  setting up drop-in centres in Syria for 
Iraqi refugees as exemplary (Chatty and Mansour 2012). Opportunities 
for education for young Syrian refugees have not been made widely 
available, despite numerous studies pointing to gaps, all of  which has left 
the UN slogan ‘No lost generation’ no more than that: just a slogan.
Temporary protection, not resettlement, is the main aspiration for 
those who have been forced to flee Syria: to be able to work and 
educate their young people until they can eventually return to Syria. 
The temporary protection afforded to nearly 1.2 million Bosnians in 
Europe in a time of  crisis is an example of  what the European states 
can do if  they have the will.
5.3 What are the alternatives? 
It is noteworthy that Turkey, which has not requested assistance from 
UNHCR, seems to have managed the process of  providing assistance 
without undermining refugee agency and dignity. Largely working 
alone, with local staff drawn from the civil service, as well as the Disaster 
and Emergency Management Authority of  the Prime Minister’s Office 
(AFAD) and the main quasi-official Turkish NGO IHH, Turkey has 
managed the Syrian refugee crisis with sensitivity and concern. 
The separate social and political and migration histories of  the 
populations in Turkey and the countries of  the Levant have obviously 
contributed to the disparities in perceptions, aspirations and behaviour 
among refugees, host community members and practitioners in each 
of  the three countries. If  humanitarian policy’s starting point was to 
appreciate which displaced populations have relocated to which parts of  
the Middle East since the 1850s, policymakers and practitioners would 
understand to some extent the nature of  population movements from 
Syria today, as different groups seek to move to where members of  their 
communities have relocated, and capitalise on these ties to survive. 
That the Turkish government has refused to allow the UNHCR to have a 
significant or major role in Turkey, which is not the case in Lebanon and 
Jordan, has also contributed to some of  the disparities noted in this study. 
Whereas Turkey maintained a locally developed response to emergencies 
through its own national management of  refugee camps for Syrians, 
Lebanon and Jordan could not and thus faced having to accept or reject the 
internationally developed humanitarian aid template UNHCR proposed. 
Global templates for humanitarian assistance, built on experiences in 
very different contexts and among populations of  significantly different 
make-up, are not easily integrated into Middle Eastern concepts of  
refuge, hospitality and charity. The close social ties and networks of  
Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan, but not in Turkey (with the exception 
of  the Hatay), have meant that the initial generosity of  relatives hosting 
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refugees in a wide social network has more rapidly given way to hostility 
and discrimination, unlike the situation in Turkey where fewer Syrians 
had social networks and hosts accepted them based on a religious and 
ethical sense of  duty to look after strangers. 
Although Syrians, historically, have accepted wave after wave of  forced 
migrants from the Balkans, the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia, they 
have no experience of  creating camps. Most of  the several million 
forced migrants who entered Syria between the late nineteenth and early 
twenty-first centuries were encouraged to self-settle and disperse themselves 
throughout the country, relying on social ties, faith-based charity – 
particularly from Christian and Sufi associations – and support, in the first 
instance. Encampment was rejected in favour of  small-scale, local assistance 
and refuge. This aversion to encampment was also fed by the profoundly 
disturbing example of  numerous Palestinian refugee camps, which the UN 
set up in their midst over the course of  more than six decades. 
6 Final reflections
Across the board, what emerges is that history matters and that 
humanitarian templates created in other parts of  the world cannot 
simply be laid down in this complex ethno-religious, middle-income 
region of  the world. 
Historically, Syria has been a haven for displaced people fleeing wars 
between the Imperial Russian and Ottoman Empires, for Armenian 
refugees following the First World War, then Kurds, Assyrian Christians and 
later Palestinians. It is ironic that Syria should now be experiencing a mass 
exodus of  its own population, seeking refuge beyond the country’s borders.
Many of  the differences in attitudes and perceptions described in 
this article can be linked to Syria’s historic social ties and political 
relations with Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. In addition, the disparity in 
perceptions among policymakers, practitioners and host communities 
is widespread, but not equally so in the three countries. Many refugees 
and practitioners described steps that the UN and other international 
organisations could take to improve conditions, halt a potential mass 
exodus from the region, and create conditions on the ground for future 
return and reintegration in Syria.
The present situation is unsustainable. Lebanon and Jordan, and even 
Turkey, cannot cope with such high numbers of  refugees – currently 
over 3 million – for much longer; international assistance is insufficient 
to provide refugees with survival in dignity; and local social networks, as 
well as local organisations, cannot afford to help feed and clothe larger 
numbers without support. For example, if  the UK were to take the same 
number of  refugees relative to it population as Lebanon, it would accept 
at least 20 million refugees from Syria (instead of  the 20,000 that the 
government proposes to take over the next four years). 
Without a dramatic change in international humanitarian aid policy and 
programming people will resort to mass flight from the region, by any 
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means necessary, to secure survival in dignity (the opportunity to work to 
feed and educate their families until they can return to Syria), which they 
cannot access in the region. The Russian bombing campaign against 
opposition forces and the Islamic State (IS), alongside the Syrian regime’s 
barrel-bombing of  civilians and IS gains in the countryside, are leading 
to greater outflows of  Syrians, many of  them going directly to Europe. 
The danger continues to be that as long as the discrepancies in 
perceptions and aspirations among refugees, humanitarian practitioners 
and policymakers in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey are not addressed, 
more Syrians will risk their lives making irregular movements to Europe 
in search of  survival with dignity. 
Notes
1 The League of  Nations was founded in 1920 shortly after the First 
World War as an intergovernmental organisation committed to 
maintaining world peace.
2 The return of  alleged refugees to their states of  origin is commonly 
referred to as refoulement. International treaties explicitly prohibit 
this practice; for example, Article 33 of  the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of  Refugees.
3 Interviewees’ names have been changed to preserve their anonymity.
4 UNHCR uses the phrase ‘survival in dignity’ to mean being able to 
access basic necessities such as food, shelter and education for children.
5 Consociationalism is a stable democratic system in deeply divided 
societies that is based on power-sharing between elites from different 
social groups. In Lebanon it occurs between numerous ethno-
religious communities.
6 See www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_242021/lang--en/
index.htm
7 Also referred to as Romani, Rom and Dom.
8 See www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/
turkey/225-blurring-the-borders-syrian-spillover-risks-for-turkey.pdf
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Syria’s Lost Generation: Refugee 
Education Provision and Societal 
Security in an Ongoing Conflict 
Emergency
Shelley Deane
Abstract Education policy is uniquely placed to address the soft security 
concerns of refugee resettlement, with educators equipped to recognise, 
react and respond to the unique education needs and welfare of the Syria’s 
next generation. An appropriate education policy response to the refugee 
crisis can reduce the risk of stigma, isolation, intra-community tensions, 
marginalisation and even radicalisation. The protracted nature of the Syrian 
conflict has directed international donors’ attention to the ‘lost generation’ 
of school-age Syrian refugee children. Governments, international 
agencies and foundations at the fourth Syria donors’ conference in London 
(Supporting Syria and the Region) pledged to fund education projects 
and programmes to bridge the education gap. This article addresses the 
status of formal and informal education in Syrian refugee host states. The 
article examines the factors that shape formal, non-formal and emergency 
education provision, and addresses accelerated learning and best practice 
provision to help the next generation of Syrian refugees thrive.
1 Introduction
Education, described by Aristotle as a refuge in adversity, can be part 
of  the problem or part of  the solution in conflict and post-conflict 
transitions. Since the beginning of  the Syria crisis in 2011, education 
has become a societal security issue. A generation of  Syrian children 
have had their formal education suspended. The protracted conflict 
in Syria has displaced over 6.6 million people and created 4.5 million 
refugees, of  whom 2.1 million are children. The war has rendered 
18 million people in need of  humanitarian assistance, of  whom 
8.1 million are children.1 Of  the 5.4 million children in need of  
education inside Syria, 2.1 million are not in school. Of  the 1.4 million 
Syrian refugee children in Syria’s neighbouring host states, 700,000 are 
not in school.2 The protracted nature of  the Syrian conflict has directed 
international and local organisations’ attention to the ‘lost generation’ 
of  school-age Syrian refugee children. 
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Education policy is uniquely placed to address the societal security 
concerns of  social cohesion, child protection and refugee resettlement. 
Similarly, educators are in a position to recognise, react and respond to 
the unique education and welfare needs of  Syria’s next generation. By 
executing an appropriate education policy response to the refugee crisis 
the risk of  stigma, isolation, intra-community tensions, marginalisation, 
and even radicalisation can be reduced. To that end governments, 
international agencies and foundations have funded education projects 
and programmes to address the education gap and secure support for 
communities caught between humanitarian emergency aid provision 
and the need for long-term development support. For example, in 2013 
the No Lost Generation (NLG)3 initiative was created to support and 
coordinate Syrian refugee host states’ national education responses, 
and to bridge humanitarian and development responses to the crisis. At 
the fourth United Nations (UN) Syria pledging conference in London 
in February 2016, 4 donors promised that by the following year every 
Syrian refugee child would be offered a place in school. 
This article addresses the status of  formal, non-formal and informal 
education5 in Syria and the main Syrian refugee host states (Turkey, 
Lebanon and Jordan) in the context of  the promises made at the 
London conference. The article examines the factors that shape 
education provision for refugees, including insecurity, neglect of  
students and children in refugee communities, and often limited and 
uncoordinated responses of  donors and governments, and considers the 
ramifications for European states planning to host, educate and resettle 
young Syrian refugees. It starts by providing an overview of  the current 
state of  refugee education in Syria and the three main host states, before 
examining basic, secondary and higher education in more detail. It 
makes a number of  recommendations about how to fulfil the promises 
made at the London conference, but also calls for the international 
community to pay far greater attention to the pressing need of  Syria’s 
refugees for improved access to higher education. 
2 Refugee education in Syria and the host states
2.1 Syria
The war in Syria has crippled all state capacity to build the human 
capital that is vital for a sustainable post-conflict economic recovery. 
In Syria itself, the impact of  the war on education provision was 
immediately measureable. In 2011, the Syrian Department of  
Education purchased 6,386,000 one-per-child textbooks for schools. 
By 2013, the number of  books purchased had dropped to 2,378,000.6 
The textbook figures show the speed at which school-age children were 
displaced. According to a 2015 UNICEF report, one in four Syrian 
schools had been damaged, destroyed or procured for military use 
(UNICEF 2015a). Some 80 per cent of  educators remaining in Syria 
are women.7 Often untrained, these women are teaching 2 million 
students using alternative learning modalities, accelerated learning 
programmes and an alternative ‘curriculum B’ for children who have 
missed out on elementary education. School-age children experience 
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multiple displacements, continuous exposure to violence, and economic 
exploitation during successive waves of  population movement. 
Internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees include doubly 
displaced Palestinians, Kurds and Iraqis, as well as Syrians, migrating 
first in search of  safety, then to neighbouring states and, more recently, 
in increasing numbers to Europe, in search of  safety, sanctuary, 
education and health provision. Syria’s neighbouring states of  Turkey, 
Lebanon, Jordan, in addition to Iraqi Kurdistan have absorbed the 
greatest number of  refugees, and attempted to educate refugees in 
double and sometimes triple school shifts, with mixed results. Regional 
fears of  conflict contagion have escalated insecurity in poorer border 
areas in neighbouring states, with limited access to rudimentary 
education, and escalating host community–refugee tensions. The 
varying education responses of  host states demonstrate the role of  
education in societal security provision. 
2.2 Turkey
Turkey shares a 911km border with Syria, and at the beginning of  
the crisis instituted an ‘open door’ policy toward Syrian refugees. As a 
result, Turkey in February 2016 was hosting an estimated 2.6 million 
refugees (registered and unregistered), out of  the total 4,718,279 Syrian 
refugees registered with UNHCR. In 2015, since the beginning of  the 
refugee crisis 159,000 Syrian refugees had been born in Turkey. Of  the 
452,598 refugees of  school-going age, Turkey made education provision 
for 310,000, and committed to enrolling 460,000 Syrian refugees in 
education by the end of  2016 (Erdogan 2015).
While Turkey’s Ministry of  National Education operates under a 
temporary protection mandate, and has eliminated administrative 
barriers for Syrian refugees to access the education system, Turkish 
language instruction is an obstacle for Arabic-speaking Syrians. 
Temporary education centres in Turkey use Arabic as the language of  
instruction based on a modified and limited Syrian curriculum, taught 
by Syrian volunteer teachers. A professional development and support 
programme for teachers has trained 7,000 Syrian volunteer teachers 
on child-centred protective and interactive methodologies, psychosocial 
support and classroom management. The Turkish government prohibits 
payment of  Syrian teachers; instead, standardised incentive schemes 
exist for Syrian volunteer teaching.8 
The volunteer status of  Syrian teachers is one of  the obstacles 
education-focused international non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs) face. Similarly, donors’ insistence on determining the syllabus 
taught to refugees hinders the ability to coordinate education for 
refugees across Turkey; education providers lament the fact that nine 
different syllabi are in operation in Turkey. Despite these efforts, since 
2013 the number of  refugees excluded from education has increased; 
many child and adolescent refugees are unaccompanied, showing a 
demographic shift in the refugee community in Turkey, where women 
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and children are over-represented as young men leave for Europe (Royal 
Institute of  International Affairs 2015).9 As a result of  these obstacles, 
Turkey calculates that 50,000 Syrian refugee children are in need of  
child protection, and better integration mechanisms are needed for 
Syrian children in Turkish schools (UNICEF 2015b).
2.3 Lebanon
In Lebanon 50 per cent of  6–14 year olds are in formal education in 
public and private schools. Of  the 755,000 refugees in need of  education, 
377,000 (Syrian, Palestinian and Lebanese returnees from Syria) are 
targeted for support, 158,000 refugees have been enrolled in public schools, 
with provision made for 200,000 (UNHCR 2015).10 The challenge of  
meeting the needs of  refugees lies in existing public school provision, which 
the Lebanese Ministry of  Education and Higher Education (MEHE) 
acknowledges. Its Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) plan is an 
attempt to meet this challenge. Official MEHE figures state that 30 per cent 
of  Lebanese children attend public schools, although this overestimates the 
actual number of  Lebanese children in public schools. 
Lebanon’s languages of  instruction (Arabic, French and English) 
compound the learning challenge for the small minority of  Syrian 
refugees currently in formal education. In Lebanon, English and 
French are taught as second languages, and the language of  instruction 
for maths and science is either French or English. In Syria, English 
and French are taught as foreign languages rather than second 
languages. Limited public education provision and language challenges 
notwithstanding, Lebanon’s education provision for Syrian refugees 
imposes ever-increasing strains on the resources of  the state. 
To address this demand, 239 public schools currently operate in 
double shifts, with Lebanese children attending school in the morning 
and, where possible, Syrian refugees attending in the afternoon, at a 
cost of  US$600 per child, funded by the international community. 
Increasingly overworked teachers grapple with problems of  language 
of  instruction and broader security protection issues concerning refugee 
children. Lebanese Education NGOs have wisely rejected informal (and 
unpublicised) proposals that some INGOS have proposed to institute 
triple shifts, which would require refugee children to go to school in the 
evenings and place even greater demands on Lebanese teachers.11 
Syrian refugee children receive subsidised formal education in 
Lebanon’s numerous private schools, and some of  the 205 informal 
settlements across Lebanon provide non-formal education (NFE). 
Facilities in informal schools are often limited: in one informal 
settlement ‘school’12 in the Bekaa Valley, where only 36 per cent of  
refugee children attend school, one toilet serves 250 elementary school-
age children, their parents and teachers. However, refugee preferences 
for informal schools reveal inter-communal tensions, and a response to 
peer-to-peer violence in double-shift schools. Refugee settlement schools 
understand that boys, sometimes as young as eight years old, are often 
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the sole breadwinner for their families, and hence need to work rather 
than attend classes. Refugee parents’ preferences for informal settlement 
schools that teach a Syrian curriculum stem from a perception that 
Syrian teachers will understand refugee needs better and will also be less 
likely to discriminate against refugee children. 
Lebanese initiatives to further regulate education for refugees can create 
unforeseen obstacles. For example, efforts to transport refugees from 
informal settlements to public schools not only incur transportation 
costs, but also have an impact on protection perceptions for refugee 
families. Non-formal schools in informal settlements allow girls to attend 
classes close to their family residence. Lebanese government proposals 
to transport refugee children outside settlements to public schools 
threaten to discourage refugee families from allowing girls to attend 
public school. In Lebanon, 20 per cent of  refugee heads of  households 
are women, who often opt to keep their female children close. By 
requiring refugee girls to travel a distance to attend public schools, new 
education initiatives, in turn, have an impact on protection and security 
concerns for refugee girls and young women. 
NFE provision in informal settlement schools in Lebanon serves as a 
platform for greater education, protection, WASH (water, sanitation and 
hygiene) and food distribution provision for refugees. Strict regulation 
of  refugee education provision would require greater coordination of  
supplementary services to address the needs of  Syria’s most vulnerable 
refugees and their host communities in Lebanon’s Akkar and Bekka 
Valley regions. To bridge these gaps, Lebanon has developed an 
accelerated learning programme to provide children (aged 7–17 years) 
who have been out of  school for more than two years with a condensed 
Lebanese curriculum, which will allow them to integrate into public 
education in Lebanon.
In February 2016 Lebanon committed to securing quality education 
for all children aged 3–18 years with the RACE plan. Under the 
2015/16 enrolment campaign, the MEHE has provided formal 
places for 200,000 Syrian children in public schools. Lebanon is now 
accelerating its targets to meet the London conference goal to enrol 
all children aged 5–17 years in education by the end of  the 2016/17 
school year. Lebanon seeks to provide early childhood education for 
all children aged 3–5 years. A subsequent plan (RACE II) seeks to go 
beyond opening the doors of  public schools to all children, by ensuring 
that Lebanese public schools achieve high learning standards through 
curriculum reform, expansion of  access, regulation of  NFE, and 
improved access to youth, vocational and technical training for young 
people aged 15–24 years. The cost of  educational reform for Lebanon 
is estimated at US$1.75bn over five years. 
2.4 Jordan
Of  the 635,324 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, 50 per cent are 
under 18 years of  age, and 50 per cent are women. Jordanian officials 
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determine that 7 per cent of  Syrian refugee children are at risk, and 
203,264 are in need of  child protection services. In Jordan, only 18 
per cent of  Syrian refugees live in the refugee camps at Za’tari, Azraq, 
and Mrajeeb Al Fhood (Supporting Syria and the Region 2016). For 
Syrian refugee children in Jordan, many of  whom come from Daraa 
in southern Syria, literacy is the greatest education challenge. To meet 
this need the Jordanian Ministry of  Education concentrates its efforts 
on basic education provision for grades 1–10 (ages 6–15) for Syrian 
refugees. 
According to estimates, in February 2016 130,000 Syrian refugees were 
in the Jordanian school system, but at least 90,000 were not in school.13 
Public schools in refugee camps operate a double-shift system, and use 
Syrian teaching assistants to help Jordanian teachers. In cities with large 
refugee populations, such as Irbid, for example, the double-shift process 
escalates tensions between Jordanian students attending the 0700–1400 
morning shift and Syrian refugees attending the second shift 1400–1700 
in the afternoon. Teachers supervise shift transitioning to mediate 
tensions between the Jordanian host community and refugee pupils, 
because tensions have been known to escalate into confrontation and 
even fighting.14 To accommodate the demands of  a double shift, lessons 
are shorter and teachers work longer hours. The strain on teachers and 
students is palpable. Teachers note that the education of  all of  their 
charges, Jordanians and Syrians alike, is suffering.
Existing legal and admission regulations often prohibit Syrian refugee 
children from accessing formal education in urban areas where the 
majority of  refugees live. In February 2016, 30,000 Syrian refugee 
children were attempting to access the Jordanian school system. 
Successful non-formal and informal education options involving art, 
play, sport and drama are available, funded by independent charities 
and INGOs. Similarly, foreign donors often fund vocational training 
and technology courses for Syrian young people in Jordan, beyond the 
auspices of  the host government. 
In emergencies a greater onus is placed on non-formal and informal 
education, often without ministerial oversight, is a cause of  concern 
for the Jordanian government. The Ministry of  Education has made 
repeated calls for greater coordination and collaboration, particularly in 
NFE provision for refugees, highlighting the broader issue of  education 
funding and differing donor priorities. The Makani (‘My space’) 
informal integrated education system provides numeracy, literacy, 
English and science classes to Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian 
children.15 The Accelerating Access to Quality Formal Education plan 
is the Jordanian response to remedying the education gap for Syrian 
refugees and vulnerable host Jordanian children. The plan seeks to 
implement the promise of  a place for every Syrian refugee child in 
formal education in Jordan in 2016/17, and is expected to cost up to 
US$1bn over three years. 
(Endnotes)
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3 Towards a school place for every Syrian refugee
Despite research highlighting the importance of  education provision in 
emergencies, historically it has been a second-order priority in conflict 
and post-conflict contexts. Conflict-affected states spend far below the 
recommended levels of  national income on education. In 2012, just 
3.2 per cent of  conflict-affected states’ national income was spent on 
education, when the global average is 5 per cent. Doubling the percentage 
of  young people in secondary education from 30 to 60 per cent has 
the potential to halve the risk of  conflict. When education inequality 
doubles, the probability of  conflict more than doubles from 3.8 per cent 
to 9.5 per cent, and yet education projects receive only 1.4 per cent of  
global humanitarian funding. This represents a decrease from 2.3 per 
cent in 2010. The globally agreed figure for minimum spending towards 
education in humanitarian aid is 4 per cent which represents a shortfall in 
education funding of  2.6 per cent (UNESCO 2015). 
Moreover, historic education providers (UNICEF, Save the Children) 
have changed their focus to concentrate on child protection rather than 
education, because education provision is too difficult to monitor and 
evaluate in keeping with traditional government donor requirements. 
For their part, existing education initiatives, such as accelerated learning 
programmes, basic literacy and numeracy, catch-up programmes, remedial 
classes, and including the NLG initiative, tend to overlook the long-term 
strategic and security ramifications of  large-scale population displacement. 
Donor responses to the Syria crisis have left the provision of  education 
for refugees to the generosity of  host state governments. When first 
tasked with shouldering the education burden of  refugees, governments 
anticipated that UN agencies would assist in covering extra costs 
(Watkins 2013). In 2016, the UN agencies must not only assist the 
commendable efforts of  the host states in the task of  educating refugees, 
but also help to protect the education systems of  the increasingly 
overburdened host states. 
In this context, the February 2016 London conference marked a 
watershed in international recognition of, and the response to, the 
refugee education crisis. At the conference, donor states sought to meet 
the Oslo Summit on Education and Development’s call for a global 
education emergency fund of  US$4.8bn (Oslo Summit 2015) to meet 
the financial challenge to educate children in conflict. By devising new 
financial instruments, and a new global education emergency fund, 
donor pledges at the London conference have started to meet the 
financial response to special envoy Gordon Brown’s call to establish the 
goal of  ensuring that every Syrian refugee child continues in education. 
The international donors’ pledges will help support strained host state 
education ministries, and allow new initiatives to draw on successful 
NFE initiatives. Created in response to the Syria crisis a proliferation of  
NFE initiatives operate across Syria and in refugee host states to meet 
the pressing and widespread challenges that out-of-school children 
face. NFE initiatives for IDPs in Syria and refugees in neighbouring 
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states are united by a shared objective to seek equity in education for 
displaced, disadvantaged and refugee children.
Conflict and dislocation mean that many Syrian IDP and refugee 
children have no formal education, or prior learning. Formal education 
provision is unavailable to many refugee children because of  issues 
of  supply, cost, certification and access. As a result, unregulated NFE 
initiatives have been largely successful because the learning support 
and instruction provided, usually by small local and foreign NGOs and 
charities, adapts education instruction to the ever-present challenges 
and testing realities of  a refugee child’s experience. 
Successful NFE programmes are child focused. Most programmes 
integrate music, art, play, sport or storytelling into conventional literacy, 
numeracy and language classes to assist children with education and 
play, many of  whom have been or are exposed to conflict and violence 
and display signs of  psychosocial trauma. Children often withdraw 
socially, while conversely others tend to act out in class. Some students 
refuse to talk and need to be encouraged to engage in play-driven 
learning. In one NFE location, when bilingual Arabic-English children’s 
books were being distributed to refugee children, the teacher expressed 
surprise when a child who had not spoken in class before volunteered to 
read the book in English to the whole class.16 Engaging in English rather 
than in Arabic facilitated a new route to communication. 
In addition, NFE programmes also tend to integrate health and hygiene 
education, often by the simple virtue of  housing the most accessible 
WASH facilities for children. NFE programmes are often housed 
in buildings or shelters that only offer rudimentary protection from 
the weather, but children are made to feel at home by painting and 
drawing on plywood-sheet walls, or in one memorable instance, on 
the papers covering glassless window frames. Children learn to share 
limited materials and resources where necessary. In one ‘science lab’ 
in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon an instructor explained the principles 
of  momentum, velocity and force with a child’s toy car and an elastic 
band; the children in the instructor’s charge were transfixed, as were 
many of  the researchers.17 
Desks in classrooms are rarely empty and children often sit in fours 
rather than in conventional twos for warmth in winter. Refugee children 
regularly cry, but are promptly comforted by their peers and teaching 
instructors alike. Far greater affection is visible among children and 
teachers than is the norm in formal education settings. Issues of  space 
and insufficient teaching support often result in children with physical 
and learning disabilities being educated side by side with their peers.18 
In these instances children often compete to help their more vulnerable 
friends. In NFE environments children appear to benefit from an 
unexpected ‘bonding through adversity’ effect in a way that children in 
formal education settings do not. 
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Child refugees often engage in seasonal work, which leads to difficulties 
retaining male pupils in the formal education sector, which UNHCR 
student retention figures show. Where schools tend to penalise students 
for absence, NFE makes greater provision for pupils missing class time.19 
By accommodating absences and working students, NFE adapts to the 
needs of  refugees, making its provision all the more important. One of  
the criticisms of  existing NFE provision in refugee camps and informal 
settlements is the lack of  formally qualified educators and teachers. The 
majority of  NFE educators are female, and while they may not possess 
formal teaching qualifications, many have attended university only to 
have their studies cut short by the war. 
Among Lebanese education charities, educators are often dual-nationals; 
many have a Syrian parent, and a Lebanese or Jordanian parent. NFE 
instructors live in the informal settlements and are refugees themselves. 
As a result, NFE educators, who are paid less than teachers in formal 
education, are often best placed to advocate for the needs of  refugee 
children. In addition, NFE educators can promptly identify gaps and 
share insights into techniques, mechanisms and processes to best help 
refugee children. While no resource or vocation is wasted in the NFE 
sector, successful programmes are often limited by scale and access to 
resources. As a result, despite their effectiveness, small NFE programmes 
are often absorbed by larger INGOs that have greater access to funding 
and, importantly, because donors require a programme delivery 
infrastructure, which smaller education-oriented NGOs often lack. 
Informal education mechanisms, including community-based 
homework support groups, operate in refugee camps, settlements and 
urban areas. Well aware that it is not an option to delay education 
while waiting for development, 18,000 parents in Lebanon share their 
knowledge and assist vulnerable Syrian refugee children with their 
homework in their own homes.20 Community-based NFE initiatives 
form the basis of  emergency education bridging programmes that help 
vulnerable students to learn, by supporting basic literacy and numeracy 
for children most at risk. Homework support groups have proved 
invaluable for improving school attendance rates for hard-to-reach 
refugees in urban areas. 
The Syria crisis has created an education emergency. A flourishing 
NFE sector has emerged in response. In turn, Syria’s neighbouring 
governments are trying to standardise NFE to create a uniform 
pathway to formal public education access. For example, as part of  
the commitment to education of  donors at the London conference, 
Lebanon’s RACE plan commits the education ministry to ensuring 
that all children in Lebanon have access to quality formal and non-
formal learning opportunities in a safe and protective environment. The 
Lebanese government will implement this promise by adopting existing 
good-quality programmes that work and making sure everyone follows 
the same standards, regardless of  service provider, location, nationality 
or socio-economic status. 
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Education ministries are beginning to advocate greater technical and 
operational coordination between formal and non-formal education, with 
the aims of  ensuring appropriate supervision and monitoring of  NFE 
delivered to children, and validating and accrediting learning achievement 
in NFE. New oversight mechanisms are being created to effectively 
authorise, supervise, monitor and coordinate NFE programming with 
any authorised legal entity providing NFE programmes. In so doing, 
neighbouring host state governments are beginning to respond to the new 
education initiatives, acknowledging NFE programming mechanisms and 
seeking to replicate and formalise NFE provisions. 
Lebanon is one of  the first of  the education ministries in the region to 
institute new national standards and validation processes for NFE and 
to introduce regulatory mechanisms to bridge the existing gaps between 
formal and non-formal education. New proposals for child-focused 
pathways propose to emphasise early learning and school readiness for 
children aged 3–5 years, before joining Grade 1 of  formal education: 
For children aged 6–15 years, corresponding with the compulsory 
school age in Lebanon, NFE programming is required to support 
children to reach a grade of  formal education appropriate to their 
age. For adolescents and youth aged 16–18 years, NFE is designed 
to either support re-enrolment in formal Secondary or vocational/
technical education, or to support young people to reach a minimal 
level of  functional literacy and numeracy (MEHE 2016). 
The MEHE seeks to integrate existing NFE programmes as a pathway 
towards formal public school education for all younger children, and 
towards vocational training for older children. The new objective of  the 
NFE initiative in Lebanon is to map how children might move through 
NFE programmes to join formal public education, or for adolescents 
and young people to move through NFE to further formal education or 
other learning opportunities. 
Effective implementation of  these new policies will require greater 
coordination between education donors and stakeholders at local, 
regional and national levels, with training and monitoring of  NFE 
programmes. Greater geographical coordination is being considered to 
ensure provision of  spaces in formal public schools (first/second shift 
and secondary) within a reasonable distance of  NFE service points for 
each child of  compulsory school age (6–15 years) and upper-level age 
(16–18 years) enrolled in NFE programming. The ‘School-in-a-Box’ 
initiative21 provides materials for pupils in public schools, with each child 
in first and second shifts receiving necessary learning materials. 
The MEHE will address long-standing challenges surrounding 
accreditation to ensure singular standardised child assessments with 
accreditation; in addition, greater scrutiny of  pilot activities and strategies 
to scale up successful programmes are planned. A series of  action plans 
are scheduled to standardise each of  the NFE programmes. These action 
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plans are designed to create continuity in service provision between NFE 
and formal public education, so that out of  school children can progress 
through NFE programmes into appropriate grades of  formal public 
schools. Regulatory responsibility – to ensure that all delivered NFE 
services are of  good quality and aligned with international standards, 
including INEE (Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies) 
standards, and taking into consideration national standards – lies with the 
host governments. To that end, educators, bureaucrats and institutions 
alike would welcome initiatives to support further training, and 
certification of  NFE instructors and educators.
Certifying NFE instructors and recognising the qualifications of  Syrian 
teachers working as assistant teachers in Jordan and Turkey would 
temper the frustrations expressed by well-qualified and experienced 
Syrian teachers, who must report to sometimes junior teachers in the 
host state. The frustrations of  the Syrian assistant teachers and host 
community teachers may partially account for the number of  violent 
incidents between teachers and students that NGOs report. It may also 
account for the numbers of  young, disillusioned refugee NFE instructors 
who decide to seek refuge elsewhere because of  the conditions and 
hardships they face in camps and urban areas.22 
UNHCR protection and education officers and NGO staff repeatedly 
referred to instances of  teacher violence in classrooms and the need 
for greater training of  teachers to curb peer-to-peer violence and 
teachers’ violence against pupils in refugee classrooms. In addition, they 
highlighted the need to provide teachers with psychosocial training to 
assist in the identification of  children suffering from post-traumatic stress 
and manage classroom discipline effectively. Similarly, in interviews 
and direct observation with teachers in schools, the degree of  prejudice 
and discrimination some educators directed at Syrian children vividly 
illustrated the cost of  conflict and accompanying strain on resources, 
resilience and inter-communal relationships.23 A number of  NGOs have 
called for greater teacher training in classrooms to help teachers better 
manage students with post-traumatic stress disorder. Creating certified 
education and training opportunities for NFE instructors and Syrian 
refugee teachers would build community resilience and counter the trust 
deficit between host and refugee communities. 
4 The tertiary education crisis
Education initiatives in conflict and post-conflict contexts typically focus 
almost exclusively on basic and secondary education; higher education 
is rarely even considered. The Syrian United Nations Development 
Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2007–11, for example, does not 
mention higher education nor does it plan for higher education initiatives 
(UNDAF 2006). Similarly, tertiary education provision did not feature at 
the London conference, despite the emphasis on refugee education.
The gravity of  the Syria crisis is such that higher education provision 
for refugees is not a priority for emergency relief, humanitarian 
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provision or development support. Higher education is also deemed 
beyond the remit and scope of  designated ministries and international 
agencies. UNHCR is primarily tasked with humanitarian assistance 
and emergency relief, not development. UNICEF is concerned with 
the welfare of  children and women, and UNESCO is mandated to 
address the quality of  education provision rather than building schools. 
Combined, these agencies, in association with the World Health 
Organization and UN Economic and Social Commission for Western 
Asia, could coordinate the higher education response in the longer 
term, but there is currently little such collaboration. 
A related problem is the absence of  reliable information on refugee 
higher education needs, because very little attention is paid to the 
higher education and training needs of  refugees. Tertiary education 
information does not guide the allocation of  resources and mandates 
across international organisations tasked with addressing emergency 
relief. Among humanitarian service providers in the host states, there 
is little understanding or knowledge of  the size, need or distribution of  
Syrian refugees aged 18–24, many of  whom have had their university 
studies interrupted. 
According to the first higher-education survey research that began 
to address some of  these issues, which the International Institute for 
Education (IIE) conducted in April 2013 in Za’tari camp in Jordan, 
humanitarian aid and higher education officials said that there were 
no university students at the Za’tari refugee camp (Watenpaugh and 
Fricke 2013). But for every two Jordanian teachers in Za’tari, there is 
approximately one Syrian assistant teacher. Syrian assistant teachers 
are often university students who have had their university education 
interrupted by the war. The IIE researchers found only 17 students in 
the camp who were willing to speak to them. 
In September 2013 the UNHCR Youth Task Force (YTF), along with 
the Norwegian Refugee Council, conducted a study to document the 
number of  young people aged 15–24 in Za’tari camp, in response to 
the possibility of  a scholarship programme for Syrian students. The 
findings showed a total number of  292 tertiary-age students in Za’tari.24 
The figure is far from exhaustive, but nonetheless reflects the number 
of  young people with skills in law, languages, English and teaching 
accessible in Za’tari through the activities of  the YTF. 
There are important reasons why tertiary refugee education should 
receive greater international attention and support than it does 
presently. First, higher education is critical to the building of  human 
capital. The long-term future of  Syria lies in the ability to regenerate its 
human capital and encourage its now displaced and refugee population 
to return home once the conflict ends. Human capital affects growth 
directly, and indirectly when working in conflict-affected environments. 
Education can improve legal, economic and political institutions, which 
are conducive to growth. Individuals with tertiary education typically 
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earn higher incomes than those who begin work immediately after 
completing secondary school. The London conference reiterated the 
strong correlation between tertiary education returns, training and 
work-based learning, and the quality of  legal, economic and political 
institutional factors.25 The better the institutional environment, the 
greater the productivity of  highly educated people; fostering higher 
returns in schooling encourages more capable people to complete 
tertiary education. This in turn creates momentum for human capital 
accumulation, and consequently for growth (EBRD 2013). Syria’s 
human capital currently resides with its refugee diaspora, rendering 
higher education provision for talented refugees an imperative for Syria. 
Secondly, higher education provision and training can support an 
existing security platform that provides the university as a semi-public 
place of  assembly for students, and as a platform for mitigating tensions, 
and a mechanism for security protection. Higher education provision 
can begin to map the numbers and needs of  Syrian refugee students 
and academics, and act as a bellwether for measuring the societal 
impacts of  refugees and host communities. In shaping state and non-
state actors’ responses and responsibilities, higher education provision 
creates scope for identifying policies that bolster the resilience of  states, 
refugees, INGOs, agencies and host communities. Moreover, education 
and appropriate skills training provide supporting or resilience 
mechanisms for mitigating the risk and effects of  conflict as well as 
of  economic recession. States with a higher education base are more 
resilient to political and economic shocks. Higher education combined 
with sufficient training provision can counter the destabilising influences 
of  conflict-affected economies. 
There is also, thirdly, an important gender dimension to higher 
education. Syrian women outnumber men in tertiary enrolment, 
though this trend is not reflected in employment figures. High fertility 
rates, limited affordable child care, cultural norms that require the 
permission of  male family members before accepting employment, 
the mismatch between female skills and the demands of  the labour 
market, and gender-based gaps in remuneration, shape women’s 
participation in the workforce. Where possible, women are more likely 
to secure paid employment in the public sector than the private. Where 
impossible, women are more likely to leave education to marry early, 
and are more susceptible to gender-based violence, sexual exploitation 
and early pregnancy. Greater education provision for women mitigates 
early marriage and early pregnancy. Redressing the scarcity of  women 
teachers among Syrian refugee communities is necessary to harness a 
greater role for women in the provision of  education and harness the 
capacity of  education in the interests of  child protection and security. 
From the beginning of  the Syrian crisis, Syrian students have expressed 
a desire to complete their studies abroad, in other Arab states, the 
United Kingdom or the United States. However, without access to 
UNHCR-administered DAFI programme26 and similar scholarships, 
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visa requirements and costs were deemed to be prohibitive. The refugees 
who are seeking to return to education that are most at risk lack access 
to stable resources and are struggling to meet their basic needs. For more 
fortunate refugee students currently in tertiary education in Jordan and 
Lebanon, access to external sources of  funding is usually found among 
family members in the diaspora. For refugees without financial support 
from diaspora family abroad or Syrian diaspora change agents options 
are limited.27 Without external support, skilled students are subject to 
exploitation. For example, criminal gangs in Lebanon and Jordan coerce 
and co-opt students with chemistry backgrounds to engage in drug 
production. Creating opportunities for skills-based academic training for 
refugees is critical for the refugee generation. Postponing training and 
scholarship decisions in the short term increases the likelihood that Syria’s 
refugees may become part of  a permanent diaspora in the long term. 
The need for language and vocational training is particularly strong. 
Among the Syrian refugee population of  tertiary age in Lebanon, 
urban and rural, accelerated language courses are the most pressing 
need identified after surveying scholarship donors and providers across 
Lebanon (Brehon Advisory n.d.). Language courses are in equal 
demand for Syrian students in Turkey and Jordan. The provision of  
language courses is prohibitive due to course costs, travel restrictions 
and costs, and, critically, space for classes. All existing school and 
learning-friendly spaces are occupied in urban areas, because the 
majority of  schools have second shifts of  secondary school classes to 
accommodate Syrian refugees late into the evening.
Pearson Education and the British Council provide online English 
language and literacy programmes, as well as online British Technology 
and Education Council national diploma courses in their ‘passport 
for work’ initiative,28 which allows students to take a series of  modules 
to gain an internationally recognised qualification (IPPR 2013). 
Documentation requirements that restrict refugees from accessing 
university courses can be addressed by taking coursework-based 
diploma courses. Teaching refugee students skills that they can use 
for a trade or profession is increasingly problematic in Lebanon and 
Jordan without complementary legislative changes to allow refugees 
greater access to work. Online courses and virtual mechanics courses 
are innovative alternatives for refugee students. Greater access to online 
academic courses and training programmes, such as technical and 
vocational education and training courses (Oxford Refugee Studies 
Center 2014) democratises knowledge and access, and signals the 
beginnings of  an ‘education passport’ opportunity for refugees whose 
physical movements are restricted by law, licence or finance.
5 Conclusions
In conflict-affected states, education is a means of  socialisation and 
identity development; education is critical for inclusive post-conflict 
state-building, and the absence of  education is often instrumental in 
narrow ideologically driven and exclusive nation-building efforts. 
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Typically, refugee children in conflict crises spend at least 17 years 
in exile, often missing out on essential formal education. Conflict 
and prolonged dislocation negatively affect literacy rates. The 
unprecedented exodus of  people that the Syrian conflict has displaced 
will resonate beyond the next generation if  initiatives fail to address the 
escalating instability and associated crises of  a generation of  children 
and young people with limited literacy, language and formal education. 
Any education initiative to fill the knowledge gap must encourage 
greater provision for institutional learning and acceptance of  the 
refugees among host communities.
The diminishing numbers of  young male Syrian refugees finishing 
school, coupled with the lack of  appropriate educational and 
foundational skills provision, contributes to the regional employment 
crisis. Syria’s human capital – defined as the accumulated stock of  
education, knowledge and skills – is dislocated, dispersed and currently 
virtually unaccounted for. Syria’s protracted conflict undermines efforts 
to build the human capital that is vital for future economic sustainability. 
The long-term education, employment and security ramifications 
of, in effect, losing a generation of  Syrians is well understood. Yet, 
coordinated 12- and 15-week accelerated NFE learning programmes 
can enable refugee and conflict-affected students to bridge the learning 
gap and flourish in formal education. Equally important to long-term 
education provision is the need for a similar pathway for refugees to 
access tertiary education. Accelerated certification recognition, visa 
provision and language training will not only help individual refugees 
pursue their interrupted education, but would also help foster globally 
recognised accreditation by facilitating greater academic exchange 
between higher education institutes in the region, and overseeing the 
development of  regionally and internationally recognised degrees. 
In short, the education deficit among Syrian refugees will undoubtedly 
have profound negative impacts for economic growth and regional 
security in the future. Addressing this deficit is not only a duty in and of  
itself, because education is a fundamental human right, but, crucially, 
the provision of  high-standard, good-quality education is also of  critical 
importance to the building of  a post-conflict Syria, and the long-term 
stability, security and economies of  its neighbouring states. 
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10 November–December 2015 Monthly Educational Sectional 
Dashboard UNHCR http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/
working_group.php?Page=Country&LocationId=122&Id=21 
(accessed 4 February 2016).
11 Interviews with Lebanese education charities, MED Dialogue, Rome, 
10–12 December 2015.
12 In Lebanon, unregistered informal schools are not referred to as 
‘schools.’
13 Jordanian education charity official, Education Working Group, 
Supporting Syria and the Region conference, London, 3 February 2016. 
14 Interviews conducted during school visits, Al-Qadeseyeh school, 
Irbid, Jordan, November 2014. 
15 Education Working Group, Support Syria, London Conference, 
3 February 2016; see also www.unicef.org/jordan/overview_10143.html.
16 Author’s bilingual book distribution to refugees with Brehon 
Advisory and monitoring and evaluation review with informal school 
teachers, May 2015.
17 Author’s bilingual book distribution to refugees with Brehon 
Advisory, December 2015.
18 Of  the 72 public schools in Lebanon rehabilitated in 2015 to 
meet safety and WASH needs, only seven schools are equipped to 
accommodate children with special needs. 
19 Interviews with UNHCR staff and empirical evidence note that 
young males are conspicuously absent from schools. 
20 Repeat interviews with UNHCR education officers.
21 This is a UNICEF initiative in origin, but is run with UNHCR; see 
www.unicef.org/supply/index_40377.html
22 Refugees and aid agency staff expressed these opinions, lamenting 
the return to Syria of  refugees who were contributing to their NFE 
programmes. When Syrian assistant teachers returned to Syria, 
students suffered the loss of  the teacher and took time to adapt to a 
new assistant. Interviews with NGOs in Jordan working in Za’tari 
camp, 10 November 2014. 
23 Author interviews conducted over three years and school visits 
between 2013 and 2016 in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.
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24 Author interviews with NRC staff Amman, January 2014 and Za’tari 
camp education officers, November 2014.
25 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Meeting, 
Supporting Syria and the Region conference, London, 4 February 
2016. 
26 The Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative Fund 
(DAFI) Scholarships for Refugees. In 2015 134 Syrian Refugees were 
awarded DAFI scholarships. See www.unhcr.org/40dbee984.pdf.
27 Interview with Kingsley Aikins, Diaspora Matters, 5 October 2015.
28 https://tr.pearson.com/en/work-passport.html
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The ‘Rojava Revolution’ in 
Syrian Kurdistan: A Model of 
Development for the Middle East?
Can Cemgil and Clemens Hoffmann 
Abstract As the civil war in Syria continues, in the territory of Rojava – 
in Kurdish, ‘the West’ – the northern Syrian Kurdish political movement 
is attempting to implement ‘libertarian municipalism’, based on the 
thoughts of United States (US) anarchist Murray Bookchin. Since 
the withdrawal of Syrian regime forces in 2012, the movement has 
consolidated significant territorial gains as a US ally in the anti-Islamic 
State (IS) struggle, while simultaneously securing Russian support. Viewed 
with suspicion by Turkey, Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, the geopolitical 
conditions of Rojava’s emergence are its greatest impediment. This article 
analyses Rojava’s model of rule and socioeconomic development, and its 
theory and practice in the context of the civil war, and regional Middle 
Eastern and wider global geopolitics. It reflects on Rojava’s place and 
meaning for contemporary geopolitics in the Middle East, and considers 
the territory’s prospects, discussing its transformative potential for an 
otherwise troubled region. 
1 Introduction: locating Rojava among many alternatives
The current global financial, regional geopolitical and environmental 
crises, are all thought to coincide and express themselves in the 
most vicious forms in the contemporary Middle East. Historically, 
hydrocarbon developmentalism, rentierism, recurrent crises and conflict 
have characterised the region. Authoritarian militarist-bureaucratic 
rule through clientelist networks, fuelled by oil rents re-invested in arms 
purchases, has long characterised the whole region. This entrenched 
militarist authoritarianism is exacerbated by the effects of  large top-
down hydro-civilizational projects (irrigation, dam building), bloated 
bureaucracies, and neoliberal policies that have led to new forms of  
land appropriation and environmental degradation, all of  which have 
contributed to the region’s problematic ‘development’ template. 
Despite this declared regional specificity of  the Middle East, alternative, 
critical concepts of  development and governance are frequently 
conceived at the global and universal levels (e.g. Radcliffe 2015). They 
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start by developing alternative macro-policies that are subsequently 
implemented through national centralised governments, which turn 
them into local social realities. ‘Sustainable development’, but also more 
radical movements such as ‘de-growth’ (e.g. D’Alisa et al. 2014) and 
similar concepts, while offering to re-think the parameters of  global 
growth and development, do so within established global macro-
political settings where institutionally supported notions, notably those 
of  the World Bank or International Monetary Fund, are located in – 
rather than on top of  – a geopolitically fragmented system of  nation 
states indispensable to the formulation and implementation of  policy 
alternatives. 
National, centralised states act as interlocutors of  a globally formulated 
developmental ‘consensus’, as well as implementing it. Similarly, states 
are important fields of  struggle, though alternatives are still developed 
within national confines. Looking at development in holistic and 
geographically expansive terms, and changing policies to reflect where 
power actually lies in the state, is certainly imperative. But there is also 
a more problematic element in this dominant strategy: by changing 
developmental notions, strategies and policies in the current universal 
structures, most alternatives also emulate and, thereby, reproduce, 
top-down approaches. Even ‘participatory development’ (e.g. Cooke and 
Kothari 2001) depends on hierarchically organised national–territorial 
developmental states and the international organisations they form as 
the interlocutors. 
This article will present and interrogate a yet more radical departure 
from the developmental mainstream, relating its abstract formulation 
to its lived practice in a peculiar geopolitical setting: that of  a local, 
anti-authoritarian, anti-hierarchical and communitarian approach, 
as well as its current social practice in the northern Syrian Kurdish 
enclaves, or cantons, of  Rojava. Based on the theories of  Bookchin, a US 
thinker frequently labelled ‘eco-anarchist’, the Rojava model is a radical 
departure from the hierarchical global growth regime. This ‘democratic 
confederalism’ or ‘libertarian municipalism’, entails elements such as 
community-based, cooperative production and trade as social ecology, 
radical gender equality, and local forms of  direct democratic political rule. 
The following study is based on secondary research into the foundations 
and realities of  Rojava, using personal accounts, reports, academic 
articles and journalistic sources. It will first set out the ideological and 
philosophical foundations of  this revolutionary project in Bookchin’s 
work, before elaborating on the historic and geopolitical conditions of  
its emergence. It will then provide an overview of  the social structure 
and lived reality of  this political and socioeconomic project. It will close 
by arguing that the very conditions of  the project’s emergence – the 
contemporary crisis-ridden geopolitical conjuncture – are at the same 
time the greatest threat to it, not so much externally but due to the 
potential internal contradictions of  a militarised society. 
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2 From Bookchin to Öcalan: democratic confederalism and the Rojava 
‘revolution’
This alternative project of  development and democracy owes its 
intellectual sources and political inspiration to Bookchin. It was 
Bookchin’s social historical theory that inspired the intellectual and 
strategic transformation of  the Kurdish Liberation Movement (KLM) 
after imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah 
Öcalan read his work. Like Bookchin himself, Öcalan was disillusioned 
with the orthodox tradition of  Marxist-Leninist party organisation and 
underwent a series of  transformations even before he was imprisoned 
(Üstündağ 2016). 
The PKK reflected these changes in a series of  congresses in the 1990s 
and 2000s, and changed its orientation and strategies accordingly from 
a separatist–nationalist movement to a democratic autonomist and 
democratic confederalist movement (Güneş 2012). Akkaya, Jongerden 
and Şimşek (2015) described it as a transformation from rebellion 
to reconstruction. Surprisingly though, this intellectual and strategic 
transformation of  the KLM did not materialise in Turkey, its birthplace, 
but in neighbouring Syria, following the outbreak of  civil war in 
2011. The Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian affiliate and 
sister organisation of  the PKK, seized the opportunity to implement 
Bookchin’s ideas in Rojava.
Bookchin’s theoretical contribution to studies on ecology, development, 
freedom and citizenship, among other areas, consists of  a diverse, 
sophisticated, yet at times incoherent and factually unsubstantiated 
(White 2008) body of  ideas brought together in a series of  volumes.1 
The central thread, however, is clear: disillusioned with vulgar versions 
of  Marxism and what Bookchin calls ‘lifestyle anarchism’ (Bookchin 
1995), he sets out to offer a sweeping social and ideological history 
that specifies ‘hierarchy’ almost as the source of  all social, political and 
ecological evils. A concept broader than all other forms of  domination, 
be they the contemporary state, class domination, or human domination 
over nature, hierarchy is also antecedent to these ills of  society. 
Freedom, then, consists of  overcoming these hierarchical relations 
and establishing relations based on ‘equality of  unequals’, social 
complementarity, and access for everyone to an irreducible minimum of  
needs that they themselves define (Bookchin 1982). 
Abolition of  social hierarchy will also result in repairing the ‘metabolic 
rift’ (Foster 1999) that Marx declared ‘irreparable’ under capitalism 
(Marx 1981: 949). Marx attributed the separation of  human beings 
from nature to the rise of  capitalism, which resulted in soil exhaustion 
and the impossibility of  bioregionalism (i.e. producing crops locally 
and sustainably for decentralised markets) in the context of  expanding 
urban centres, industrial production and their ever-increasing demands 
on nature, and argued that this was an irreparable rift under capitalism. 
While in agreement, Bookchin saw capitalism only as one manifestation of  
domination, that is class domination, among others such as gerontocracy 
56 | Cemgil and Hoffmann The ‘Rojava Revolution’ in Syrian Kurdistan: A Model of Development for the Middle East?
Vol. 47 No. 3 May 2016: ‘Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and Beyond’
and patriarchy, and accordingly believed that human domination of  nature 
was the result of  social domination in general and could be done away 
with only when social hierarchy was completely abolished.
While Bookchin is unwilling to suggest a determinate way to bring about 
this large-scale social and environmental change, he traces historically 
and proposes theoretically what he calls the ‘legacies of  freedom’ that 
we inherited from ‘organic societies’, which knew no hierarchy and had 
an ‘ecological sensibility’ as well as an intuitive and practical knowledge 
of  freedom (Bookchin 1982). Distinguishing between ancient Greek 
participatory democracy and Roman republicanism (Bookchin 1987: 
43), Bookchin argues that the republican model with its representative 
system slides into a de-socialised elite rule, and creates professional 
rulers who govern, rather than administer (Bookchin 1982: 129) in an 
exclusive political space (Cemgil 2016). To socialise the political and 
to politicise the social (Üstündağ 2016), Bookchin argued for direct 
democracy starting at the most local level, building up a confederation of  
libertarian municipalities that are, just like members of  ‘organic societies’, 
interdependent and cooperative. The representative state in its current 
form, ‘absorbed’ administrative social functions and made itself  ‘as 
indispensable as an organising principle for human consociation’ (Bookchin 
1982: 127), becoming a major source of  domination (Cemgil 2016). 
Direct democratic participation entails the social administration of  
production and need determination as its corollary. Social administration 
of  production requires a localised, decentralised economy, scaled down 
to ‘human dimensions’ (Bookchin 1982: 344), with various libertarian 
municipalities cooperating if  they decide to do so. While decentralisation 
enhances direct democratic participation it does not necessarily exclude 
the possibility of  forms of  local social hierarchy, and Bookchin is 
well aware of  this. In any case, democratic processes might generate 
hierarchies as well. That is why he proposes a confederation of  libertarian 
municipalities, in the final analysis, in the belief  that a municipality that 
generated domination would be checked by others, besides internal 
democratic checks and balances (Biehl and Bookchin 1998: 108). 
A democratised economy and polity also allow for the determination of  
needs of  the community by the democratic processes of  the community. 
Rather than being expressed in objective categories, those involved also 
determine needs. The democratisation and de-centralisation of  social 
administrative functions that we now call economy, and scaling it down 
to human dimensions, would also reduce dependence on hydrocarbons 
through de-industrialisation, without dismissing the possibility of  
interdependent self-sufficiency. 
Among Bookchin’s primary aims in writing these numerous treatises 
on domination was the concern to offer a social ecology that 
re-constructs human–nature relations. Organic societies, for Bookchin, 
did not see nature an externality to be controlled. The emergence of  
institutionalised hierarchy and social domination, however, also resulted 
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in the emergence of  the notion of  dominating nature. The language of  
domination of  nature became so strong with the advent of  capitalism 
that even radical critics of  capitalism, such as Marx, fell prey to its 
ideology at times. The mending of  the metabolic rift requires a full-scale 
subjective as well as material transformation of  relations, though. 
Calls for bioregionalism, decentralisation or autarchy will not by 
themselves resolve the apocalyptic future that awaits us. Nor will 
anti-consumerism or de-industrialisation. A full-scale struggle against 
domination and hierarchy is needed and an ecological society can only be 
built on non-hierarchical relations. A self-sufficient interdependence within 
the democratic confederation of  libertarian municipalities, usufructory 
or use-oriented property relations in municipalities, direct democratic 
policymaking in all areas of  social life, as well as a subjective and material 
transformation in human–nature and human–human relations to erase 
hierarchy, are preconditions for such transition (Bookchin 1982).
Bookchin insists that if  hierarchy and domination are the root causes 
of  all social ills, then a genuine transformation into an ecological, 
libertarian society must take aim at all of  their manifestations. Among 
primordial forms of  domination is men’s domination over women, 
which grew organically, according to Bookchin, but then became 
institutionalised into a perennial patriarchal domination. Building on 
Bookchin’s social ecology, Biehl (1991) concurred that this primordial 
form of  domination must be destroyed along with all others, and 
added that women must make use of  their full potential by liberating 
themselves from the trap of  the oikos; that is, their domestic roles. While 
these activities have naturally emerged in the form of  childbearing 
and childrearing, women’s domination by men originates from women 
being exclusively associated with these roles. For Biehl, rather than 
seeking an expanded oikos in the polis, women should actively engage in 
liberatory politics in the polis (1991: 154), for ‘humanity… has greater 
potentialities than caring and nurturing’ (1991: 26). 
What most informed the KLM’s view on women and their liberation, 
however, were Öcalan’s writings. Öcalan set the liberation of  women as 
the precondition of  the liberation of  society in general and the liberation 
of  Kurds in particular. Drawing on Bookchin’s social-historical account 
of  patriarchal domination and hierarchy, Öcalan suggests that women 
have the capacity and will not only to participate in and revolutionise the 
democratic process, but also to create their own institutions to empower 
themselves. For this purpose, he proposed the notion of  Jineolojî, the 
science of  woman and life, which aimed to provide an alternative view 
of  social reality from the perspective of  self  definition and actualisation 
of  woman in social life (Öcalan 2013). 
Öcalan first familiarised himself  with the work of  Bookchin when he 
was serving a life sentence on the prison island of  İmralı in Turkey. 
Bookchin’s work so fascinated Öcalan that by 2005 he was steering the 
strategic orientation of  the KLM towards democratic confederalism 
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(Jongerden and Akkaya 2013). Building on Bookchin’s work, Öcalan 
saw capitalism, the nation state and patriarchy as the root causes of  all 
social and ecological problems under conditions of  capitalist modernity. 
A social revolution, for Öcalan, must do away with these three elements 
of  capitalist modernity and replace them with democratic modernity. 
Along with ethical and philosophical motivations, and his personal 
disillusionment with Marxist and nationalist positions, one could 
reasonably claim that Öcalan’s adoption and adaption of  Bookchin’s 
perspective in the case of  the KLM was partly due to long-term 
strategic considerations that in great part stem from the Kurds’ social 
and geographical reality. Having been territorially dispersed among 
four states –Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran – the Kurds have been fighting 
these states in a bid to gain independence or autonomy in a federal 
system. If  as nation states these four countries have been responsible for 
all the Kurds’ suffering, reasoned Öcalan, why would the Kurds want to 
establish yet another source of  domination? Democratic confederalism 
was the solution not only to the problems of  Turkey’s Kurds, but also 
a larger blueprint for a democratic Middle East, a region rife with 
conflict, suffering, oppression and poverty (Öcalan 2011).
3 History and conditions of possibility of the Rojava revolution 
In the case of  Syria, post-colonial statist development started with the 
Ba’athist regime and its socialist experiment during the 1950s, intermittently 
removing the old class of  notables from power (Hourani 1981; Khoury 
2003). With the opening, or infitah, of  the 1970s, the elite composition 
changed and started to include the ‘old bourgeoisie’ again, without, 
however, fundamentally altering the conditions of  a rentier economy, 
including all of  its socio-political contradictions (Perthes 1991). None of  
these transformations created the potential for change or the conditions for 
Kurdish emancipation (Perthes 1995). It was not until the breakdown of  
the Syrian regime in 2011, first politically and then geopolitically, that such 
conditions arose. These have now established a considerable remit of  action 
for the armed Kurdish movement in the north of  the country. 
Historically, the Syrian Kurds were hostile to the Ba’thist regime, having 
repeatedly experienced ‘Arabisation’ (Arab Belt policy) and marginalisation, 
which maintained the region’s underdeveloped agricultural status. 
Agricultural production was kept artificially low yielding. It concentrated 
on producing staple food crops, especially wheat and beans, underutilising 
a fertile area that had been deliberately developed as a ‘bread basket’, using 
landless Kurds as cheap labour (Flach et al. 2015: 244). In the river valleys, 
especially along the Euphrates, the regime’s hydro-civilisational mission 
included higher-yielding cultivation, settling Sunni Arabs where economic 
opportunities were higher. 
The valleys are now mostly dominated by IS, providing it with food 
security and taxes. Although all land has been subject to large-scale 
reform and nationalisation since the Ba’athist socialist coup in 1963, the 
rural population in general and Kurdish landless workers in particular 
(Endnotes)
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have benefited very little from any of  the developmental ambitions of  
the rent-seeking Syrian state (Perthes 1994). However, rich Kurdish 
landlords, similar to their counterparts in Turkey, were co-opted, 
becoming urbanised regime loyalists in the process. 
Neoliberal reforms opened Syrian markets to cheap imports, which 
undercut local production and led to job losses and depressed wages. 
The overuse and degradation of  land and water resources also caused 
rural poverty. The resulting rural–urban migration led to a swelling of  
Kurdish neighbourhoods in the larger cities. In Aleppo, in particular, rural 
migrants started working in low-skilled and poorly paid jobs in catering or 
construction, while property prices soared due to the inflow of  capital. In 
reaction to the 2011 uprisings that followed these drastically deteriorated 
social conditions, Assad initially planned to implement political reforms, 
but could not in the face of  the old Ba’athist militarist regime, which 
clearly preferred violence, fuelling the armed rebellion in return. After 
the structurally invested brutality of  the regime escalated the conflict, 
the preceding neoliberal reforms, having generated the revolutionary 
potential in the first place, were frequently overlooked in favour of  over-
simplified conflict analysis through the prism of  ‘social media’ (Howard 
and Hussain 2013) or ‘climate conflict’ (Werrel and Femia 2013). 
Unsurprisingly, the Syrian Kurds were part of  the uprising at an early 
stage, having already suffered large-scale killings during the so-called 
‘Qamishli Revolts’ (Gambill 2004; Noi 2012: 18) in 2004. In an attempt 
Territorial control in the Syrian civil war: situation on the ground June 2013
Source Redrawn from original by Dilek Gürsoy.
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to limit the number of  fronts it was engaged on, the regime successfully 
appeased the Kurds by granting them unprecedented citizenship rights. 
More importantly, having identified rebel groups that had formed 
around army defectors, the so-called Free Syrian Army (FSA), as the 
main enemy, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) in 2012 withdrew from the 
Kurdish majority areas in the north.
This tactical retreat was based on the idea that a poorly equipped 
Kurdish force would be easily defeated and was thought to be tolerable 
as an interim placeholder, especially if  kept in check by opposing 
groups, notably IS. Exploiting its own geopolitical momentum, IS 
went on to brutally occupy vast tracts of  Kurdish majority areas in the 
north, reaching the limits of  its expansion in Kobanê during October 
2015. Over time, however, the fortunes of  war changed, not only in 
favour of  IS, but also the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and 
associated Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). All warring insurgents were 
left with an array of  weapons, some of  them heavy. The Kurds even 
started to get air support from the US-led anti-IS coalition, whereas the 
SAA became overstretched, which motivated not only Iranian military 
support but also a last-minute Russian intervention in 2015 and, 
increasingly, direct Turkish military action against Syrian Kurdish forces 
and their allies in February 2016, using long-range artillery. 
What appeared as a negotiated retreat by the regime also left the 
Syrian Kurds and their relations with other opposition forces in dire 
straits, exacerbating a long-standing distrust between the Kurdish and 
‘Arab’, or Sunni population due to Ba’athist ‘divide and rule’ policies. 
The YPG’s acceptance of  a de facto ceasefire offer from the regime 
contributed to allegations that it has collaborated with the regime 
(Atassi 2014). Although Rojava is not a regime priority for the moment, 
it shows little willingness to accept de facto autonomy as an unintended 
consequence of  a tactical retreat indefinitely, as frequent skirmishes 
between the YPG and the remaining regime forces around the SAA 
bases in al-Hasake and Qamishli make clear, as well as the barrel-
bombing of  YPG-held areas in Aleppo.
Similarly, relations with the rest of  the opposition are multifaceted. 
Cooperation with the self-declared FSA units from the so-called 
‘Euphrates Volcano’ (Burkan al-Firat) coalition proved effective in 
and around Kobanê, whereas there is open hostility and military 
confrontation between the YPG and a variety of  FSA-labelled forces 
north of  Aleppo. It was in the context of  the liberation of  Kobanê from 
IS between October 2014 and January 2015, that the US-led anti-IS 
coalition developed strong military cooperation with the YPG and 
associated forces, whereby the YPG called in US airstrikes on military 
targets it identified on the ground. Having consolidated this successful 
cooperation over 2015, it led to an unprecedented campaign to 
recapture northern Syrian territory from IS. The most recent iteration 
was the US-sponsored formation of  the so-called Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF) in October 2015, which went on to occupy Tishrin Dam 
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in December 2015, with the active involvement of  US special forces. 
The SDF is a multi-ethnic force under YPG leadership, which continues 
to repulse IS in areas where Kurds are not the majority population, to 
secure local support and to counter claims of  Kurdish ethno-nationalist 
territorial expansionism (e.g. Amnesty International 2015a, 2015b). 
Naturally, the geopolitical position of  a new and in many ways 
revolutionary social formation in the complex environment of  the Syrian 
civil war is difficult to summarise concisely. It ranges from open battle 
with IS, enmity towards Turkey, and ambiguous relations with the FSA 
and the regime, to a tactical alliance with the US and, more recently, 
Russia. After Turkey shot down a Russian military jet over an alleged 
airspace violation in October 2015, reports of  Russian diplomatic and 
military support for Syrian Kurdish forces emerged (Idiz 2016). 
The origins of  the uprising itself  have conditioned the more intricate 
regional geopolitics. From the start of  the uprising in Der’aa in 2011, the 
Syrian opposition, with a strong support base among the Sunni Muslim 
Brotherhood, cultivated relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Turkey, 
in particular, identified the Brotherhood as an ideal vehicle for its regional 
ambitions. The Alawite majority Syrian state class invited military support 
from its historic allies, Iran, Hezbollah and, to a lesser extent, Iraq. 
The wider regional confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which 
is frequently couched in sectarian terms, also came to bear on the civil 
war. These rivalries are also embedded in global geopolitical relations, 
with Russia and China opposing regime change, whereas the West, and 
the US in particular, have clearly formulated Assad’s departure as a 
policy goal, by force if  need be. This also informs their support for those 
forces in the region and on the ground in Syria that share common goals. 
A second defining regional element is Turkey and the northern Iraqi 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)’s opposition to Rojava and its 
political and territorial-military consolidation. As opposed to the process 
of  Kurdish quasi-state-building in northern Iraq (Natalie 2010), Rojava 
had vastly different socio-political conditions attached to its emergence. 
They also follow different political visions, reflecting deeper divisions in 
the Kurdish movement. 
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of  
Kurdistan (PUK) dominate KRG-controlled northern Iraq, competing 
for trans-regional Kurdish leadership with the PKK (Natalie 2015: 148), 
which reflects not only geographical, but also political divisions between 
the revolutionary Marxist-anarchist ideology of  the PKK,2 following 
the political agenda of  Öcalan and Bookchin, working towards socio-
political transformation and the hierarchical-tribal developmental 
ambitions of  the KRG. 
Although some of  these deeper, historical and political differences 
have been temporarily put aside during the joint struggle against 
IS (Gruber 2015), there are other core reasons for the different 
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developmental trajectories. First, after the 1991 Iraq invasion a long 
process of  Kurdish empowerment started with the help of  no-fly zones 
and Western aid, culminating in creation of  the KRG. Unlike Rojava, 
this did not happen in isolation and therefore bears the marks of  
more conventional pro-Western state-building (Soderberg and Phillips 
2015), having been subjected to a much stronger involvement of  the 
international community and its conventional vision of  development, 
starting with the international humanitarian relief  operations in the wake 
of  the 1991 US-led invasion and the establishment of  the no-fly zone. 
This hierarchical, hydrocarbon- and, eventually, construction-
dominated path under tribal authoritarian rule is at odds with the 
Rojava model, and has led to Rojava’s isolation, while confirming 
Bookchin’s assumptions about the socially corrosive effect of  the oil 
economy in the KRG’s case. There is also a ‘Turkish embrace’ of  the 
KRG leadership and Turkey’s insistence on a form of  development in 
line with its anti-PKK geostrategic and commercial interests, which 
centre on exporting Turkish construction business. 
However, the most formidable geopolitical obstacle is probably 
Turkey itself  at its own current contradictory geopolitical conjuncture 
(Hoffmann and Cemgil 2016). Apart from a general opposition to 
any Kurdish bid for autonomy or outright independence in any of  
the neighbouring states, Turkey’s own Kurdish peace process, which 
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) initiated in 2013, 
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broke down in the wake of  a series of  bomb attacks on Kurdish party 
offices and rallies during the 2015 Turkish general election campaign. 
In particular, a suicide bomb attack on pro-Kurdish youth in the border 
town of  Suruç on 20 July 2015, which killed 33 activists, led to the 
murder of  two police officers, allegedly at the hands of  a PKK youth 
organisation. These events initiated a renewed military campaign 
against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq, including 
intense urban clashes and the large-scale loss of  civilian life. 
In light of  these Turkish domestic developments, initially favourable 
contacts between the Turkish government and the PYD quickly turned 
into hostile relations, in line with Turkey’s domestic confrontation. After 
officially declaring both PYD and YPG ‘terrorist organizations’ in 2015, 
Turkey launched a military campaign in February 2016 in response to 
YPG’s territorial advances in northern Aleppo province. In part because 
of  domestic Syrian-Kurdish politics, the KRG has closed ranks with its 
long-standing ally, maintaining a de facto embargo over Rojava. Given 
that all regional US allies also oppose the territory, it has somewhat 
curtailed open US military support for YPG and SDF forces. 
4 Rojava’s reality: a socialised polity and economy
Rojava comprises three cantons as administrative units: Cizîrê in the 
east, Afrîn in the west and Kobanê in the middle. While Rojava takes 
theoretical and political inspiration from Bookchin’s work, this is not a 
case of  a ‘to the letter application’ of  a theory, for much is determined 
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by the reality on the ground. During the initial phases of  the Rojava 
revolution, first the FSA then IS controlled the territories between Cizîrê 
and Kobanê, and Kobanê and Afrîn. This territorial non-contiguity 
partly explains the separate organisation of  these cantons.3 
In line with the theories of, Bookchin and Öcalan, the Rojava 
Autonomous Administration (RAA) went through a barrage of  
institution-building to implement democratic self-administration and 
confederalism, a form of  stateless democracy (Kolokotronis 2014), 
without directly confronting nation states militarily. This involved the 
establishment of  the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), 
an umbrella organisation composed of  constituent groups in Rojava. 
However, the PYD is the prime mover and the socio-political force behind 
the movement. Despite wartime conditions, the PYD sought to establish 
direct democratic institutional mechanisms, especially at a local level, 
from neighbourhoods and streets to the larger bodies in the cantons. 
This attempt to socialise governance and politicise social life generated 
working committees at local level that directly participated in decision 
making (Küçük and Özselçuk 2016). These institutions are crucially 
based on a co-chair system, with one male and one female filling 
all posts from the local to the confederation level. To ensure that no 
professional political and military elites emerge, key positions are rotated 
unless this poses an immediate risk. Furthermore, from neighbourhood 
to canton level, all-female parallel institutions are established so that 
the deep-seated patriarchal patterns do not disempower women, even 
in gender-equal settings, and women look for solutions to their own 
problems and needs themselves. 
Besides gender-egalitarianism, the RAA pays utmost attention to 
representing ethnic and religious groups institutionally in the Rojava 
Constitution – called the Social Contract of  the Rojava Cantons – and 
in assemblies and committees, as well as canton governments. The 
opening sentence of  the Preamble of  the Constitution reads: ‘We, 
the people of  the Democratic Autonomous Regions of  Afrîn, Cizîrê 
and Kobanê, a confederation of  Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs, Arameans, 
Turkmen, Armenians and Chechens, freely and solemnly declare 
and establish this Charter.’4 Notwithstanding this recognition of  
the multi-ethnic composition of  Rojava’s population, interethnic 
relations remain tense. Decades of  hostility and mistrust among these 
different communities are not easily overcome, especially considering 
the Ba’athist regime’s forced displacement of  Kurds alongside other 
discriminatory practices that favoured Arabs. 
The continuing transfer of  social-administrative functions from the 
state to the society has ensured the spread and reach of  the democratic 
process. The judicial system is a case in point. Inspired by Bookchin’s 
abovementioned notion that justice is only a bad replacement for 
freedom, the Rojavans created justice and peace committees to act on 
behalf  of  neighbourhood assemblies – that is, the commune – to deliver 
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‘social justice’ (Ross 2015). That the neighbourhood assemblies and 
peace committees act in a capacity similar to courts of  peace or first 
instance testifies to the expansion of  the principles of  direct democracy 
to what one would usually consider technical matters. 
Cases that these committees cannot resolve are referred to people’s 
houses or women’s houses, whose function is to address the needs of  
the local population in areas ranging from economic coordination 
to domestic violence. The high overall rate of  case resolution by 
committees, houses and assemblies indicates the penetration of  this 
practice among the population. More serious criminal offences, such as 
murder, on the other hand, are referred to more institutionalised courts.5 
Despite these institutional advances over the Ba’athist Mukhabarat 
(security intelligence)-led justice system, the RAA has faced criticism for 
prolonged detentions and unfair trials (AI 2015a, 2015b).
Another state function that has been transferred to society is defence 
and security, both internal and external. Responsible for external 
defence, the YPJ and YPG act as a people’s self-defence force rather 
than specialised military units detached from society. Their members 
were initially recruited from the local population on a voluntary 
basis, and they received basic training from more experienced armed 
members. In response to the more forceful IS threat since 2014, the 
YPJ and YPG have become increasingly institutionalised, and even 
introduced conscription. 
Asayîş, or Internal Security, is responsible for internal policing and is also 
composed of  voluntary elements who report directly to neighbourhood 
assemblies. External and internal security organs are not only staffed 
by the people themselves, but also report to their democratic bodies 
unmediated by a representative state, which serves to ‘unmake’ the state 
(Üstündağ 2016) that, according to Bookchin, detaches these security 
institutions from their social functions and from society. 
Although militarisation may not usually be considered an emancipatory 
act, this unmaking breaks the monopoly of  a de-socialised state over 
means of  legitimate violence, creating the conditions of  a re-socialised 
and democratised defences. This ensures that security forces are 
not placed over and above the members of  the society as bearers of  
authority; rather, the compassionate and close relations between YPJ 
and YPG troops and the larger population demonstrates the socialised 
nature of  security (Üstündağ 2016). 
Socialisation of  defence, however, has not been a smooth process. 
Amnesty International (AI) strongly criticised the YPJ and YPG for razing 
the houses of  people they suspected of  having helped IS and forcibly 
displacing them (AI 2015a), and the Asayîş for arbitrary detentions 
(AI 2015b). The RAA countered that IS was operating in its territory, 
and although it acknowledged wrongdoing by Kurdish forces, these were 
isolated and had to be placed in the context of  war against IS (AI 2015a). 
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The YPJ, as an all-female army, has also served to emancipate women 
in an otherwise extremely conservative society where patriarchy is still 
a strong undercurrent in social life, despite the huge steps the KLM 
has taken in Turkey and Syria. As paradoxical as this may sound, 
and despite contrasting experiences in the US military and elsewhere 
(D’Amico 1996), crucial differences exist between the YPJ and the other 
instances of  women taking part in war-making. First, the most obvious 
reason is that by joining the YPJ (or PKK in Turkey), women free 
themselves from patriarchal bonds and get control over their own lives. 
The alternative for most would be to get married at a relatively early 
age and suffer patriarchal domination for the rest of  their lives. 
Since the 1990s, when the KLM in Turkey saw the emergence of  
a strong Kurdish Women’s Movement that challenged and even 
transformed the KLM from within, Kurdish women increasingly 
came to play important roles in public life, especially through the 
legal and illegal organisations in the KLM, such as the pro-Kurdish, 
left-wing People’s Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey, the PKK, and 
the Group of  Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), as well as affiliated 
non-governmental organisations in Turkey. 
Now this can be seen in Syria, as well, through ideological and political 
education. Second, unlike the cases of  the Israeli, US, Canadian or 
French militaries, where women serve alongside men, in the case of  the 
YPJ they are organised as a separate force with female commanders. 
Where patriarchy is still a strong force in society, even the presence of  
men in the same organisation with women may hinder the uncovering 
of  the full potential of  women. Third, and in a more direct policing 
capacity, the YPJ fights directly for women’s rights; in the words of  
commander Nesrîn Abdalla: 
Until now, armies were created exclusively by men with patriarchal 
thinking, so they had only two tasks: to defend and win power. But we 
are an army of  women… We do this not just to protect ourselves, but 
also to change the way of  thinking in the army, not only to gain power, 
but to change society, to develop it… we had to organize ourselves 
properly in order to deal with the feudal thinking (Sputnik 2016).
Along with the state, the market is seen as a major source of  
hierarchical social domination (Cemgil 2016). Concurrent with the 
transfer of  state functions to democratic self-administration bodies, 
socially reproductive functions are also transferred to society to ensure 
democratic control over the economy. This ‘social economy’, in turn, 
is further democratised through decentralisation and cooperative 
production, avoiding Soviet-style centralisation and state planning. 
As with the emergence of  the overall political project, geopolitical 
conditions determine the nature of  socioeconomic transformation. 
Although the KRG-imposed embargo, political and economic isolation 
are major constraints for the political economy of  Rojava, which lead 
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to shortages of  goods – especially of  medicines – and increase prices, 
they can also be seen as an opportunity, facilitating the transfer towards 
local, sustainable production. The decentralised assembly structures are 
geared to react to the conditions of  the embargo and relative isolation, 
maintaining food security, public services and other basic needs using 
local, municipal governance structures, generating what can be called 
‘economic communalism’ through cooperatives. The assemblies’ 
economy commissions deal with all issues relating to production, and 
exist alongside commissions for women, politics, defence, occupation, 
education at all levels of  the democratic self-administration (Biehl 2015; 
Ayboğa 2014b). Nonetheless, the necessities of  a war economy have 
compromised the development of  this social economy. 
Although ‘development’ has partially been adopted as a discourse, 
overarching ‘goals’ such as subsistence, autonomy, locality and 
sustainability remain core pillars of  Rojava’s social economy, with 
cooperatives at the centre of  this localised, ‘subsistence-plus-x’ 
production, (Biehl 2015). Not entirely anti-market, price caps are 
nevertheless imposed as an important tool to avoid food speculation and 
maintain subsistence (Yeğin 2015). The declared aim of  this democratic 
economy is to keep surpluses within local communities, maintaining the 
long-term ecological sustainability of  production and democratised access 
to resources over short-term exhaustion of  resources for investor profit. 
For the time being, the socialisation of  land has been circumvented to 
avoid any form of  hierarchical enforcement as a practice. Despite this, 
there is a general ideological tendency towards the socialisation of  land, 
not least due to historically low Kurdish land ownership in the region. 
Land, water and energy are seen as public goods, which assembly-led 
municipalities manage and control (Flach et al. 2015: 258). Historical 
circumstances have prevented a strong social contradiction, because the 
expropriation and transformation of  Syrian state land, which accounts 
for around 80 per cent of  arable land in Rojava, allows for plenty of  
scope for transformation towards cooperative structures after the regime’s 
departure made this land available. This not only follows ideology, but 
also the need for crop transformation and diversification away from the 
large, quasi-colonial, Ba’athist monoculture and monocrop production. 
Parallel structures continue to coexist, nonetheless, with private 
companies, cooperatives and assemblies all cooperating in the 
production process. Just as the national state and local autonomy 
are meant to co-exist peacefully, so too are capitalist and cooperative 
production: ‘Private capital/property is not forbidden but it is put to 
work for the communes/cooperatives’ (Yılmaz 2014), complementing 
one another. Private landowners and refinery owners charge 
commercial rates and the assemblies have no ambition to expropriate 
those holdings, trying to integrate them into the current war economy 
instead. A question remains over potential post-war collectivisation, 
however. Hence, the model is not ‘anti-private property’, but puts 
private property to communal use, bringing together democratic 
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self  rule in democratic assemblies with company owners and members 
of  the relevant commissions (Biehl 2015). 
Many large landowners were co-opted into the social and war economy, 
rather than confronted. Conversely, their production is not export- 
and world market-oriented but meets local demand in line with the 
requirements of  the assemblies. This, then, also constitutes a major 
difference compared to the Turkish-Kurdish regions, where Kurdish 
feudal lords were co-opted into a regime of  ‘pacification through 
export-oriented industrial agriculture’ in southeastern Turkey, which 
was not ecological, and did not provide secure employment or, from a 
2016 perspective, peace. In Rojava, 30 per cent of  agricultural profits 
from cooperatives go to the assemblies for the maintenance of  public 
goods, while 70 per cent remain with the producing cooperatives, 
frequently made up of  the families of  fallen fighters (Flach et al. 2015: 
258). Individual families can only get access to land in exceptional cases, 
avoiding the formation of  landed vested interests.
While advantageous in terms of  social transformation, specific challenges 
emerged from being a peripheral, primary commodity producer, with 
little to no processing capacities, located in non-Kurdish majority areas 
not under the control of  Rojava, further west in the country. Wheat could 
not be turned into flour, crude into diesel and so on. Some of  these issues 
have been addressed; for example, by building mills (Flach et al. 2015). 
Currently, however, around 70 per cent of  production goes into the war 
effort, making long-term planning and the transition to a peaceful society 
difficult. Neither crops nor ownership transformation are complete, despite 
the transformation having begun with the emergence of  Rojava in 2012; 
for example, by supplying seeds to newly formed cooperatives. In this 
sense, the model gets closest to what Bookchin hoped any future ecological 
society would have: a use-based or quasi-usufructory property regime. 
Ideologically, as well as practically, the imperative for all production is 
Rojava’s food security, or better yet, food sovereignty. This requires, first 
and foremost, rapid diversification and, at a later stage, crop rotation 
mechanisms as part of  ecological agriculture. Under the Ba’athist 
regime production was purposively kept low value and dependent on 
industrial means, leaving most surplus value-adding processing to areas 
with stronger loyalties to the regime in the south and west. 
Agricultural production is regionally specific throughout the cantons, 
which presents challenges to complete self-sufficiency. Whereas Cizîrê 
was historically forced to specialise in food staples, Kobanê und Afrîn 
cultivated mostly olives and fruit. The latter two have indeed achieved 
high levels of  self-sufficiency, but in the fertile Cizîrê region, artificially 
developed as a Syrian bread basket, parts of  the former state lands have 
been turned over to vegetable production for the local market. Food 
production beyond subsistence levels, such as animal husbandry, is still 
underdeveloped and dependence on imports persists, which allows 
importers to monopolise the market (Sulaiman 2015).
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Other non-agricultural elements include craft (important for 
reconstruction), commerce and manufacturing, organised in associations 
similar to guilds. This, typically, includes soap and olive oil production, 
construction, textiles, shoes, marble quarrying, and hospitality. 
Manufacturing remains decentralised, maintaining rural and semi-
urban livelihoods, as well as their non-industrial character. Unlike 
localised subsistence agriculture, these sectors are most likely to develop 
an interest in ending their isolation, because imports and exports are 
high risk and require payment of  large bribes to enemy forces. 
Although much of  Bookchin’s work is dedicated to questions of  
urbanity and ecology, property development has not taken on a 
central role in Rojava’s economy so far, though rebuilding, especially 
in Kobanê, has been considerable. The sector has started to evolve 
in response to the demand for living space in the relatively peaceful 
Kurdish areas, and increasing migration by non-Kurdish urban middle 
classes, especially from Aleppo into Afrîn (Yilmaz 2014). The resulting 
price hikes were offset by a construction boom, partially a consequence 
of  lifting regime constraints on building height. An increase of  two 
storeys can now be done at relatively low cost and cooperatively. 
However, a lack of  available finance restricts construction. 
Given that all borders of  Rojava are in effect sealed, the de facto embargo 
also encompasses access to financial markets and institutions. This also 
means, however, that foreign direct investment cannot disrupt local organic 
and social ecological development. Aid and donations from outside, partly 
from international solidarity networks,6 but also from wealthy Kurdish 
landowners in Turkey, still reach Rojava. Low-level finance is nevertheless 
needed and village banks have developed, but finance capital and interest 
charges are strictly banned, leaving Rojava as a primitive cash economy. 
Despite the focus on local subsistence-level production, energy 
resources remain a central, if  potentially controversial resource in 
Rojava. Originally, the Syrian Kurdish areas around Cizîrê accounted 
for 50–60 per cent of  petroleum production; however, as with wheat 
production, refineries in other parts of  the country carried out processing. 
Like water, Rojava considers all oil to be a public good. Cooperatives have 
been founded for local diesel production, which is important for heating, 
transport, electricity production, and not least military purposes. 
It suffers, however, from the primitive methods used to refine the crude, 
which in turn reduces the life spans of  engines and generators. The 
demand for spare parts is difficult to meet in an isolated economy. 
Although the Syrian Kurds have taken the greater portion of  oil wells 
from IS in eastern Rojava, the inability to refine oil in large quantities, 
let alone to market it internationally, has led to environmental problems 
with oil spills (Russia Today 2016). In the meantime, discussions on the 
future of  oil exploitation continue inside and outside of  Rojava’s self-
governing structures. The discussion around potential oil exports and 
revenue distribution, remains abstract as long as the realities of  the 
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embargo persist. Developing a hydro-carbon economy would also be in 
direct contradiction with Bookchin’s social ecological thinking. 
The discussion on how to implement the ‘social economy’ and its ‘social 
ecological’ foundations is in full swing. It has partly been realised in the 
form of  cooperatives built on old state land, diversified production in 
Rojava, socialised oil profits and, in turn, increasing levels of  autonomy 
in line with the ideological foundations outlined above and in reaction 
to the geopolitical realities of  the KRG-imposed embargo. Much of  the 
social economy remains characterised by the necessities of  the war effort 
though. For example, military commanders, rather than assemblies, take 
some decisions to meet short-term needs of  units engaged in fighting. 
Not only does this consume ecological resources, but the situation also 
allows ‘old’ structures to survive and may jeopardise the project of  social 
transformation. 
5 Conclusion and outlook for Rojava
The constraints Rojava must contend with range from the embargo 
and open Turkish aggression to the internal contradictions of  potential 
hydrocarbon development. The geopolitical conditions of  Rojava’s 
emergence are the defining contradiction this conclusion focuses on. The 
territory’s role in the anti-IS coalition and, subsequently, the fallout from 
the confrontation between Russia and Turkey worked in the northern 
Syrian Kurds’ favour. However, this success itself, Rojava’s more 
prominent geopolitical role, and the continuation of  a strong militarist 
element in its social experiment, which arose out of  necessity and 
ambition, could constitute a severe limitation to the territory’s success. 
First, internally, even if  a peace and accommodation of  Syrian Kurdish 
autonomy were reached, demobilising and transforming a society that 
has gained not only its freedom from domination through military 
means, but which has also transformed itself  under the catalytic 
conditions of  hierarchical militarism itself, will be major tasks. A central 
contradiction in the project is that the main target of  this attempted social 
transformation, hierarchy, is also deeply wedded to the condition of  its 
emergence through a necessary militarisation under conditions of  armed 
struggle. This is a general problem, but also one that affects other core 
aims of  the project, namely women’s emancipation and social ecology, 
which are wedded to the militarised processes of  state formation. 
Whereas women’s emancipation hinges on their participation in 
the armed struggle as a viable alternative to the continuation of  
patriarchy, the relationship between radical democracy and ecology, 
well developed in Bookchin’s theory, may be compromised by some of  
the more conventional dynamics of  state formation and development. 
In particular, the promise of  oil wealth beyond local consumption, 
generating cash flows through exports, remains a potential breaking 
point, socially as well as ecologically. Reports of  current oil spills to 
maintain infrastructure are worrying signs in this regard. Even less 
radical steps, such as organic farming, in the form of  crop rotation and 
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sustainable seed policies, are compromised, in this case by the practice 
of  domestic (petro)chemical fertiliser production in the name of  self-
sufficiency, or food sovereignty at times of  war. 
If  Rojava’s assemblies are serious and wish to avoid not only the 
environmentally but also socially destructive effects of  hydrocarbon 
exploitation, use and rent-extraction, they will have to leave considerable 
wealth in the ground to avoid the very hierarchies they aim to destroy. 
During the current armed conflict, however, a hydrocarbon-based war 
economy and mass food production are imperative. Those necessities of  a 
society fighting an existential threat coincide, if  not clash, with the delicate 
task of  generating a new social project. In sum, the main condition that 
would allow Rojava to emerge (i.e. the geopolitical conjuncture), is also 
potentially its most severe limitation, not so much externally or territorially, 
but in terms of  the process of  its own social genesis. 
Despite these potential breaking points, it is notable that this 
transformation is happening in a region where there is little hope. 
Conventional diplomacy or even military interventionism appear to be 
incapable of  overcoming a structural crisis in the Middle East and its 
inter-state, post-First World War order. The conflict lines have become 
more than complex, leaving observers puzzled and policymakers 
contending with impossible choices. The socio-political experiment of  
the Syrian Kurds and its practical implications have mapped out the 
potential for transformation, if  only in abstract terms. The social reality 
of  being elevated from landless agricultural workers to a military force 
that the US and Russia support at the same time is nevertheless specific 
and historically conditioned. In other words, the fertile ground for 
Bookchin and Öcalan’s ideas, namely the absence of  vested interests and 
historically grown power structures in the Kurdish regions, is the result 
of  years of  deliberate under-development by various Ba’athist regimes. 
These social conditions cannot be expected to exist in the same form 
elsewhere. Partly for this reason, we are sceptical about the ‘model’ 
character of  the Rojava revolution and the potential for direct 
emulation elsewhere, although some of  the progressive thinking 
on democratic self-governance, ethnic inclusiveness, feminism and 
social ecology could provide positive contributions to the discussions 
about the future of  Syria and the Middle East at large. Given the 
continued tendencies towards ethnic homogenisation and hierarchical 
authoritarianism elsewhere in Syria and the wider region, the survival 
of  Rojava nevertheless provides therefore a glimmer of  hope for victims 
of  the political breakdown of  the modern Middle East. 
Notes
1 In particular, see Bookchin (1982, 1986, 1987).
2 The PKK is one of  many regional Kurdish parties committed 
to the radical democratic objective of  establishing democratic 
confederalism in Kurdistan. It is organised under the Group of  
Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), an umbrella organisation that 
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brings together the PKK in Turkey, PYD in Syria, Free Life Party of  
Kurdistan (PJAK) in Iran, and Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party 
(PCDK) in Iraq, as well as numerous civil-society organisations.
3 It must be noted that when Tall Abyad (Girê Spî in Kurdish) was 
liberated from IS and became an administrative unit of  Kobanê, 
Cizîrê and Kobanê cantons became territorially contiguous, though 
Afrîn remains isolated to the west of  Kobanê, with IS- and Jabhat 
al-Nusrah-controlled territories lying between. The SDF has been 
conducting operations from Afrîn in a push to remove Al-Nusrah 
elements in-between.
4 For a full English translation of  the Constitution of  the RAA see 
Çiviroğlu (2014).
5 A comprehensive description of  the Rojavan justice system can be 
found in Ercan Ayboğa (2014a). 
6 Given the highly effective embargo regime, conventional donor 
communities do not provide aid. Private anarchist, left-wing, but also 
liberal-humanitarian organisations provide financial and sometimes 
also direct physical help with the reconstruction effort. For example, 
see Plan C www.weareplanc.org/blog/rojava-solidarity-cluster-
opening-statement/. 
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A Panoramic Perspective on 
Islamist Movements in the 
Middle East
Ali Bakr
Abstract This article discusses and analyses the landscape of Islamist 
movements in Egypt using a network approach, and showing where 
connections lie between different movements across North Africa. The 
article unpacks the centripetal forces that bring Islamist movements 
together in ‘uber-ideology coalitions’ and the moments where centrifugal 
forces serve to divide and splinter movements. The article challenges the 
mainstream narrative on Islamist movements and violence in two critical 
ways. First, contrary to analysts’ forecasts of a ‘post-Islamist age’, one of 
the ripple effects of the Arab Spring was the revival and proliferation of 
Islamist movements on a grand scale. Second, the article challenges the 
discourse that attributes the rise in radical militancy almost exclusively to 
the obfuscation of democratic politics through the emergence of counter-
revolutionary forces. Rather, it argues that the Arab revolts created the 
political and security environment that allowed radical Islamist movements 
to flex their muscles. 
1 Introduction
The state of  Islamism (political Islam) in Egypt is of  particular 
importance for the region and global politics. It is the birthplace of  the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most significant Islamist movement 
to call for the establishment of  an Islamic state governed according to 
the Shariah, and from which sister movements were established across 
the world. It is also home to some of  the most well-established jihadi 
movements, which have strong links with other movements across the 
world. Finally, its geostrategic position means that it has served as a 
central node in relation to other Islamist movements in Palestine, Libya 
and North Africa and Syria. 
Many analysts and observers believed that the Arab uprisings marked 
the beginning of  the end of  religious-inspired violence, or jihad, in 
the Middle East and particularly the Arab world, believing this strain 
of  violent thought to be on its way to obsolescence (Bakr 2012a). 
It appeared to them that the peaceful Arab revolutions in Egypt, 
78 | Bakr A Panoramic Perspective on Islamist Movements in the Middle East
Vol. 47 No. 3 May 2016: ‘Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and Beyond’
Tunisia, Libya and Yemen had proved the failure of  jihadi thought, 
having achieved in such a short time what jihadi groups had failed 
to accomplish over three decades: namely, the overthrow of  Arab 
regimes. But shortly after the uprisings had toppled the regimes in those 
countries, setting loose a new wave of  jihad perhaps even fiercer than in 
the past, this analysis proved questionable. 
Conditions in the region have fostered the rise of  jihadi groups and, 
in turn, religious violence. Unlike the wave of  jihad in the 1990s, all 
indications are that the current upsurge is a long-term development 
with substantial staying power. The article argues that the positioning 
of  the Islamist movements in Egypt after the January 25 revolution of  
2011 not only affected the situation domestically, but also had spillover 
effects in Libya and Gaza, and the region more broadly. 
The article is organised as follows: the first part presents a typology of  
Islamist movements after the January 25 revolution, with a particular 
focus on three key players: (1) the Muslim Brotherhood; (2) Salafi groups; 
and (3) the jihadi and takfiri1 movements. The second parts examines 
how, following the ruptures that led to the ousting of  regimes in countries 
such as Egypt, the movements responded with flexibility to collective 
action. On the one hand, possibilities existed for post-ideological alliances; 
and, on the other, at times divisions and splinter movements became 
quite pronounced. The third part examines in more depth the various 
movements’ relationship to violence, examining in particular a number of  
dynamics: the centripetal forces that led Salafi movements to join jihadi 
movements, the factionalism that affected jihadi movements and the 
ideological regression among some movements that led them to abandon 
violence as a means of  achieving political ends. The final section (3.7) 
examines the fluidity and dynamism of  jihadi networks across borders. 
2 Typology of Islamist movements after the January 25 revolution
The typology presents the categories and self-identities used within 
Islamist movements, with the qualifier that in many cases ideological 
essence and political thought overlap, even if  they follow distinct 
organisational orders. One cannot understand religious violence after the 
January 25 revolution in Egypt without also understanding the changes 
the revolution wrought on Islamist movements. The uprising pushed 
many Islamist groups into the political process; as they sought to reach the 
seat of  governance, these movements often deviated from their hitherto 
peaceful courses of  action and took up violence to reach this goal. 
Since the January 25 revolution, the alignment of  Islamist movements 
in Egypt has shifted more quickly than ever before in their history. For 
decades, this map was static and well defined. Even allowing for the 
ideological revisionism of  groups such as the Jama’a al-Islamiya and the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), discussed below, changes were minimal 
and gradual, allowing close study and a full understanding. In contrast, 
the most recent shifts are so rapid that it is more difficult to track them 
and identify their strategic and programmatic implications.
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2.1 The Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood is by far the largest and oldest political 
Islamist organisation in Egypt, and played a leading political role after 
the January 25 revolution. The Brotherhood is also the best able to 
maintain its organisational cohesion in the face of  challenges, largely 
because members have been ideologically inoculated to contain the 
impact of  dissension. The term ‘ideological inoculation’ refers to the 
group’s inculcation of  a particular intellectual and jurisprudential 
doctrine that, for members, makes the Brotherhood synonymous 
with Islam and vice-versa. Any deviation from the group constitutes a 
deviation from Islam. 
This process of  indoctrination insulates the Muslim Brotherhood 
against the impact of  splits and schisms. The group has therefore 
produced an extensive literature that entrenches the duty of  working 
within the confines of  its community and preserves it from discord 
or division. To do this, the Brotherhood applies to itself  scriptural 
texts that enjoin the unity of  Muslims and discourage divisions in the 
community, and furthermore upholds the principle of  obedience to 
its leadership. A juridical and intellectual framework that enjoins and 
protects the larger brotherhood of  Muslims thus protects the movement 
also, and its literature valorises enduring membership and discourages 
rebelling against the group or leaving it.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s programme, teachings and literature 
are thus filled with scriptural citations that confirm the importance 
of  allegiance to the general guide and proscribe going against the 
group. The following prophetic hadiths are illustrative: ‘He who dies 
without having sworn an oath of  allegiance dies a pre-Islamic death’; 
‘God’s hand is with the community of  believers’; ‘Hear and obey, 
though you be in the charge of  an Ethiopian slave’; ‘He who obeys my 
commander has obeyed me.’ These and other texts have been employed 
in indoctrination to build the Brotherhood and ensure its continuity 
without dissension. Followers are made to believe that dissent against 
the movement is dissent against Islam itself, because the movement 
represents the faith. In practice, it makes it very difficult for followers to 
separate themselves from the movement. 
Several features distinguish the Muslim Brotherhood from other Islamist 
movements: its strong organisation, its members’ facility with politics and 
party work, and its experience with legislative elections, by which it has 
developed the ability to make partisan alliances and become adept at the 
electoral process. The Brotherhood is also able to mobilise the Egyptian 
street, a result of  long years of  outreach. Moreover, Brotherhood 
members have integrated themselves into most of  the country’s 
institutions and sectors. 
In the post-January 25 revolution stage, the Muslim Brotherhood sought 
to bring all Islamist organisations under its wing, bringing all the groups 
that had grown out of  the Brotherhood back into the fold to integrate 
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them into the organisation’s broad, popular base. Brotherhood members 
were ordered to let their beards grow long, making it difficult for the 
average person to distinguish a Brother from a Salafi and creating an 
external similarity among all Islamist groups. The Brotherhood also 
took part in rallies in Assyout, Cairo and Minya, welcoming the return 
of  the Jama’a al-Islamiya.2 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s mode of  action after the revolution 
included maintaining the secrecy of  the movement, despite the fall 
of  Mubarak’s dictatorship, refusing to compromise to resolve internal 
generational conflict, and refusing to discuss fully integrating women 
by giving them the right to compete or vote for internal positions in the 
movement, although the notion of  providing security and protection for 
the movement’s women had become obsolete. In its political practice, 
the Brotherhood chose the worst model, preserving a hierarchal 
structure, while establishing a political party as its political arm but 
without allowing it independence. The Brotherhood rejected party 
founders who were not Brotherhood members whom its leaders across 
the country had vetted, and it only offered membership to those people 
selected it had selected. This meant that the party was not a genuinely 
popular party, but rather the Brotherhood party. 
Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood allied itself  to Salafi movements and 
used them to reclaim legitimacy and build a new, massive popular base. 
It also used the Salafis to gin up fears about a rejection of  constitutional 
amendments, in particular Article 2.3 In return, the Brotherhood turned a 
blind eye to the Salafis’ actions, even adopting some of  their slogans and 
declaring that voting for the amendments was a religious duty. Members 
hung up banners to this effect in Alexandria and preached it in their 
mosques before later trying to disown these actions and confirming their 
differences with the Salafis, perhaps in response to the shocked outrage 
of  the political and cultural elite. Hence, relations with the Salafis went 
through various stages of  centrifugal and centripetal engagements. 
Immediately after the January 25 revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood 
sought alliances with the Salafis, seizing the political opportunities of  
strengthening its core constituency and the legitimacy of  the Islamist 
movements’ political platform. However, the Salafi branch that sought 
to engage in politics and formed al-Nour party resisted attempts to 
bring it into the fold, concerned that the Brotherhood would try to 
dominate all the other Islamist factions. Moreover, the Salafis became a 
political liability as elites exposed their ‘uncivil’ forms of  engagement, 
and the Brotherhood sought to distance itself  from them. 
As is shown below, the phase under the presidency of  Mohammed 
Morsi (July 2012–June 2013) saw various moments of  collaboration 
(to counter the non-Islamists), as well as times of  confrontation 
(when the Salafis felt they were insufficiently represented in power-
sharing arrangements). Periods of  collaboration and confrontation 
foreshadowed the period after Morsi’s ousting. 
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2.2 The Salafi movement (the Salafi umbrella)
The religious movements brought together under the Salafi rubric have 
many intellectual and juridical disagreements, but they are united by the 
general pillars of  Salafi thought such as holding fast to the Holy Quran 
and the Sunna (sayings and actions of  the Prophet Muhammed), purifying 
Islam of  all untrue doctrine or practices, striving for the application of  
the Shariah, the creation of  an Islamic state, and the reinstitution of  the 
caliphate in the Islamic world. The Egyptian Salafi movement, or what 
could be called the Salafi umbrella, has undergone the most radical shifts 
of  any Islamist movement since the January 25 revolution. 
Prior to January 25, the Salafis were also united by their non-participation in 
politics and party work. Indeed, some Salafi groups believed that all political 
work was prohibited, and even if  they had wished to undertake it, they could 
not have done because of  the restrictions the regime of  president Hosni 
Mubarak (1981–2011) had imposed on them. In short, there was virtually no 
political participation by Salafi movements prior to the revolution. 
Salafi movements as a whole did not initially support the January 25 
revolution and therefore did not take part in the protests and 
demonstrations in the early days. This was due to the nature of  Salafi 
ideology and thought, which prohibits rebelling against a Muslim 
ruler in any way, even through protests. When the protests escalated, 
however, individual Salafis began to take part in demonstrations. But 
Salafis who participated in the revolution did so as individuals, not as 
part of  a collective. Most Salafi sheikhs opposed the revolution and 
participation in it, and many even issued fatwas to their members. 
Gradually, however, and as the Egyptian army maintained its neutrality, 
then protected the demonstrators and refused to fire on them, some 
Salafi leaders went to the square to take part in the sit-in. They were still 
a minority, but individuals’ participation increased day by day. 
The winds of  change the revolution ushered in also touched Salafi 
movements, sparking off an intellectual revolution. Salafis soon rushed 
headlong into politics. Even those movements that prohibited political 
action and participation did not prohibit others from taking part or 
condemn them for it, and soon they too joined the political fray. Salafis 
engaged with politics from all directions, joining and creating parties, 
but their political presence was the clearest when they mobilised the 
street to vote for proposed constitutional amendments.4 
Salafi movements engaged in fierce competition against other political 
forces who opposed the amendments, mobilising all their forces: 
individuals, leaders, sheikhs, and preachers of  all stripes. It was the first 
time in the history of  the movement that it had been so involved in politics, 
and soon after the referendum, some Salafi movements began to announce 
their future plans. The EIJ announced that it had formed the Safety and 
Development Party (Al Rafat wal Tanmeya). The Jama’a al-Islamiya 
declared it too would be creating its own party, and the traditional Salafi 
movement founded al-Nour; other Salafi parties followed. 
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What is remarkable in the Salafi turn to politics is the speed of  the 
intellectual transformation involved. Such shifts usually take some 
time, but the Salafi movement transformed its position on political 
participation in a few months. In so doing, it began addressing issues 
it would never have broached in the past, given their incompatibility 
with Salafi thought and doctrine, such as citizenship, Coptic rights, the 
rule of  law, the civil state, and the regeneration of  religious discourse. 
However, Salafis’ doctrinal stances remained by and large far more 
conservative than those of, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Since the 2013 revolution, Salafism has become an umbrella movement 
that comprises innumerable Islamist groups that follow the Salafi 
programme and doctrine, abjure violence, and do not participate 
in politics, such as Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiya, the Shar’iya 
Association, and the post-revisionism of  the Jama’a al-Islamiya and the 
EIJ, as well as traditional Salafis. Indeed, in the period from 2006 to 
2010 the Salafi camp came to encompass nearly all religious movements 
in Egypt, with the exception of  the Muslim Brotherhood, some small 
takfiri groups, and the Sufi orders. 
Drawing a typology of  Salafi movements after the January 25 revolution 
is a complex endeavour due to the numerous, but overlapping schools 
of  thought. But, in general, there are two types of  Salafi movements in 
Egypt. 
Traditional Salafis
Also known as scholarly Salafis, these include Salafi schools and sheikhs 
in Alexandria, Cairo and Mansoura, as well as independent preachers 
such as Mohammed Hassan, Mohammed Hussein Yaqoub, and 
Mahmoud al-Masri. Traditional Salafis fall into three types:
(a) The Salafi Call. Growing out of  student activism in the 1970s, 
the movement took on an organised form in 1980 when young 
Salafis formed a quasi-federation for preachers; they later called 
themselves the Salafi School. After several years of  grass-roots work, 
they renamed the organisation the Salafi Call, after it spread all over 
the country and won hundreds of  thousands of  followers. They were 
also known as the Alexandria Salafis or Academic Salafis. 
(b) Movement Salafis (Ultra-Salafis). While the Salafi Call was 
establishing itself  in Alexandria, in Cairo’s Shubra neighbourhood a 
group of  young Salafis formed another movement, calling themselves 
Movement Salafis. They have virtually the same programme as 
the Salafi Call (the Alexandria School), but go further by declaring 
individual rulers unbelievers if  they do not rule by God’s revealed 
law, and they preach this in their sermons. They believe that 
participating in elected bodies is prohibited because these are 
governed by something other than God’s law and put a man-made 
constitution above God’s law, which is unbelief. These are ideas they 
held prior to the January 25 revolution. 
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(c) Independent Salafis. An extension of  the old Salafi trend in 
Egypt, represented by numerous groups and associations since the 
early twentieth century, such as the al-Hidaya Association, led by 
Sheikh Mohammed al-Khidr Hussein, which called for observance 
of  the Sunna and countering harmful innovations. Its members are 
concerned with adopting external markers of  their adherence, seen 
in clothing, beards, hair, and the headscarf. The movement does not 
believe in collective, organised action. Individual leaders became 
immersed in politics after the January 25 revolution, but not under 
an institutional umbrella. 
Salafi-oriented movements
These comprise numerous Islamist groups that are Salafi in doctrine 
and belief, but not in their organisation and operations; they have their 
own ways of  working, and independent outreach and preaching styles. 
They include:
(a) Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiya. Which has one of  the 
largest networks of  charity organisations and advocates Islam as a 
comprehensive system that governs all aspects of  life. 
(b) The Shar’iya Association. Founded in 1912 by Sheikh 
Mahmoud Khattab al-Subki as the Shar’iya Association for the 
Cooperation of  Those Working with the Quran and Muhammad’s 
Sunna, the primary objective of  the association at the time of  its 
establishment was preaching and guidance, calling for compliance 
with the Sunna and countering innovations, and supporting 
cooperation and social solidarity among the people. The association 
has 350 branches throughout Egypt. 
(c) Jama’a al-Islamiya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The 
Jama’a al-Islamiya emerged in the 1970s in the permissive climate 
that president Anwar Sadat (1970–81) fostered. At the time, it 
comprised members of  what would later become the EIJ, which 
split from the Jama’a after 1981. The Jama’a al-Islamiya and EIJ 
engaged in a comprehensive revision of  their ideological foundations 
from 1997–2005 onwards, an experience unique to Egypt and these 
Islamist groups. With the adoption of  this revisionist thought, the 
Jama’a al-Islamiya and EIJ left the jihadi movement and joined the 
Salafi camp, being naturally inclined to the Salafi programme and 
doctrine; once they had given up the armed struggle, they became 
like other Salafi movements in Egypt. After the revolution, these 
groups experienced an ideological relapse, as they took a clear turn 
towards violence, in theory and practice, particularly after allying 
with the Muslim Brotherhood following its removal from office. 
To conclude, Salafi movements of  all kinds underwent an atypically 
rapid ideological shift, entering politics from all directions, despite 
having declared the political process illicit in the past. They did this 
without advancing any proof  of  the permissibility of  political action 
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as they had once offered hundreds of  proofs for its prohibition. This 
raises questions and doubts about the transformation, leading observers 
to believe that Salafi movements see the post-revolution phase as more 
akin to a war – and war is deception, as the hadith has it (Nasera 2011).
If  Salafis do not fight this war, they will have wasted a valuable 
opportunity to see the implementation of  Islamic law, establish an 
Islamic state, and move closer to achieving the cherished dream of  a 
greater Islamic state under the caliphate. Salafi movements may have 
joined the political process out of  what they viewed as legitimately 
exigent circumstances. This is also what led Salafi movements later to 
turn to violence; they viewed the use of  violence as a legitimate necessity, 
in much the same way that they viewed engagement with politics. 
Jihadi and takfiri organisations
A number of  jihadi groups emerged in force amid the security vacuum 
that followed the January 25 revolution. Founded in the Sinai Peninsula, 
these organisations grew and expanded during Morsi’s tenure. The 
president turned a blind eye to them, which led to an explosion of  jihadi 
activity in Sinai (Bakr 2012a). The groups are united by their goal of  
overthrowing the Egyptian regime and attacking Israel with force of  
arms. Although there are not many of  them, the groups are influential 
and can deal painful blows to the Egyptian regime and Israel. 
The takfiri groups’ thought leads them to declare society as a whole an 
infidel society. They therefore consider the ruler to be an infidel along 
with others who deny certain religious teachings. They even go so far 
as to declare anyone who does not hold the ruler to be an infidel to 
be an unbeliever. From there, they consider the general population 
to be unbelievers, seeing them as content with unbelief  or refusing 
to condemn it. Takfiri thought in Egypt is not widespread. Indeed, it 
is always in sharp conflict with society, which utterly rejects its weak 
premises and logic, its extremism, and its deviation from Egyptians’ 
generally peaceful disposition. 
Nevertheless, takfiri groups are dangerous insofar as they resort to 
violence and sanction bloodshed and attacks on property, particularly 
against what they view as infidel state institutions, Copts, and police 
and security personnel. In general, takfiri groups believe that their noble 
ends justify the means, but they cannot easily find purchase in Egyptian 
society, due to the absence of  strong organisational links between their 
members and the lack of  a hospitable location in most of  the country. 
Jihadi groups pursue violence against the ‘secular’ apparatuses 
controlling the state, to defeat them. These include groups such as Ansar 
Beit al-Maqdes, Ansar el Jihad and Jeish al-Islam. Their aspiration was 
to establish a separate emirate in Sinai by first eliminating the army and 
police presence, then taking over the judiciary and the main institutions 
of  the state as a pathway to taking over the country. A faction of  these 
groups initially opposed this plan, but after Morsi’s overthrow they 
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considered violence against the regime as a natural outcome. These 
groups espouse a takfiri ideology and believe in armed violence as a 
means of  establishing an Islamic state. They also claim that anyone who 
does do not follow their ideology is an infidel.
The relationship between jihadi groups and these apparatuses is one of  
mutual war, with each side attempting to defeat and eliminate the other 
to implement its political and intellectual project. Regardless of  jihadi 
groups’ differing programmes and political and ideological references, 
other factions, movements, or groups will always declare them non-
believers or not Islamic enough, opposing them either with violence or 
fatwas declaring them infidels. 
The most significant jihadi and takfiri groups in Egypt now, particularly 
in Sinai, are: 
(a) Al-Tawheed wal Jihad. An extremist, violent jihadi group, it 
is closer to the takfiri school than the Salafi thought most jihadi 
movements embrace (Bakr 2012b). This organisation was responsible 
for bombings in Taba and Sharm al-Sheikh in 2004 and 2006. 
Almost all its members are natives of  Sinai, and they rely on weapons 
left over from wars and other campaigns in Sinai. The group has 
maintained strong links with several Palestinian factions such as 
Jeish al-Islam (originally known as Jeish al-Fatteh) led by Mumtaz 
Daghmash. They received military training in Gaza, and many 
used tunnels to reach the Gaza Strip, where they trained in weapons 
and explosives. A few Palestinians joined the group and trained 
members to use the explosives deployed in the Sinai bombings. 
The organisation has curbed its activities substantially following an 
Egyptian security crackdown after the bombings. 
(b) Ansar Beit al-Maqdes. A jihadi, Salafi organisation, it seeks 
first and foremost to threaten the Israel and its Zionist supporters 
worldwide by various means, including bombing gas pipelines 
between Egypt and Israel and firing rockets into Israel from Sinai. The 
organisation comprises Egyptians and Palestinians, most of  whom are 
adherents to al-Qaeda’s line of  thought. The group has distinguished 
itself  through its ability to undertake successful bombings of  the 
pipeline; for example, on 9 December 2014. It has been reported that 
some Palestinian organisations maintain ties with the group and supply 
it with money and weapons, as well as expertise, advice and military 
training (Amer 2014). It is a relatively new organisation compared 
to Tawhid and Jihad. Other nationalities besides Egyptians and 
Palestinians are joining the organisation, raising numerous questions 
about the group and its emergence at this critical juncture. 
(c) Ansar al-Jihad. Ansar al-Jihad in Sinai is an al-Qaeda franchise. 
First appearing in the media after al-Qaeda announced Ayman 
al-Zawahiri’s leadership on 16 June 2011, it emerged out of  the 
Egyptian revolution and the attendant security vacuum and loss 
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of  control over Sinai. The organisation is largely composed of  
Egyptians from Sinai and other provinces, but it has been reported 
that former members of  the EIJ joined after escaping from prison 
during January 25. Ansar al-Jihad in Sinai seeks to establish an 
Islamic emirate in Sinai, with Islam the sole basis of  legislation. To 
achieve this goal, it is attempting to expel the army and police from 
Sinai and take over all security offices. It also sought to pressure the 
Egyptian government into cancelling the Camp David Accords and 
intervene to end the siege in Gaza.
Ansar al-Jihad has carried out successive bombings of  the gas pipeline 
to Israel. The group in July 2011 attempted to set fire to the second-
largest police station in Arish, when some 200 masked attackers gained 
control of  the station using advanced weapons (rocket-propelled 
grenades, grenades and automatic weapons). Army and police forces 
countered the attack – the first of  its kind in Egypt – and the clashes 
left five people dead, including one police officer and one military 
officer, and 19 seriously injured. That month the group also attacked 
the Egyptian Border Guard, and in August carried out a bomb attack 
in Eilat in southern Israel, which killed eight Israeli soldiers. 
3 Religious movements’ turn to violence in the transitional phase: causes
Several changes after the January 25 revolution clearly had an impact 
on Islamist movements’ relations with one another. These fostered 
a rapprochement between movements that in the past had strong 
disagreements, which was achieved by forging new alliances that went 
beyond doctrine and programmes of  action to become post-ideological 
alliances. These shifts also gave rise to a new strand in the Islamist 
movement – a third way – as some jihadi movements embraced 
revisionist thought and renounced violence, but without offering a clear 
picture of  the new path and programme they would pursue, which would 
enable observers to understand how they would engage with relevant or 
new issues. After the revisionist process, these movements did not join 
other existing groups (Salafi movements or the Muslim Brotherhood), 
remaining separate but without a distinct ideology to identify them. 
The most dangerous shift has been the intellectual apostasy seen in 
some movements that had embraced revisionist thought and abandoned 
violence and terrorism. Under the rise of  the Islamists, these movements 
reverted to their earlier ways, using violence, even if  somewhat covertly, in 
inflammatory speeches, though some members engaged in open violence. 
Transformations in the region have also brought some movements to 
prominence at the expense of  others. Large swathes of  Salafis in some 
areas of  the region have turned to jihadi thought. This shift outpaced the 
migrations from the jihadi camp to the Salafi camp, which had taken a 
substantial period of  time, indicating perhaps that the turn to violence is 
easier in the region than the turn away from it. The jihadi umbrella also 
benefitted from the rise to prominence of  al-Qaeda in the region after 
the Arab revolts, in particular al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
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and Ansar al-Din, and in East Africa al-Tawheed wal Jihad. Other 
Salafi movements in the region joined them, especially from Mauritania, 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. The dominant voice began to 
shift from Salafi circles to more jihadi ones, as was the case in Tunisia. 
In Egypt this was also apparent in the Salafi discourse around the time 
of  the 2011–12 elections, when former vice-president and head of  the 
intelligence service Omar Suleiman5 stood for president and members of  
the Jama’al-Islamiya threatened him with violence if  he ran for office.
A significant consequence of  these shifts is the sharp divisions they 
have created in the ranks of  jihadi organisations across the region. 
Jihadi groups have witnessed so many splits in their ranks that divisions 
have become an endemic feature. One jihadi group may split into two 
independent groups because of  disagreements and soon enough each 
new group is plagued by its own divisions, leading to a proliferation 
of  organisations. The fragmentation within the ranks of  the jihadi 
movements is due to several factors, the most important of  which is the 
power of  influential leaders who gain popularity among the people to 
convince them to split from the mother movement. 
The reasons for this are differences in thought and ideology. For 
example, if  within the movement a group emerges that considers there 
to be a deviance in thinking that needs addressing and the leadership 
refuses on the basis that it is unchangeable, a splinter emerges. This 
explains the emergence of  groups such as Ansar al-Jihad, Majles Shura 
al-Mujahedeen, Ansar Beit al-Maqdes, Jeish al-Islam and al-Tawheed 
wal Jihad. It creates an air of  competitiveness among the different 
splinter groups rather than complementarity, as each group tries to show 
the rest that it is more active and more ‘jihadist’ than the others. This 
splintering not only means that acts of  violence occur more often, but 
that it is more difficult to enter into negotiations because they will not 
necessarily agree on the same position, and representatives of  one group 
may not be entitled to speak on behalf  of  other groups. It also means it 
is more difficult to control them. 
3.1 Post-ideological alliances
Political Islam emerged after the fall of  the caliphate in 1924 with the 
founding of  the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, followed by the birth of  
other movements. Since then a state of  hostility has prevailed among 
these groups due to ideological and doctrinal differences, which at times 
has led some groups to declare others infidels. Often these movements 
have waged fierce battles against one another, particularly among the 
three main Islamist camps in the region: Salafi movements, jihadi 
movements and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The enmity between Islamist groups is stronger than their enmity 
towards non-Islamists because it is based on doctrinal disagreements, 
each movement seeing itself  as the possessor of  the absolute truth and 
the true representative of  Islam, with the others as distorted versions 
of  Islam. The latter are thus more dangerous to Islam than liberal or 
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nationalist movements, which do not claim to be Islamic. Battles with 
non-Islamists are not difficult; they can easily be defeated by turning 
the dispute into a religious battle. But other Islamist movements wear 
the same cloak of  religion and speak the same language, with the same 
logic; they are therefore a much more formidable enemy because they 
use the same weapons. 
After the Arab revolutions, however, many Islamist movements drew 
closer together, and formed strong alliances, despite sharp ideological 
differences. These were post-ideological alliances, partnerships that 
disregarded ideological differences to achieve common interests. 
‘Coalitions above ideology’ were formed because movements found 
that when pressed, political and financial interests require joining forces 
irrespective of  ideological differences. 
One of  the most well known of  these alliances was the National 
Coalition to Support Legitimacy, which was announced on 27 June 2013, 
three days before the 30 June uprising. The Coalition brought together 
the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jama’a al-Islamiya, remnants of  the EIJ, 
and several Salafi movements as well as political parties.6 The Coalition 
is significant because it brought together various political forces who had 
major ideological differences with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
In addition, an alliance was created between the Muslim Brotherhood 
and some jihadi and takfiri organisations in Sinai, which had previously 
declared the Brotherhood and Morsi to be infidels, adding that there 
was no difference between Morsi and Hosni Mubarak: both were 
unbelievers who did not rule by God’s law. 
These alliances were based on common interests that went beyond 
ideological tenets. Islamist movements recognise two types of  
differences, those that are unbridgeable and those that allow for a 
diversity of  opinion. The first type precludes any alliance or even 
cooperation between the two differing groups, while the second does 
not. In general, the disagreements between allied movements were of  
the first type, for they were primarily based on ideological and doctrinal 
disputes. To achieve their common interests, however, these movements 
disregarded doctrine to conclude a post-ideological alliance. 
These alliances played an important role in feeding the violence in 
Egypt in the transitional period. They put all movements on the same 
side as violent jihadi groups, joining together to support the Muslim 
Brotherhood. While the jihadi movements played a larger role in the 
violence, other allied movements supported and aided them, which had 
not been the case in the past. Given this support, the violence of  jihadi 
groups was even more extreme. The Brotherhood managed to create 
these alliances for the first time in the history of  Islamist movements by 
allowing the presence of  militant groups in Sinai, and turning a blind 
eye to their access to funding and arms, in return for their supporting 
the Brotherhood in office and defending it. 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 3 May 2016: ‘Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and Beyond’ 77–98 | 89
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
The post-June 2013 situation indicates that these alliances are spreading. 
Islamist movements have discovered that post-ideological alliances are 
the shortest path for the biggest gains, leading them to place interests 
and political and material benefits above doctrinal and ideological 
principles. Examples include AQIM, which has included a number 
of  Salafi groups that were previously enemies. This suggests that the 
network of  such alliances may spread in the coming period, which will 
have serious ramifications for the entire region.
3.2 The Muslim Brotherhood and the turn to violence
The Muslim Brotherhood is fundamentally a political, religious 
outreach organisation that relies primarily on public action, and it is 
therefore unlikely that the Brotherhood will go entirely underground. 
The danger, instead, is that it will establish a secret apparatus to 
undertake violent operations the organisation does not wish to claim, 
much like the secret organisation it established in the past. This move 
carries many risks, however, and in the past had dire repercussions 
for the group. The Brotherhood appears to have realised this and is 
therefore unlikely to take this step, especially when it has an alternative: 
namely, relying on the jihadi organisations with which it has allied itself, 
especially during Morsi’s presidency, as well as depending on Hamas. 
As the revolution moved forward, the Brotherhood and its Islamist 
allies were thrown off balance and rushed towards violence. They 
began by threatening and attacking opposition demonstrations, but 
then took several confused steps to address the crisis. The non-Islamist 
movements’ ability to mobilise such large groups of  people caught them 
by surprise, and the Brotherhood leadership found it difficult to agree 
on the best course of  action to take. Some called for a general jihad as 
the only way to prevent Morsi’s overthrow, others for peaceful protests 
to ensure that the movement’s projected commitment to non-violent 
democratic engagement was upheld. 
In the end, they pursued a number of  sometimes apparently 
contradictory tactics. For one, they mobilised their supporters in force 
in an attempt to balance out opposition forces, portraying matters to 
their supporters as a conflict between Islam and secularism, while trying 
to present the battle on the ground internationally as a coup against 
legitimacy. Mobilisation was in full force, bringing supporters from 
Upper Egypt, the Delta and all over Cairo, assembling in Nahda Square 
to coincide with pro-Morsi demonstrations in several governorates. This 
came after the Brotherhood issued a ‘general alert’ to defend legitimacy. 
At these demonstrations, supporters brandished clubs and bladed 
weapons, and performed military exercises to terrorise citizens. This was 
a clear sign of  impending violence (Ghoneam 2013).
In this charged atmosphere, when demonstrators attempted to 
storm the Brotherhood headquarters in Muqattam the Brotherhood 
responded with violence. Eight demonstrators were killed in the clashes 
and 70 more injured (Al-Arabiya 2013). They captured a Brotherhood 
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sniper, who said that 250 people were on top of  the headquarters 
armed with shotguns and automatic weapons. On the evening of  2 July, 
the Brotherhood sent out armed groups in the capital to attack local 
residents, in an attempt to sow violence and foment unrest in various 
areas of  Cairo and the governorates. The objective was to prompt Gen. 
Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, the head of  the armed forces, to retract his decision 
and keep Morsi in office, out of  fear of  sparking off a civil war. Sit-ins at 
Rabia al-Adawiya and Nahda Squares also brought violence with them. 
After protesters refused to leave the squares, security forces used force 
to disperse them, which led to violent confrontations on 14 August; 
632 people killed, including eight police officers, 1,492 injured, and 
around 800 arrested. The National Council for Human Rights pointed 
out that while protesters had fired first, the police’s response was 
excessive and out of  proportion (ahramonline 2014).
The crisis was the worst the Muslim Brotherhood had experienced in its 
long history. For the first time, it found itself  out in the cold because of  
its use of  violence. Long accustomed to confrontation with the state, the 
Brotherhood had derived a sense of  victimhood and persecution, and it 
was one of  the primary reasons that many Egyptians sympathised with it.
Although the crisis proved too big for the leadership and its capacities, 
the Muslim Brotherhood maintained its organisational cohesion, 
because it was protected ideologically in the minds of  its members. 
The Brotherhood has a singular ability to maintain internal cohesion 
and counter divisions because its thought has focused on equating 
the group with Islam and vice-versa in the minds of  its members. It 
draws on Quranic verses and hadiths that prohibit going against the 
larger community of  Muslims, and applying these texts to themselves, 
thereby leading individual Brothers to believe that deviating from the 
Brotherhood’s teachings is tantamount to deviating from Islam. 
In addition to this internal cohesion, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoys 
sympathy among sections of  the people, especially in Upper Egypt. 
Nevertheless, its turn to violence has given rise to several severe crises. 
First of  all, it can no longer mobilise support as in the past due its 
declining popularity in the street, particularly in the Delta. This has 
become apparent in the poor attendance at Brotherhood demonstrations 
since the June 2013 revolution, many of  which numbered only in the 
hundreds. Moreover, its organisational performance has been weakened 
by the arrest of  active leaders who could make important and strategic 
decisions, leaving the leadership to those unable to deal with current 
challenges. This has led to haphazard decision-making and an inability 
to define a clear vision for the current phase. 
Finally, although the cohesion that has been built into the Muslim 
Brotherhood over its long history makes it unlikely that that the group 
will collapse or fragment into smaller entities, circumstances since 
mid-2015 may have a greater impact and foster increased divisions in 
the group’s ranks. The Brotherhood suddenly finds itself  confronting 
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millions of  Egyptians after taking up violence to achieve its goals, 
contradicting three decades of  claims to have definitively renounced 
violence. Internally, a leadership struggle is taking place. Many young 
members would like to challenge the movement’s leaders, but are 
waiting until the current crisis passes. 
Any predictions about the future of  the Muslim Brotherhood, and how 
to engage with it or integrate it into society therefore depend on the 
consequences the current crisis has for the organisation and if  it resorts 
to the use of  further violence. In any case, the cost of  surviving the crisis 
of  violence will be very high indeed. 
3.3 Third way movements
Since the late 1990s, the Arab region has seen a wave of  unique 
ideological transformations, as numerous jihadi movements renounced 
violence in what became known as the revisionist wave.7 Thousands 
of  former jihadis or their sympathisers turned away from jihadi 
thinking and were persuaded of  the failure of  the jihadi enterprise the 
movements promoted. These transformations were a process of  self-
criticism aimed at these organisations’ former concepts and ideological 
assumptions, as well as the practices that accompanied them, and it 
involved establishing new ideological foundations and priorities that 
differed from the previous priorities and inevitabilities (Fiqqi 2010).
The movements that engaged in this process were thus left without 
an identity. That is, they had no particular intellectual orientation or 
defining features that would permit one to identify their ideological 
underpinnings. In turn, it became difficult to categorise them among 
the major Islamist movements in the region – the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Salafi trend – because when they abandoned their old ideas as 
part of  the revisionist process, they did not adopt a new way of  thinking 
that could ground them or define their programme and objectives. They 
thus became ‘third way’ groups of  unknown identity and indeterminate 
ideas, which raised many questions about their aims and future. 
Several organisations in the region underwent this process, holding 
no distinct ideological features, most notably the Egyptian Jama’a 
al-Islamiya. The group unilaterally declared a ceasefire in 1997 
before announcing a wholesale revision of  its thought, conduct and 
organisational structure in 2002; the Jama’a eventually produced 
25 books detailing the revisionist process. It was followed by the EIJ, 
some of  whose leaders began the revisionist process in prison, led by 
Sayyed Imam al-Sherif, the author of  The Document to Rationalize the 
Jihad in Egypt and the Islamic World and The Exposure.8 Despite the general 
support for the revisions within the EIJ in Egypt, the group was not as 
successful in its transformation as the Jama’a al-Islamiya, with some 
leaders outside Egypt continuing to reject the entire process. After the 
revisions, the Jama’a al-Islamiya and EIJ became third way movements 
because they had not offered any alternative programme of  thought 
(Al-Khateeb 2008).
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The danger third way movements pose is that they have no specific 
identity or clear intellectual framework that would permit an 
understanding of  their current orientation and future plans, particularly 
because movements such as the Jama’a al-Islamiya and EIJ have become 
clearly opportunistic, power-hungry organisations, looking for political 
and economic gains by any means. Without an ideological framework 
to govern their actions, they wait for the moment to ally themselves 
with another movement that will enable them to achieve these gains. 
Moreover, some have resumed their use of  violence, among them 
members of  the Jama’a and EIJ. Indeed, another danger of  third way 
movements is that they are liable to (re)turn to violence at any moment.
3.4 Ideological apostasy
In the wake of  the relatively peaceful Arab uprisings, many researchers 
believed that jihadi movements in the region were on the wane, 
especially because the uprisings were preceded by the revisionist process 
undertaken by many jihadi movements, starting in Egypt with the 
Jama’a al-Islamiya and followed by the EIJ, the Islamic Fighting Group 
in Libya, the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, several Salafi movements 
in North Africa (particularly Mauritania), and leaders of  al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula. 
A the beginning of  the Arab Spring, several former jihadi movements 
that had embraced revisionist thought engaged with the political 
process, which they had previously boycotted and declared prohibited. 
In Egypt, jihadi movements vied to establish new political parties, with 
the Jama’a al-Islamiya forming the Construction and Development 
Party, and the EIJ creating the Safety and Development Party.
Despite the move to renounce violence and enter the political fray, 
an ideological relapse or retreat has been evident. Some of  these 
movements have begun to reconsider the bases of  the revisionist 
thought that led to their renunciation of  violence, such as the 
prohibition on taking up arms and rebelling against the ruler. Jama’a 
al-Islamiya leaders in Egypt, for example, allowed taking up arms in 
self-defence against an unjust ruler and to rebel against him. Members 
of  these movements again took part in violence. Many members of  
al-Qaeda in Sinai (Ansar al-Jihad) are thought to be former members 
of  the EIJ, and Jama’a al-Islamiya leaders appealed to the Egyptian 
government during the uprising in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi to 
permit the group’s youth wing to join fighting there. 
This act of  ideological apostasy by jihadi groups opened the door to 
the return of  violence, which soon began to grow out of  control and 
has contributed to a spike in religious violence in the country, which 
has manifested itself  in attacks on Coptic Christians, churches and 
Sufi shrines. In fact, in 2016 two types of  jihadi movement exist. The 
first, including the jihadi organisations scattered across the Sinai, are 
those in the region that continue to practise armed violence and seek 
to use it achieve their objectives. The second group, however, is more 
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problematic and more dangerous: jihadi movements that engage in 
armed violence after having embraced revisionist thought. We are thus 
faced with a wave of  religious violence due to this ideological apostasy 
that is spreading day by day. 
3.5 The shift from Salafi thought to jihadi thought
The shift from Salafi to jihadi thought is one of  the most dangerous 
seen in Islamist movements since the Arab revolutions, particularly in 
Egypt during the transitional period. Jihadi movements in the region 
have expanded into a ‘jihadi umbrella’ at the expense of  what used to 
be the largest Islamist umbrella movement prior to the Arab Spring, the 
Salafis. The Salafis had expanded when several jihadi groups turned to 
the Salafi programme of  action and ideas based on religious outreach, 
disseminating the faith, the oneness of  God, a desire for religious 
knowledge, and an absolute prohibition on armed struggle. Indeed, 
non-violence is the most significant feature that distinguishes the Salafi 
movement from the jihadi movement. 
The shifts within the Jama’a al-Islamiya and the EIJ after the revisions 
were the most renown expression of  the move from the jihadi to the 
Salafi umbrella. After the January 25 revolution, however, a shift in 
the opposite direction took place, as Islamists moved out of  the Salafi 
camp and into the jihadi camp. This move was rapid, far outpacing the 
gradual transformation from jihadi to Salafi. This indicates that the turn 
to violence might be much easier than the turn to peace. 
When al-Qaeda in Sinai emerged, it attracted numerous Salafis to its 
ranks. Jihadi movements such as the Jama’a al-Islamiya and EIJ that 
had embraced revisionism also began to change their rhetoric after 
January 25, moving closer to a jihadi discourse. Indeed, from time to 
time, Jama’a al-Islamiya warned of  its potential to take up violence 
again (for example, as mentioned above, when Omar Suleiman 
announced that he would run for president). Many Salafis also turned 
to violence, reflected in the demolition of  shrines in numerous areas and 
attacks on Coptic churches. 
Increased jihadi activity at the expense of  Salafi activity has 
repercussions for the region. It has grave security consequences: 
jihadis have successfully carried out major operations that threaten 
the security of  entire countries and their territorial integrity by taking 
control of  certain regions and imposing their rule, as was the case in 
Sinai immediately after Morsi’s overthrow. They can also inflict major 
casualties in the ranks of  those fighting them. Attacks lead to capital 
flight and impede production; some directly target tourism in areas 
where it is vital to the local economy. Moreover, state facilities have been 
attacked and destroyed,9 entailing major economic losses.
At the same time, these groups’ activities have serious political 
ramifications, insofar as they aim to overthrow all regimes in all states 
in the region, including those that describe themselves as Islamic, with 
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the goal of  establishing a caliphate through jihad and armed action. 
Meanwhile, the relationship between the jihadi and Salafi camps is 
inversely proportional: when one grows, the other shrinks. Current 
conditions indicate that the jihadi camp is expanding at an exponential 
pace, which may have serious consequences for religious violence in Egypt. 
3.6 Jihadi factionalism
Immediately before the Arab revolutions, jihadi groups across the 
region were on the retreat, and virtually none were active in Egypt. 
Paradoxically, the Arab Spring, a series of  peaceful uprisings that were 
thought to mark the beginning of  the end for jihadi movements in the 
region – and maybe the world – actually inaugurated a new jihadi wave, 
stronger and more active than the wave of  the 1990s. Subsequently, 
however, jihadi movements experienced numerous splits in their ranks, 
to the point that factionalism has become a defining feature of  the 
movement. For example, following the Arab Spring, al-Tawheed wal 
Jihad emerged out of  AQIM in 2011, and then ‘tanzim al mouq’eoon 
bel dema’a’, which came into being in December 2012, led by former 
AQIM leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Also to splinter off from AQIM is 
Ansar al Shari’a in Yemen which became an independent movement 
with its own ideological and tactical features. Meanwhile, in Egypt 
Ansar Beit al-Maqdes split from Ansar al-Jihad, and Kat’aeb al Forqan 
subsequently split from Ansar Beit al-Maqdes. 
Divisions occur in jihadi ranks for various reasons, but the most 
significant factor is the presence of  an influential figure who attracts 
followers, which leads to a schism, having persuading those around him 
to break off from the parent organisation. The causes of  division can be 
ideological or doctrinal. One group in an organisation may believe that 
some doctrinal shortcoming must be addressed, while the leadership 
does not deem it a shortcoming, believing that doctrinal frameworks are 
sacrosanct. In turn, the dissenting faction splits off with a new ideology, 
usually composed of  the old body of  thought with a layer of  new ideas, 
under a new leadership. 
Divisions may also occur for political reasons. One faction may believe 
that it will not achieve its political interests inside the organisation and 
therefore splits off to pursue these interests. Personal factors also play 
a role. Someone who aspires to leadership may see this as his natural 
place, from which he will carry out major operations that the current 
leadership cannot. He therefore breaks off and establishes a new group, 
setting himself  up as leader and attempting major operations, to prove 
to others that he is worthy of  the leadership and was right to splinter off. 
Factionalism will have major negative consequences and lead to an 
increase in religious violence. Relations among jihadi groups in general, 
and particularly splinter groups, are competitive: when one jihadi 
group undertakes an operation, another (splinter) group will attempt 
an even bigger operation to prove that its members are more devoted 
and fervent supporters of  Islam and the jihad. Factionalism also leads 
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to the proliferation of  jihadi organisations, making it difficult to control 
or negotiate with them, or even bring them together to agree on a 
position. This in turn makes it difficult to engage with and confront 
these organisations in the short and long term. The greater the number 
of  splinter groups, the greater the proliferation of  acts of  terrorism and 
violence. 
3.7 Regional ripple effects
Three types of  Jihadi movements are present in the region that have 
become particularly active since the Arab Spring, most of  which 
subscribe to al-Qaeda’s thinking. The first is the ‘mother’ movement 
itself, al-Qaeda, which Osama Bin Laden established in 1988 under the 
name of  ‘the Islamic international front for jihad against the Jews and 
Crusaders’. It formed out of  a number of  jihadi forces in various parts 
of  the world, and focused its activities on Pakistan and Afghanistan. The 
second are branches of  al-Qaeda that were formed under Bin Laden’s 
direct instruction. These include al-Qaeda in Gaziret al Arab, which is 
active in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. While some extend their ideological 
thinking from the mother movement, they are organisationally separate 
and do not get their directions or instructions from al-Qaeda. The third 
type comprises groups that looked to al-Qaeda as a model for jihadi 
activism, and follow its ideological thinking and way of  organisation, 
but are not formally linked to al-Qaeda, either the mother movement or 
its offshoots, and were not formed by Bin Laden. These include Ansar 
al-Jihad, AQIM, Jama’at Ansar al-Jihad in Sinai and al-Qaeda fi bilad 
al Rafedeen in Iraq. 
The map of  jihadi movements in the Middle East has changed since the 
Arab revolts. The fall of  the security apparatus in countries in the midst 
of  chaos, the relaxation of  many states’ border patrols, the circulation 
of  weapons, humans and resources have enabled such movements to 
thrive in the Arab world. Many of  these organisations recognise that 
this is a moment in the region’s history that has afforded them the 
opportunity to spread and strengthen ties between one another, with a 
view to establishing an Islamic caliphate based on a model of  forming 
Islamic emirates in land they occupy, as with attempts at establishing 
Islamic emirates in the south of  Sinai, in Tunisia, in Yemen, in Iraq and 
the north of  Mali. This has resonance from one country to another, 
with ripple effects. The growth of  the jihadi movement in Egypt after 
the January 25 revolution had a ripple effect in activing movements 
elsewhere. Likewise, the regional crisis that has grown out of  Syria, 
and the situation of  jihadi movements in the region, influences the 
positioning of  the jihadi movement in Egypt. What we see is the 
emergence of  an situation that is very much conducive to the growth 
and strengthening of  networks of  jihadi groups everywhere. 
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Notes
1 Those who assume ‘takfiri’ thought hold others who do not espouse 
their version of  Islam to be infidels, even if  they are Muslim and 
members of  Islamist movements. In the eyes of  members of  takfiri 
movements, it is legitimate to kill people and take their wealth if  they 
are declared to be kafir (infidel).
2 From insider information, it appeared that the Muslim Brotherhood 
looked favourably on the rallies that the Jama’a al-Islamiya held 
in February 2013 in support of  the Brotherhood and the current 
administration.
3 Article 2 of  the Egyptian constitution since 1977 has stated that 
‘the principles of  Islamic Sharia are the main source of  legislation.’ 
Before the 1977 amendment to the constitution, Article 2 stated that 
‘the principles of  Islamic Sharia are a main source of  legislation’. 
Following the January 25 revolution, a controversy erupted about 
whether ‘secularists’ wanted to revert to the pre-1977 formulation 
in a new constitution, which would in effect dilute the centrality of  
Islamic Sharia in governance and legislation.
4 These included easing of  the conditions of  eligibility for a presidential 
candidate, full judicial oversight over the presidential elections and 
clear articulation of  the processes representing a roadmap.
5 He was also in charge of  negotiations between the regime and the 
Muslim Brotherhood during Mubarak’s presidency.
6 These include the Labour Party, the Reform Party, the Watan Party, 
Arab Unity Party, Raya Party and Islamic party.
7 The revisionist wave encompassed the Jama’a al-Islamiya. In a 
number of  publications, the jihadists denounced violence – but 
not necessarily in favour of  political activities. This ideological 
revisionism continued up to the January 25 revolution. Subsequently, 
some of  these movements appear to have reversed their positions on 
violence, as speeches of  the late Essam And el Maged and Tarek el 
Zomor, leaders of  the Jama’a al-Islamiya, reflected. 
8 These documents are of  paramount importance to revisionist 
thinking on jihad.
9 See, for example, www.masress.com/alwafd/621466 .
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Rethinking the Youth Bulge and 
Violence
Akram Alfy*
Abstract The dominance of a generation of combat age, high levels 
of education combined with high unemployment, failed cities, and 
the relatively long duration of the transitional period still constitute 
an appropriate atmosphere for the explosion of a new wave of youth 
violence in the Middle East. The author takes Egypt as a case study. Egypt 
witnessed an unprecedented spike in violence following the revolution of 
January 25, 2011. This article first examines the political violence through 
the lens of political demography, drawing partly on Henrik Urdal’s theses 
on the impact of demographic factors on the risk of political violence, but 
more broadly documents and analyses the trajectory of youth movements’ 
involvement with violence in relation to issues of employment, education 
and urbanisation. 
1 Introduction
Several analyses have attempted to explain the growing political 
violence in Egypt since January 2011, most of  them attributing 
the repeated clashes to political polarisation, economic decline, the 
security vacuum, the decline of  state status and authority, the absence 
of  social consensus, or the intensification of  the class struggle. Some 
analysts have also focused on young people’s sense of  frustration with 
the hijacking of  the revolution, first by the Supreme Council of  the 
Armed Forces (SCAF), and later by the Muslim Brotherhood, and their 
attempts to reclaim their stolen rights and confront the aspirations of  
the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition to political and social causes, 
others have discussed what they see as a shift in the Egyptian character 
following the revolution, from submission and concession to rebellion 
and rejection. Writings have addressed the behavioural changes of  
Egyptians, the emergence of  a culture of  violence, and the escape from 
the grip of  repression.1
In the context of  this debate, this article looks at rising violence using 
political demography, which seeks to interpret political behaviour, 
including political violence, using demographic factors. The article 
discusses the nexus between youth cohorts’ domination of  the population 
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pyramid, growing numbers of  young university graduates, and violence, 
in addition to the role of  urban growth and urbanisation in increasing 
the risk of  political violence. Finally, the article looks at how political 
instability and the extended duration of  the transitional period have also 
increased the likelihood of  violence, as well as other possible factors, such 
as previous experience of  deploying violence as a method of  contestation 
and the organisational structure of  youth movements. 
1.1 Combat age and the youth bulge
In 2013, the number of  young people aged 15–29 in Egypt reached 
24.38 million (CAPMAS 2013: 5), in a society where 54 per cent of  the 
population was already under the age of  24. This fact in itself  increases the 
risk of  political violence, according to Henrik Urdal and Jack Goldstone. 
According to Urdal, youth bulges in a country increase the potential 
and motives for political violence, especially if  they are associated with 
other factors, such as high youth unemployment, a quasi-democratic 
system, and a high dependency ratio (Urdal 2006: 609). Goldstone 
believes that the potential for violence and political change is higher 
in societies experiencing the second stage of  the demographic 
transition, which brings higher birth rates, lower mortality rates, and 
the beginning of  industrial progress and service provision. This stage 
is also characterised by a high proportion of  youth (aged 15–24) in the 
population age structure and a growing middle class of  educated young 
people that the labour market is unable to absorb (Goldstone, Kaufman 
and Duffy Toff 2012: 9).
In political demography, youth bulges signify a high proportion of  youth 
(young people aged 14–25) in the total population, meaning that society 
is young. If  we observe Tsegaye Tegenu, whose definition of  the youth 
bulge in developing countries includes ages 15–29 (Tegenu 2011), then 
youth in Egypt comprise 29 per cent of  the population. This makes 
the country a good testing ground for Urdal’s well-known thesis which 
posits that societies where youth comprise 35 per cent of  the population 
are 150 per cent more likely to experience an explosion of  political 
violence than countries whose population age structure is closer to 
developed countries.
In political demography, a youth bulge means that a cohort of  combat 
age dominates the population pyramid, thereby increasing the chances 
of  violence. Eric Neumayer observes that young males constitute the 
principal bloc of  participants in violence, the same view adopted by 
Samuel Huntington, who found that people who fight other people are 
largely men aged 16–30 (Urdal 2006: 612). 
The character of  political violence in Egypt conforms to these 
hypotheses, as most of  those involved in the violence are aged between 
15 and 29. The ages of  those involved in youth movements that have 
adopted violence is similar: Ultras football fans are typically aged 
15–22, and most members of  April 62 are aged 18–29, while the age of  
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Black Bloc members does not exceed 22 (both the Ultras and the Black 
Bloc are discussed further below). In violent clashes between February 
2011 and June 2013, 80 per cent of  the injured were aged 15–29, while 
70 per cent of  the dead belonged to the same cohort.3
The relatively high proportion of  young people in Egypt has provided 
fuel to youth movements in recent years, and has increased the 
likelihood that these movements will resort to violence as the ‘combat 
generation’ dominates the field of  political actors, a situation reflected in 
the competition among political blocs to recruit and mobilise the largest 
number of  youth. The demographic rise of  this generation comes as 
it declares its political triumph and its power to settle conflicts at the 
decisive moment, and for young people, the fastest means of  conflict 
resolution is violence. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the youth 
bulge in Egyptian society is what has driven youth movements to adopt 
the strategy of  violence, or is what has increased the resort to use force 
to settle conflicts. 
1.2 The young combatant: an educated person looking for a job
The massacre at the Port Said stadium on 1 February 2012, in which 
72 members of  the Ahli Ultras were killed, revealed several facts about 
these football fan clubs. Most importantly, they are comprised of  young 
men with generally high levels of  education. Indeed, most of  the victims 
of  the massacre were university students, including some at private 
universities, where annual tuition ranges from US$5,000–10,000. This 
came as a shock to many Egyptians, who assumed that these football 
fans were largely less-educated youth. 
Yet, young people with a university degree or who are enrolled in 
university constitute the backbone of  Egyptian youth movements that 
have used violence. This is also true of  the Black Bloc; one of  its leaders 
stated that those involved in this underground organisation range in 
age from 18 to 23 years old, and are all either university students or 
graduates.4 University graduates and students also make up the bulk of  
April 6. 
The Egyptian condition thus contradicts the thesis of  many schools of  
terrorism studies, which in the 1980s and 1990s posited a correlation 
between low education and violence. It is, however, consistent with 
modern demographic theories that suggest that higher educational 
levels in young societies increase the risk of  violence. 
For Urdal, the spread of  unemployment among university graduates 
provokes feelings of  frustration and deprivation among a large segment 
of  educated youth, which increases the potential for violence (Urdal 
2004). Brynjar Lia attributes the growth in university education in several 
Middle Eastern countries to the rise in large cohorts of  educated youth 
not absorbed by the labour markets in these countries, thus fostering a 
climate ripe for the recruitment of  these youth into radical and violent 
organisations (Lia 2005). Similarly, Jack Goldstone posits that the likelihood 
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of  violence by large youth groups increases with higher levels of  education. 
He believes that an exponential increase in the numbers of  educated youth 
helps foster a climate for political change, as the most educated youth are 
at the forefront of  political violence in periods of  political change. Richard 
Braungart supports the thesis by noting that unemployment in any society 
weakens the legitimacy and stability of  the political system, which creates 
an environment ripe for the radicalisation of  young people who have 
nothing to lose in the struggle for revolutionary gains. 
Higher levels of  education feed the sense of  dissatisfaction among 
educated youth, who are more ambitious and expect to obtain a 
better income. In turn, this increases the gap between expectations 
and the reality of  unemployment. Educated youth also have a greater 
sense of  the possibilities of  political influence. Thus real or potential 
unemployment among young graduates or university students increases 
the likelihood of  dissatisfaction, instability and violence. 
As for Egypt, according to the World Bank, 
During the last two decades, the evolution of  educational attainment 
in Egypt has been one of  democratization of  access, particularly 
at the basic and secondary levels… An examination of  three 
generations of  21–24 year olds, born between 1964 to 1967, 1974 to 
1977 and 1982 to 1985, most of  whom have already completed their 
education, shows that preparatory completion rates increased steadily 
from 43 per cent to 69 per cent and secondary completion rates 
from 38 per cent to 65 per cent. College completion rates among 
the same groups have more than doubled from 7 per cent in 1988 to 
17 per cent in 2006 (Ersado 2012). 
Some 332,776 students graduated from Egyptian public universities 
and 10,726 from Egyptian private universities in 2011 (CAPMAS 2013: 
130–31), while in the same year, 1.7 million students were enrolled in 
these universities.5 
The rapid increase in graduates of  universities and institutions of  
higher education coincided with an exponential increase in youth 
unemployment, particularly among those with university degrees. 
According to official figures, unemployment in 2013 reached 12 per 
cent, or about 3.18 million people (CAPMAS 2013: 30). Unemployment 
was highest among the 20–24 age cohort, at 40 per cent, followed by 
ages 25–29, at 23 per cent. Unemployment among those with university 
degrees came in at 32.1 per cent. 
These data clearly indicate that substantial numbers of  Egyptian 
graduates have not been able to find jobs, which feeds their sense of  
frustration and anger at the regime and society. University graduates 
have positive expectations of  jobs, a steady income, and class mobility. 
According to Dan LaGraffe, this frustration is reflected in heightened 
social and political alienation, the increased likelihood of  instability, and 
a tendency to adopt radical ideas and behaviour (LaGraffe 2012: 72). 
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This contradicts the thesis of  Paul Collier that posits that poorer, less-
educated youth are more likely to join radical, violent organisations 
because of  the low recruitment cost. It should also be noted that high 
youth unemployment increases the dependency ratio, which, Urdal 
notes, is a decisive factor for the increased chance of  violence in 
communities (Urdal 2006).
In Egypt, substantial numbers of  young university graduates are 
frustrated by the dearth of  job opportunities and their inability to 
influence the political process and the ruling elite. This frustration is 
expressed as a generational clash, exemplified in a statement issued by 
the White Knights football fan club, which noted that the clashes with 
security were an expression of  ‘the battle of  an entire generation that 
only asked for a normal life, only asked that it be the master of  its own 
affairs, as they know their affairs best’. The statement noted that security 
practices against the fan clubs were not exclusively a war on them, but 
targeted an entire generation of  young people who are longing to be rid 
of  the gerontocracy with all its corruption, sordidness and misery.6
The commanders in this virtual generational war are educated youth 
frustrated by unemployment – a substantial youth bloc in the country. 
In Egypt, youth violence is concentrated in the capital and large cities, 
especially in the Delta, which is richer than Upper Egypt. This calls for 
a closer look at the relationship between youth political violence and 
urbanisation. 
1.3 Failed cities and political violence
Violent clashes between protesting youth and security or between 
competing Egyptian political factions have been concentrated in 
Cairo and large urban areas. Of  the 65 instances of  socio-political 
violence documented by this study, through a systematic review of  the 
daily Al Masry Al Youm newspaper from 11 February 2011 to 30 June 
2013, 33 took place in the capital. Of  the 16 most violent incidents, 
12 occurred in Cairo, or 75 per cent. 
Dan LaGraffe observes that the danger of  failed cities, much like failed 
states, clearly figures in the academic literature on violence and security. 
LaGraffe cites a study from the National Intelligence Council noting that 
the shift from agricultural to service and industrial employment has brought 
young people from rural to urban areas at dangerously high rates (LaGraffe 
2012: 70). The growth of  urban areas in recent years in less developed 
countries has led to heightened pressure for equality and a growing sense 
of  social grievance, making cities more vulnerable to instability. Large 
cities now hold greater numbers of  educated, unemployed youth and are 
thus a centre for social tensions given wide class and social gaps, which are 
more visible in urban than rural areas. In addition, cities are closer to the 
institutions of  power, which have a more palpable presence in urban areas. 
This opens up a space for conflict between angry, frustrated youth and 
a state unable to realise their aspirations – indeed, often perceived as the 
primary obstacle to a dignified life. 
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Egypt offers an exemplary model of  centralisation, with 20 million 
people, or nearly 25 per cent of  the population, living in Greater Cairo 
(the governorates of  Cairo, Giza and Qalyoubiya), one of  the highest 
urban concentrations in the world; the population of  Cairo alone is 
approximately 8.9 million, or 13 per cent of  the population.7 According 
to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), 
approximately 43 per cent of  the population of  Egypt live in urban 
areas, while 57 per cent live in rural areas. Urban areas in Egypt are 
growing at a rate of  1.9 per cent annually (2000–10). With annual 
population growth less than 1 per cent, this points to the continued 
migration from the countryside to the city, meaning that cities absorb 
hundreds of  thousands of  new inhabitants each year. Meanwhile, rural 
areas account for 61.4 per cent of  all births, compared to 38.6 per 
cent for urban areas. The number of  city dwellers in Egypt rose from 
22.5 million in 1990 to 35.3 million in 2012, an increase of  65 per cent, 
representing 43 per cent of  the total population (CAPMAS 2013: 8). 
The availability of  educational services and universities in the capital 
allows it to absorb large numbers of  young university graduates, about 
30 per cent of  its residents according to unofficial figures. According 
to Richard Cincotta, the migration of  large populations from rural to 
urban areas in Egypt over the last two decades played a contributing 
role in creating the environment conducive to the eruption of  the 
January 25 revolution. The city offered youth the chance to express 
their aspirations and frustrations, to interact with the elite and the 
media, and to step out of  the space of  familial relationships and 
primary affiliations to the realm of  peer relationships and direct 
interests (Cincotta 2012).
In this context, Urdal notes that high rates of  urbanisation strengthen 
the correlation between youth bulges and political violence (Urdal 2006: 
613). Goldstone explains that high urbanisation rates are associated 
with increased unemployment among educated youth and economic 
marginalisation. Rapid urbanisation is reflected in relatively higher rates 
of  poverty and unemployment, two primary factors for youth political 
violence. Tegenu believes that urbanisation and rapid urban growth are 
directly linked to large concentrations of  youth. He argues that youth 
migration from rural to urban areas therefore constitutes a primary 
factor for the increased likelihood of  political violence, as urban youth 
with rural roots have a greater tendency to violence in moments of  
political instability. 
The centrality of  Cairo is reflected in the makeup of  the youth protest 
groups under study. The study focused on the most important youth 
groups at the time (2011–13) and excluded the Islamist groups as they 
were addressed in Bakr’s article in this IDS Bulletin. Young people from 
Cairo account for more than 35 per cent of  the members of  the Ultras 
football fan clubs, for both the Ahli and Zamalek clubs.8 According to 
another report, there are 360,000 registered Ahli Ultras, with 90,000 
of  them, or 25 per cent, from Cairo, which is the most influential and 
(Endnotes)
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active branch.9 As for the Black Bloc, a leader of  the movement says 
that of  300 active members, some 200 are from Cairo. The movement 
itself  first emerged in Cairo during the demonstrations of  25 January 
2013. It also had a large group from Mansoura (Daqahliya governorate 
in the Delta), numbering 40 members.10 The faction of  April 6 that has 
resorted to violence is centred in Cairo, Alexandria and Mansoura. 
Urbanisation and Cairo’s centrality have played a fundamental role 
in the tendency of  educated, frustrated youth to use political violence. 
Large cities are one determinant of  violence in Egypt, which contradicts 
Urdal’s thesis that cities play a secondary role in the eruption of  political 
violence, whereas the countryside retains the great repertoire of  youth 
violence (Urdal 2006: 624). 
1.4 Organisation, ideology, and past experience
Past experience, organisational structure, and ideology are determinants 
of  any group’s propensity for violence and its capacity to adopt violent 
tactics. Among Egyptian youth groups, the Ultras are the only ones with 
the expertise and organisational form that make violent tactics a viable 
option. The experience of  other youth groups is limited to the violent 
clashes with security forces during the January 25 revolution, especially 
on 27–28 January. 
Organisationally, most youth movements are fluid and have no clear 
central leadership. This has given rise to overlapping memberships 
whereby a great many young people who participated in the revolution 
were simultaneously involved in multiple organisations rather than 
holding exclusive commitments to one particular group. This, in turn, 
has promoted incoherent action by youth movements. A member of  
April 6, for example, may also belong to the Ultras and the Black Bloc 
or a radical political organisation such as the Revolutionary Socialists. 
The political action of  these young people was influenced by their 
multiple affiliations with various organisations and movements. At the 
same time, the individual experiences of  these young people became the 
basis for youth movements’ collective experience as opposed to building 
a collective around common ideology. 
The Ultras are central to understanding youth mobilisation in Egypt on 
account of  having the largest youth constituency in the country, with the 
exception of  the Islamist movements. The Ultras are the most organised 
of  all non-Islamist movements in Egypt. Any study of  youth and 
violence necessitates a focus on the Ultras since they deployed violence 
prior to the January 25 revolution, and also in its aftermath. They were 
also key actors in the violent struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood 
and non-Islamist forces in the lead up to the 30 June revolution. The 
Ultras fan clubs appeared in 2007. The first was the White Knights, 
the first fan club in Egypt, followed by the Ahli Ultras, who first made 
their presence known in the stands on 13 April 2007, during a match 
between Ahli and Enbi.11 
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The international origin and development of  the Ultras is uncertain, 
although some reports suggest that the first fan clubs arose in China 
and South America. Their appearance in Europe is associated with 
fans of  the Croatian club Hajduk Split, who first exhibited extreme 
fan behaviour during a match on 29 November 1950 against the club’s 
traditional rival, Red Star Belgrade, when, after the final whistle, Hajduk 
fans collectively and methodically stormed the pitch. Ultras groups then 
emerged in Italy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Fossa Dei Leoni, a fan 
club of  Milan, arrived on the scene in 1968, while other reports indicate 
that the first Italian Ultras group appeared in Torino in 1951 under 
the name Fedelissimi Granata. The first to call themselves Ultras were 
supporters of  Sampdoria in 1969, which is the same year that the Inter 
Boys appeared, an Ultras group supporting Inter Milan.12
Ultras in Egypt have adopted a cluster-like organisational form with a 
number of  overlapping circles in contact with a central decision-making 
core.13 This organisational structure works to manage Ultras activities, 
which involve massive numbers of  young men, while also maintaining 
coordinated, consistent action. The main leadership and individual 
Ultras are linked by the capo, the leader of  an individual section. The 
capo administers the affairs of  a cluster group containing hundreds 
of  fans in a particular area, while also coordinating with the leaders 
of  other clusters. The capo’s role is clear in cheering activities during 
football matches, when individual sections each assume a specific role, 
and the capo is responsible for making sure his section does its part 
of  the exercise in synchrony with the other groups. During matches, 
the capo leads the cheering and chants, and one can observe clear 
coordination between capos and between the capo and his section. 
According to Mahmoud Abduh Ali, 
The Ultras have no president, but rather a group of  founders who 
quickly recede into the background when the group is able to stand 
on its own feet. Action within the Ultras is directed by small working 
groups (top boys), each of  which is responsible for organizing group 
activities such as the design and execution of  murals and placards, 
leading chants in the bleachers, arranging trips, and overseeing the 
group’s financial resources.14
This organisational structure and its capacity to support synchronised, 
coordinated activity is reflected in the Ultras’ ability to stage acts of  
coordinated, sudden violence, as was seen in January 2013, when the 
fans paralysed the metro system in the capital on the eve of  the sentences 
handed down to defendants in the trial for the Port Said stadium massacre.
The Ultras’ adoption of  violent tactics has been further fostered by their 
experience in engaging with security forces since 2007. Elgohary says, 
Since the establishment of  the groups in Egypt, the police have 
tried by all means to contain Ultras’ activities in and outside of  the 
stadium. Before the revolution, Ultras members would be subjected 
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to demeaning searches when entering the stands and the confiscation 
of  items used during the cheering such as flags, banners, and 
placards for the synchronized entrances. They were even prohibited 
from bringing in bottles of  water to the bleachers.15 
The Ultras had a generally hostile relationship with the police due 
to the latter’s apprehensiveness, with security fearing potentially 
uncontrollable violence on the pitch and the fans’ capacity to mobilise. 
Security thus used violence to counter the Ultras. In turn, the Ultras 
groups adopted a single anti-police slogan that appeared frequently in 
their graffiti and their synchronised entrances to the bleachers: All Cops 
Are Bastards, or ACAB.
This provides a window into the ideas underpinning the Ultras. The 
fan clubs have no coherent ideology, but, in Egypt, are based on two 
principal ideas: loyalty to a particular football club and rebellion. 
According to Elgohary, 
The Ultras’ strong sense of  belonging can be explained by the state 
of  alienation rampant not only in Egypt, but in many other Arab 
countries – a sense of  alienation from the state. These young people 
thus inevitably created an entity or idea to belong to.16 
The second pillar of  the Ultras’ identity is rebellion, which entails both 
a rejection of  authority and a hostility toward security forces. 
In this context, many note that Egyptian Ultras groups have been 
penetrated by various ideological organisations, most prominently the 
Ahli Ultras by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis loyal to Hazem 
Salah Abu Ismail.17 Although this seems incompatible with the main 
purpose of  the Ultras groups – namely, supporting football clubs – 
young people’s multiple organisational affiliations, discussed above, 
mean that many Ultras capos also belong to political groups, a fact 
that led the media to make these allegations of  penetration. Overall, 
however, Ultras groups in Egypt are not associated organisationally 
or ideologically with any political factions, governed only by the all-
important ideas of  club loyalty and rebellion. 
The Black Bloc was established formally in 2012, specifically after 
Mohamed Morsi won the presidency. Its raison d’être was to bring down 
the rule of  the Muslim Brotherhood, and one of  its key tactics was to 
attack the Brotherhood’s economic base. The founders of  Black Bloc 
groups have also adopted a cluster-like organisation, with a separate 
leadership for each cluster that is careful not to reveal the identity of  
members to any other group. The founding principles of  the Black Bloc 
are rebellion and a rejection of  Muslim Brotherhood authority. Indeed, 
the one thing members share is their hostility to the Brotherhood. The 
group’s founders chose not to adopt a specific ideology to better allow 
the recruitment of  young people from various political movements 
and factions, motivated and united by the goal of  bringing down 
Brotherhood rule.
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Young people in the Black Bloc borrowed the group’s name, slogan, and 
dress code from European and American anarchist groups that emerged 
in the 1980s, but did not adopt the ideological framework of  the latter, 
largely because they sought to create propagandistic hype through 
the internationally-known name, slogan and garb. Perhaps the main 
shared feature of  the Egyptian group and the Western movements is 
the use of  violent tactics. The activists were initially involved in peaceful 
movements and sit-ins, but found that peaceful protest was unable 
to bring the change they desired; they thus turned to violence. The 
notoriety that accrued to Black Bloc groups due to their use of  violence 
in the Seattle demonstrations of  1999 and the G8 conference of  2007 
was replicated in Egypt, as the Black Bloc became a constant media 
presence soon after its establishment and following its use of  violence 
against the Muslim Brotherhood in the first half  of  2013. 
The Black Bloc in Egypt was short-lived, lasting no more than six 
months. It grew out of  Facebook pages for the so-called ‘Black 
Revolutionary Bloc’ after groups of  Muslim Brotherhood members 
attacked protestors from secular parties and movements at the Ittihadiya 
presidential palace in December 2012; and in tandem with the 
emergence of  Hazimun militias (followers of  Hazem Salah Abu Ismail), 
who surrounded Media Production City, the home of  satellite channels’ 
studios in Cairo. Discussions on the Black Bloc’s Facebook pages 
revolved around the importance of  standing up to Islamist militias, and 
its first statement stressed that its goal was to ‘bring down the Muslim 
Brotherhood regime and its military arms’. Notably, the group said that 
it would not accost police and army personnel, but it warned that the 
Black Bloc would not hesitate to respond to the Ministry of  Interior 
if  the latter confronted it. The first street appearance of  Black Bloc 
youth came on 25 January 2013, during celebrations of  the second 
anniversary of  the revolution, when dozens of  them assembled in 
downtown Talaat Harb Square wearing the group’s signature black 
clothing and masks. 
Organisationally speaking, the Black Bloc adopted a cluster-like 
structure, forming 14 separate groups of  20–30 individuals, with 
members of  each group unknown to the others. This structure gave the 
group freedom of  movement and made it more difficult to identify its 
leadership. The previous violent experiences of  Black Bloc members 
were limited to clashes with police in January 2011 and, later, clashes on 
Mohammed Mahmoud Street in November 2011.
The April 6 movement was established by a group of  young people 
belonging to different ideological and political schools of  thought, 
most of  them without any previous background in politics or political 
action, following the labour strike in Mahalla al-Kubra on 6 April 2008. 
The April 6 movement had made a call on Facebook for a nationwide 
strike to express opposition to the ‘inheritance of  the presidency’ from 
Mubarak to his son, Gamal, and to protest the capitalist policies of  the 
Egyptian government. The group gained renown in the 2011 revolution 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 3 May 2016: ‘Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and Beyond’ 99–116 | 109
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
when many of  its young people led demonstrations and it became an 
icon of  the Egyptian revolution. 
The organisational form of  April 6 is similar to that of  European social 
movements, with a central leadership and individual groups in each 
area led by local leaders with decision-making authority. April 6 is an 
open organisation and sets no conditions for membership, making it 
more of  an umbrella youth organisation. This relatively loose structure 
and the absence of  a specific ideology makes it more of  a social 
movement than a narrow party formation. Its structure also enabled the 
movement to avoid explicitly defending violence although several of  its 
members were involved in violent clashes with security forces during 
demonstrations. In principle, the movement is committed to non-
violence, as the adoption of  tactical violence would diminish its broad 
membership and undermine its flexible organisational structure.
As is clear from this analysis, Egyptian youth movements involved 
in either offensive or defensive violence had no specific ideological 
framework other than an amorphous notion of  rebellion. This contradicts 
Della Porta’s thesis that violence requires a rejectionist ideology (Della 
Porta 2009). Rather, for these movements, the main factor for the use of  
violence was a confrontation with a specific opponent – for Ultras, the 
police and for the Black Bloc, the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast, the 
broad umbrella-like nature of  April 6 acted as a curb on violent tactics, 
although a great many of  its members were involved in fierce clashes with 
security forces or the Muslim Brotherhood. 
2 Self-described view of violence
This study has looked at several factors for the increasing turn to violence 
by youth protest movements in Egypt following the January 25 revolution, 
including the population age structure, higher levels of  education 
combined with the inability of  the market to absorb millions of  new 
graduates, the failure of  cities to absorb contradictions, the transitional 
period as a critical phase that permits the emergence of  violence as an 
option to resolve pressing political and social issues, shared experience, 
and the adoption of  a strategy of  rebellion. But understanding the 
violence of  youth movements in Egypt also requires understanding 
how young people involved in these movements see violence and 
examining the stance of  various movements on violence. Sole reliance 
on an objective analytical framework that ignores the subjective risks 
drawing mistaken conclusions about Egyptian youth movements’ general 
predilection for violence. 
An analysis of  field interviews and data about youth movements reveals 
that there is a clear tendency to reject violence in political action and, 
indeed, a recognition that the success of  the Egyptian revolution in 
removing Mubarak was due to its peaceful nature. Even members of  
the Black Bloc boast that they are ‘the kings of  non-violence’,18 noting 
that no person was killed in their attacks on Muslim Brotherhood 
property and offices between January and June 2013. In addition, all of  
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those involved in protest movements stress that it is security forces that 
typically start the violence and that their violence is purely defensive.
In this context, justifications for violence are limited to self-defence. 
Hisham, a 27-year-old photojournalist and former Revolutionary 
Socialist, who was wounded more than once in violent clashes, says, 
Our violence was a response to the violence of  the other side, whether security, 
paid thugs, the Brotherhood, or regime loyalists. The other side was always 
the one to start the violence so we defended ourselves and protected the other 
participants in the march.19
Hisham justifies his involvement in violence, saying, 
I’m against violence. I would leave home to take part in a peaceful march, but 
I’d be angered by the actions of  the police or the other side and see people in our 
march killed and injured. Then I’d decide to join the fray and counter the attack 
and even try to get even and avenge those who were killed or injured. 
This highlights another motive for violence – revenge – in addition to 
the defence of  protests and demonstrations. 
The picture is not complete, however, without a discussion of  
intractable elements within marches or demonstrations organised by 
youth movements. Hisham states, 
There were in fact thugs and [homeless] street children in the marches who would 
sometimes start the violence. But we can’t stop anyone from taking part in the 
march. Anyway, the police and the Brotherhood also used thugs and street children. 
Hisham reached a clear conclusion based on his experience with 
violence during demonstrations: 
The violence did not help us realise our goals. In fact, it ended with more dead 
and wounded, criticism of  young people, and allegations of  thuggery and 
vandalism. The ideal solution is peaceful action and escalation through strikes 
or civil disobedience to achieve goals.
Hisham’s words distil the trajectory of  an ongoing debate among 
youth groups in Egypt. It starts with the assertion that violence is 
purely defensive, but then goes on to affirm the use of  violence for 
revenge, followed by the admissions that thugs and homeless children 
in their own protests helped to inflame the violence. It concludes 
with a recognition that violence had negative consequences for the 
achievement of  youth movements’ ultimate goals. This ongoing 
dialogue, heard among young people in Egypt, has led to a critique of  
the use of  violence. According to Della Porta, the strategy of  violence 
arises from a collective debate, the result of  a dynamic process of  
engagement between social or political groups. In our case, however, 
the social debate and engagement between youth groups has ended in a 
rejection rather than an adoption of  violence by the majority. 
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This does not mean that more radical voices do not exist that hold to the 
necessity of  violence in the face of  the police and political opponents, the 
focus of  this study. Islam, a 22-year-old humanities graduate and a fixture 
of  political demonstrations since January 25, is a member of  this minority: 
The Interior Ministry was and remains criminals and killers, and until it is 
restructured and reformed, fighting and resisting it is a revolutionary duty. Blood 
is the fuel of  revolutions and the blood of  the dead is an incentive to stand firm in 
the face of  the authority. It’s a gain.20 
Islam defends the use of  violence as the sole means of  changing the 
regime and countering the security apparatus in the country. He 
supports the idea of  vengeance from a somewhat different perspective:
People from popular areas get involved in violence because they’ve been oppressed, 
marginalised, and tortured in police stations, so they have a longstanding grudge 
against the police.
Vengeance as a motivator is particularly striking among young people 
who are involved in violence in protests and demonstrations. Motazz, a 
21-year-old graduate of  a social service institute, emphasises the death 
of  his friend during a post-revolution demonstration as a reason for his 
use of  violence: 
I saw my best friend die in front of  me and I decided to take part in all the violent 
demonstrations. Even though I recognise that violence only leads to more bloodshed, 
I’m venting the grief  within me.21 
Shadi, a 22-year-old Coptic university graduate who belongs to a liberal 
party, speaks with the same logic: 
I’ve seen friends killed during the events of  Mohammed Mahmoud, the Cabinet 
building, and Maspero, and I’ve seen people who’ve been blinded by the police, so 
I was forced to turn to violence because of  these bloody scenes.22 
In contrast, 29-year-old Sherif  Abd al-Younis speaks of  violence more 
as a defensive act: 
We aren’t thugs. We’re defending our right to life against those who 
want to ground us down yet again [the Muslim Brotherhood].23
These young people speak largely for a small segment of  radical groups 
within April 6 or left-wing formations, and they have largely been 
involved in demonstrations only since the January revolution. Their use 
of  violence is predicated on the logic of  self-defence and taking revenge 
on the security apparatus. This language differs from that used by young 
Ultras who employ violence. A.A., a 20-something-year-old member of  
the Ahli Ultras who asked to remain anonymous, says, 
Fighting with the Interior Ministry is just something I like to do, even if  they 
haven’t done anything. The violence always used to start with the police, but later 
we started it because we knew in advance that security would attack us.24
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This view is consistent with the Ultras’ perception of  themselves as a 
vital part of  the Egyptian revolution that is always willing to engage 
in violent confrontations. The clashes that took place on Mohammed 
Mahmoud Street, near to Tahrir Square, involved violent confrontations 
between youth protestors and the security forces of  the Ministry of  
Interior. The Al Masry Al Youm quoted one Ultras member as saying, 
We’re not afraid of  clashes. The true Ultras member is not afraid. 
In fact, some of  us are happy to be injured because that becomes a 
memento for him and his [Ultras] brothers.25 
These, then, are young people who consider the organisation they 
belong to as more of  a brotherhood and see clashes and conflict as part 
of  its doctrine of  protest. 
Ironically, the Black Bloc, according to one member, see themselves as 
‘masters of  non-violence’, saying, 
The movement did not kill or injure any person and attacked no government 
institution or building. It was always careful to avoid state property. We largely 
use Molotovs and birdshot, while the use of  firearms is limited to solely threat 
and protection.26 
According to another Black Bloc member, in a testimony given to 
researcher Hani al-Aasar, 
Violence against the regime [the Brotherhood regime] is legitimate 
because it is violence directed at an illegitimate regime. Violence has 
become the only way to express one’s opinion and resist the special 
organization [i.e. the Brotherhood military wing].27
The views of  several young men involved in clashes and acts of  violence 
clearly indicate that the major justification for violence is revenge, 
followed by self-defence. It is also clear that there is no coherent 
ideology or ultimate goal for the use of  violence outside of  an attempt 
to punish police. The punitive aspect is how young people justify the 
violence to themselves, without the need to adopt a clear political 
objective. Some interviewees did discuss the need for violence to create 
‘chaos’ which might be necessary to curb attempts by the regime to 
control and suppress liberties, but even this supposition is not based 
on an integrated political project that employs political violence as a 
tool. This limited view of  violence among the participants themselves 
makes it impossible for them to maintain the conflict for a period of  
years. Ultimately, the absence of  a youth organisation that explicitly 
adopts violence as a tactic to realise its political project reduces the risk 
of  continued violence or the emergence of  new forms of  violence. On 
the contrary, it indicates that the main arena for violence will remain 
random violence motivated by a desire for revenge or self-defence. 
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3 Conclusion
There is no positive correlation between youth movements and violence 
in Egypt. Youth movements that emerged outside the political Islamist 
groups resorted to violence occasionally, such as the Ultras and the 
April 6 movement, while movements that exclusively deployed violence 
as the only strategy of  engagement were more likely to form and then 
disappear again, such as the Black Bloc. It is a constellation of  factors 
that made the youth bulge predisposed to resorting to violence in the 
post-2011 transitional period, most notably the high percentage of  
education among young people, and the sizeable proportion of  youth 
who migrate to the city in search of  employment. Against the backdrop 
of  the military assumption of  power in the aftermath of  the 30 June 
2013 ousting of  President Morsi, and the confrontation between 
political Islam and the state, the author believes that youth movements’ 
resorting to violence will significantly decrease. 
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The Political Economy of Violence 
in Egypt
Magdy Rezk
Abstract This article examines the political economy drivers of the uprisings 
in Egypt in 2011 and 2013. It shows that there was a continuity in neoliberal 
economic policy from the rule of Hosni Mubarak through to that of 
Mohamed Morsi, accompanied by an increase in poverty and unemployment. 
However, it was Egyptian citizens’ perception of the political dynamics 
behind the economic situation that drove them to revolt. In 2011, a sense of 
intolerable levels of corruption and the prospect of their continuation under 
Mubarak’s son, Gamal, made people responsive to calls for revolution; in 2013, 
it was the scale of their disappointment at the unmet promises for economic 
betterment. In both cases, economic conditions were crucial, but political 
grievances and mobilisation ultimately determined and shaped the revolts.
1 Introduction
There has been a great deal of  speculation about whether Egypt’s 
enduring economic crisis, five years after the January 25 revolution 
of  2011, poses a threat to its stability.1 The broader issue at stake here 
concerns the relationship between economic conditions and violence 
(Richani 1997). Despite decades of  interest in the topic, research has 
reached no conclusive findings about whether economic interests or 
problems, such as unemployment, poverty, or social inequalities, affect 
the potential for violence.
The main argument in this article is that economic factors, especially 
the inequitable income distribution, poverty, and unemployment, are 
significant determinants of  political violence, but each one on its own 
is insufficient to provoke violence. Rather, these factors come into play 
in particular political, historic and cultural circumstances contingent 
on the nature of  the system of  governance, the political culture or level 
of  democratic development, and the extent of  corruption, bribery, and 
favouritism in a society. 
It posits that economic circumstances are the objective condition, 
which, absent other subjective conditions, may not act as an impetus 
to violence as a means for political change. In other words, economic 
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factors are a necessary condition for violence, but alone are insufficient 
to cause it. Such a political economy approach avoids the pitfalls of  
simplistic political theory (Krueger and Maleckova 2002) and the 
narrow approach of  economic accounts of  violence, both of  which are 
reductionist and disregard history.2 
The article illustrates this approach with particular reference to the 
2011 and 2013 mass uprisings. Egypt after the January 25 revolution 
is a particularly important case study because it offers a complex 
picture of  various forms of  violence. At the outset of  2011 revolution, 
revolutionaries deployed violence to counter the violence of  the Mubarak 
regime’s security forces, and this was followed by bursts of  revolutionary 
violence under the Supreme Council of  the Armed Forces (SCAF) until 
June 2012 and for a year under Morsi. Terrorist groups, which declared 
their existence immediately after January 25, have also used violence, 
especially in Sinai, and stepped up its use against security forces after 
30 June 2012. Since the January 25 revolution Copts, especially in 
Upper Egypt, and other minority religious communities such as the Shia 
have been victims of  hate crimes. Deteriorating economic conditions, 
which signal the expansion of  the informal economy, seen especially in 
the spread of  sidewalk peddlers and other itinerant vendors, have also 
generated violence. Finally, violent crime has spiked, fuelled in part by a 
security vacuum that has considerably weakened legal deterrents. For all 
this, the analysis below focuses solely on the two major and comparable 
moments of  violence, in 2011 and 2013.
2 The road to January 25, 2011
Two related economic factors underpinned Egypt’s 2011 revolution: 
entrenched poverty, which significantly worsened in the three years 
immediately prior to the revolution, and the nature and power of  
the country’s business elite. These economic contexts are crucial to 
understanding the revolution because they were its necessary conditions, 
but insufficient on their own. 
2.1 Poverty
Socioeconomic conditions in Egypt worsened over the three decades 
of  Mubarak’s rule, and were especially difficult for its poorest citizens. 
The first decade of  Mubarak’s rule (1981–91) saw skyrocketing foreign 
debt and budget deficits, from which the 1991 Gulf  War offered only a 
temporary reprieve, when Western and Arab donors and the Paris Club 
wrote off a significant chunk of  Egypt’s debt burden. This was followed 
by an IMF-led stabilisation programme, which brought the country’s 
budget deficit to 3 per cent of  GDP, brought inflation under control, 
and stabilised the price of  the Egyptian pound (El-Beblawi 2008). This 
success, however, was followed by a relapse for nearly a decade. While 
high growth rates returned in 2005, the economic upswing was cut 
short just three years later by the global financial crisis. The revolution 
thus took place during an economic downturn, but also after years of  
propaganda that had portrayed Egypt as a strong emerging economy, 
the ‘Tiger on the Nile’.
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A 2011 report by the World Bank’s Social and Economic Group on 
poverty and social welfare in Egypt in 2008/09 gave a comprehensive 
picture of  the evolution of  poverty prior to the revolution.3 The report 
found that poverty declined in Egypt between February 2005 and 
February 2008 due to rapid economic growth, but that high inflation 
during this period had damaging effects on the poorest. Poverty and 
near poverty declined by some 20 per cent in this rapid-growth period, 
but extreme poverty (defined as the inability to meet basic food needs) 
increased by nearly 20 per cent due to rising inflation and food prices, 
which eroded the purchasing power of  the Egyptian pound. But the 
sudden economic slowdown of  2008/09 amid rapid inflation erased the 
gains made in reducing poverty in the previous period. 
By the end of  2008, the standard of  living of  the poor and near poor, 
which had been rising, again began to decline due to the economic 
recession, with the crisis creating additional tension due to its impact on 
labour demand. As a result, poverty increased markedly between 2008 
and 2009. Despite a decrease in the proportion of  absolute poverty 
between 2005 and 2008, extreme poverty and absolute poverty increased 
from 2004/05 to 2008/09. In 2008/09 some 1.5 million Egyptians 
suffered extreme food poverty, about double the number in 2004/05, 
and absolute poverty rose from 19.6 per cent to 22 per cent. In contrast, 
the rate of  near poverty dropped from 21 per cent before 2004/05 to 
19.2 per cent in 2008/09, as many of  that cohort moved into the ranks of  
the poor. According to this analysis, in 2008/09 31 million Egyptians, or 
nearly 40 per cent of  the population, were poor or near poor. 
The economic fluctuations especially affected vulnerable populations. 
A detailed comparison of  labour rates and poverty in 2004/05 and 
2008/09 shows that many of  the poor were marginalised in the 
period of  growth because they had little involvement in the most 
rapidly growing sectors. Rising food prices and other economic shocks 
exacerbated the impact. Workers in the informal sector and those with 
low levels of  education sustained long-term damage, as further cuts to 
already depressed incomes pushed many working families into poverty. 
The crisis harmed families with children the most, especially those 
supporting large families, and families that relied on remittances from 
abroad. Poverty increased in rural Upper Egypt to its highest levels 
since 1995/96. Indeed, extreme poverty was concentrated in the rural 
south. At the same time, sluggish job creation limited the opportunities 
available to migrant workers from densely populated rural areas. 
The loss of  a job during the crisis year was the principal reason for 
families falling into poverty. A comparison of  family data in February 
2008 and February 2009 found that decreased employment rates in the 
family were responsible for more than one-third of  cases of  poverty 
(people who were newly poor). Moreover, policies designed to help 
families bear the impact of  the crisis were inadequate to prevent more 
poverty. During the crisis, Egypt greatly expanded its food subsidy 
system and increased bread subsidies. According to World Bank data,4 
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without this expansion the poverty rate would have been at least three 
points higher, but this support was not targeted at those in need and 
was extremely costly (at least 1 per cent of  GDP). Cash social aid 
programmes were expanded as well and helped some of  the poor to 
avoid extreme poverty, but the impact was too slight to have any clear 
effect on national rates. 
The rate of  chronic or near chronic poverty in Egypt is about half  the 
total poverty rate. The food crisis of  mid-2008 sent about 6 per cent 
of  the population into the ranks of  the poor for the first time, while 
others were driven into poverty due to the loss of  their jobs. Data from 
February 2009 indicate that the newly poor were younger than the 
chronic poor and were more likely to be non-agricultural workers. 
According to the World Bank study, the crisis exposed a major 
weakness in the social welfare system in Egypt. The study found that 
the food crisis, combined with the impact of  the global economic crisis, 
temporarily stalled and indeed reversed progress made on anti-poverty 
efforts in 2005–08, indicating that the comprehensive subsidy system 
could not protect families from shocks. The crisis showed that Egypt did 
not have a social safety net that offered adequate protection to the poor 
or those at risk of  poverty in the event of  an external crisis. 
The food subsidy regime played a crucial role in maintaining standards 
of  living, but because of  its comprehensiveness, it can only minimally 
defray the impact on the poor of  rising food prices. The report found that 
were it not for food subsidies, the poverty rate in Egypt in 2008/09 would 
have been 31 per cent rather than 22 per cent, based on 2008/09 prices. 
Inflation rates continued to rise, especially for major foodstuffs that 
constituted the bulk of  expenditure for the poor and those with limited 
income. The Egyptian Central Bank in September 2010 noted that 
monthly inflation for August 2010 reached 2.85 per cent, bringing the 
annual rate (September 2009–August 2010) to nearly 11 per cent. More 
seriously, the biggest part of  the monthly increase was attributable to 
food prices that were continuing to rise due to limited supply, especially 
of  red meat, poultry, vegetables, fruits, rice, and vegetable oil.
According to the Central Bank statement, increases in the prices of  
vegetables and fruits for the second month in a row bumped up the 
monthly inflation rate. The price of  poultry increased 30 per cent 
from January 2010 to the end of  August, while the price of  red meat 
rose nearly 25 per cent in the same period. The price of  rice increased 
43.5 per cent from May to the end of  August, while fruits and vegetables 
went up 10 per cent in the month of  August alone. These increases 
accounted for 79 per cent of  the jump in general inflation that month. 
During this period, for the first time in Egypt violence occurred over 
competition for food. A report issued by the Awlad al-Ard Center 
recorded that 14 people were killed, 190 injured and 137 arrested in 
fighting over bread in the first half  of  2008 (ANHRI 2008). The same 
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scene was repeated, though on a narrower scale, in the summer of  
2010. The press reported on 17 August (Shaath 2010) that a young man 
had been killed in a fight in a bread line at a bakery in Nagaa Hamadi, 
in Qena governorate. Daily newspaper Alsharq Alawsat reported: 
the sight of  lines has again become common with the rarity of  
butane canisters, the price of  which in some areas has risen to LE40, 
although the official price is LE2.70. The crisis has acquired tragic 
dimensions as two people were killed in the scrum to buy canisters 
and citizens suffer in in the exhausting search for them.
2.2 The business elite: monopoly, corruption, cronyism
The perceived corruption of  political and business elites was a key 
driving force behind the 2011 revolution. Berlin-based watchdog 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index showed that in 
the years preceding the revolution Egypt faced increasing corruption 
problems, falling from a rank of  70th out of  158 in 2005 to 115th out of  
180 in 2008 (where first place is least corrupt). Moreover, according to a 
Pew survey (Chekir and Diwan 2012: 2), in 2010 corruption was the top 
concern of  Egyptians with 46 per cent listing it as their main concern, 
ahead of  lack of  democracy and poor economic conditions.
The last government before the revolution was formed on 14 July 2004. It 
included most of  the major businessmen close to Gamal Mubarak, while 
other business leaders held positions in the dominant National Democratic 
Party (NDP) or in one of  the two houses of  Parliament, some of  them 
heading the most important committees in the parliament. Among them 
was Ahmed Ezz, a steel magnate and member of  parliament, whose 
companies dominated Egypt’s steel industry after 2000, controlling up 
to 65 per cent of  the local market at times, and who has been accused 
of  having improperly acquired the largest public steel corporation at 
an artificially low price, generating excess profits, and having lobbied to 
raise external tariffs to gain protection from foreign competition and for 
Parliament to pass watered down anti-monopoly legislation. 
Ezz was a prominent member of  the NDP, a member of  its influential 
Policy Committee, and the chair of  Hosni Mubarak’s election campaign 
in 2005. In Parliament, he was the chair of  the Budget Committee, which 
oversaw the work of  the Competition Commission (Chekir and Diwan 
2012: 2) A second example is Ahmed al-Maghrabi, majority owner of  
Palm Hills, the second-biggest real estate development company in the 
country, and simultaneously minister of  housing. After the revolution he 
was accused of  using his position to sell large tracts of  land at heavily 
discounted prices to his own company and other individuals connected to 
the NDP (ibid.) 
The significance of  crony capitalism is that it excludes businesspeople 
who do not have access to policymakers. Thus many felt that even 
existing market-based, neoliberal policies were not operating as they 
should to encourage efficient products and sideline inefficient ones – the 
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fundamental promise of  neoclassical theory and neoliberal policies. 
A great many businesspeople felt that at a certain point they would either 
turn over some of  their profits to senior politicians or come up against 
an invisible ceiling that would stop them from further advancement, 
regardless of  their capabilities. 
It was therefore no wonder that some took part in the revolution or 
provided logistic support to demonstrators in Tahrir Square, giving 
them medicines or other goods. The prevalent sense was that the door 
of  opportunity was closed even to members of  the upper-middle and 
upper classes who had no connections with the political elite. Moreover, 
as el-Beblawi notes, ‘the private sector failed to establish a credible 
image in the public opinion as a dynamic, creative body. Stories and/
or rumours of  corruption and profiteering undermined its picture in the 
public eyes’ (el-Beblawi 2008: 10). 
2.3 Political dynamics
For all their importance, these economic factors do not by themselves 
explain the 2011 revolution, however; political factors, including 
mobilisation, were also crucial. After the formation of  the government 
under prime minister Ahmed Nazif  in July 2004, supported by Gamal, 
many people realised that the move was laying the groundwork for 
Gamal’s assumption of  power. This in turn prompted the formation of  
the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kefaya), whose defining slogans 
were ‘No to extension’ (the extension of  a new term of  office for Hosni 
Mubarak) and ‘No to inheritance’ (Gamal’s inheritance of  power). 
This was followed by the emergence of  several movements and frequent 
demonstrations, strikes, and protests, whose size and geographic scope 
were unprecedented in Egypt’s history. The protests affected a variety 
of  sectors took, and included civil servants and workers from across the 
country. According to one study, between 2006 and 2009:
more than 1.7 million workers took part in protests, a stark indication 
of  the qualitative leap taken by the labor movement in Egypt. The 
vast majority of  these strikes and actions were organised by labor 
leaders outside the official trade unions, which in many cases workers 
simply abandoned, seeing them as useless’ (Al-Mahdi 2012).
With protests gaining momentum and the opposition becoming 
increasingly vocal, the security apparatus stepped up its activities, and 
many citizens were treated violently in police stations and detention 
facilities. Many of  these incidents were filmed with mobile phone 
cameras and posted on social networking sites, causing much outrage, 
especially among young people. This in turn prompted young protesters 
to set up the ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ Facebook page – named after a 
young man killed by police in Alexandria – which was seen by hundreds 
of  thousands of  people in the run-up to the revolution. 
In addition, the State Security Investigations (SSI) service tightened 
its grip. The SSI received much criticism for its interference in public 
(Endnotes)
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life and attempts to control politics to ensure the regime’s survival. It 
vetted civil service employment at most significant state departments 
and agencies, linking employment to background security reports, and 
it similarly controlled most promotions, also based on security reports 
submitted to decision makers. Moreover, the SSI was in charge of  highly 
sensitive political matters, including sectarian issues, and obstructed the 
activities of  political parties, organisations and movements, either by 
direct harassment in the street or inciting schisms and dissent within their 
ranks. Finally, it kept a hand in the media and various cultural sectors, 
though its influence declined somewhat after 2005 (al-Aasar 2013).
The key political event that perhaps ignited the repertoire of  
accumulated rage, especially among the middle classes, was the People’s 
Assembly (lower house) election on 28 November 2010, with runoffs 
on 5 December, which were flagrantly rigged in a way that surpassed 
the usual fraud by the ruling NDP. While some parties and movements 
boycotted the elections from the outset, others – primarily the Wafd 
and Tagammu parties, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood – fielded 
candidates. Following violence and blatant fraud in the first round, Wafd 
and the Brotherhood, which had won 88 seats in the 2005 parliament, 
or 20 per cent, boycotted the second round. In the final count, the NDP 
won nearly every seat in the assembly. 
Members of  the middle classes, most of  whom did not vote in the 
elections, were nevertheless resentful, perhaps because the fraud was 
conducted in their name. These feelings were stoked further when the 
NDP and the party’s secretary-general, Ezz, the architect of  the fraud, 
took to the pages of  daily newspaper Al-Ahram on 23 and 24 December, 
to write that the results were the natural outcome of  the party’s efforts 
and the unprecedented economic successes the NDP government had 
achieved over the previous five years. The chair of  Al-Ahram pushed 
the same line, most prominently in an article on 10 December, titled 
‘Last Word on the Egyptian Elections’, in which he commented on the 
prevailing response among Egyptians to the election results: 
I could not turn the page and move on to other subjects after 
encountering that outpouring of  anger on the part of  Al-Ahram 
readers in response to my commentaries on the recent parliamentary 
elections. Among the many letters I received, there was not a single 
positive reaction. Admittedly, they represent a relatively narrow 
segment of  the Egyptian people, those members of  the middle class 
who own a computer and act on their urge to comment on the 
articles they read, whether in Arabic or English, but they form a very 
proactive and vibrant segment (Said 2010). 
Moreover, Mubarak further incensed the public when, during the 
inauguration of  the new session of  Parliament on 19 December, 
commented on the move by members of  the political factions and 
former parliamentary candidates to create a shadow parliament saying, 
‘Let them have their fun.’ 
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Finally, one cannot deny that the uprising in Tunisia, the popular overthrow 
of  Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January 2011, was a contributing factor. 
It inspired the hope among young Egyptians in particular that the people 
could change their leaders and the state of  the country. 
All of  these events motivated many to respond to the appeal to 
demonstrate on 25 January. Following violence against protesters, the 
crowds were bigger on 28 January, the ‘Day of  Rage’, and there was 
a willingness to meet that violence with counter-violence. The events 
leading up to the uprising also prompted a very broad coalition of  
people to join the demonstrations that brought down the regime, a 
coalition that included businesspeople, the middle classes, unemployed 
young people, and poor workers and farmers. According to al-Mahdi: 
The people that staged the revolution were not only the middle- and 
upper-class youth in Tahrir Square who wanted another president. 
Young and old people in Cairo, Suez, Beni Soueif, and Arish also 
took part. These people did not want to die in lines for bread, water, 
or hospitals, be arbitrarily abused by police, or be forced to remove 
their children from schools so they could work to make ends meet 
(Al-Mahdi 2012: 218).
2.4 Revolutionary violence
Despite widespread claims that the revolution was peaceful – which 
perhaps initially helped broaden and diversify the base of  supporters 
and delegitimised security forces’ violent interference – the turn to 
violence in fact happened quite rapidly. Some young people used 
violence as a means to counter police violence, particularly on the Day 
of  Rage. Groups of  protesters also set fire to police stations, burning 
down 99 in total, and NDP offices (al-Aasar 2012). 
Events evolved in an entirely unexpected direction. When the police 
apparatus collapsed on 28 January, security officials turned to their ‘plan 
B’, opening the prisons and releasing criminals. The same night, several 
shopping malls were looted and automated cash machines robbed. 
Some claim that police officers directly supervised these crimes, and 
while this is unverified, it is certain that the police showed no interest 
in stopping them. Other events followed that were tantamount to a 
campaign to terrify citizens and encourage them to remain at home. 
People were frightened by the prospect of  roving gangs breaking into 
homes, and several false appeals for help were heard, particularly using 
women on television and radio news. 
People’s response, however, was unexpected: they quickly formed 
neighbourhood watch committees to guard their homes and shops, 
searching cars on the streets and even directing traffic. For the 
first time, they disregarded the curfew that had been in place since 
28 January and remained in the streets, guarding their homes and 
shops throughout the night. Revolutionary committees were set up 
at the entrances to Tahrir Square to guard against security forces 
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and hired thugs. It thus became apparent that Egyptian citizens were 
prepared to fight violence with violence, which brought a rapid end to 
the organised wave of  terror and panic.
The next step regime supporters (or the counter-revolution) took came 
in the ‘Battle of  the Camel’, when prominent pro-regime businessmen, 
NDP leaders, and members of  parliament paid thugs to use violence 
to remove the revolutionaries from the square. In an ugly attempt to 
justify the violent incursion, some said that the assailants were mostly 
informal day labourers who had lost their livelihoods in the week 
from 25 January to 1 February. In other words, they sought to portray 
events as civil strife that had resulted from the deteriorating economic 
conditions of  citizens who rejected the uprising and wanted to reinstate 
security and the regime. This plan and its justification failed, as the 
revolutionaries stood their ground; at least 11 people were killed in the 
ensuing violence and more than 2,000 were injured. 
The 18-day uprising ended with the fall of  the Mubarak regime and 
SCAF’s assumption of  rule on 11 February. Although some hoped to 
achieve the revolution’s objectives peacefully and build the country 
on more equitable foundations, events did not move in this direction. 
Indeed, the first outcome of  the revolution was the dissolution of  the 
broad-based coalition that made it: 
When the protestors occupied Tahrir Square, first on January 25 
and later on January 28, their unified slogan was ‘the people want 
to overthrow the regime.’ This ingenious slogan reflected an ad-hoc 
agreement among groups that all wanted to change the system of  
governance, but not necessarily in systemic ways that would endanger 
their interests. Others wanted more systemic change to protect their 
class interests against exploitation. While many of  the protestors 
were part of  the broad hegemonic elite, most of  them came from 
the exploited classes. There was thus a momentary union between 
the upper and middle class and the working classes – a union that 
did not last long. After Mubarak was ousted, the media and parts of  
the middle class began to condemn ongoing strikes by the working 
class, accusing the strikers of  advancing ‘selfish, parochial demands’ 
(Al-Mahdi 2012: 230).
The first post-uprising protests centred on the demands of  workers, 
especially in various parts of  the civil service. These demands included 
making temporary appointments permanent, wage increases, and 
wage parity for all workers in the same government body with the same 
educational qualifications, a particularly strident demand given existing 
wage gaps unrelated to competence or merit.
Overall, the explosion and continuation of  violence that confounded 
everyone’s expectations can be attributed to two primary factors. First, 
some of  those surprised by the continuation of  the revolution scrambled 
to contain it within the narrowest bounds possible. From the outset, 
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they focused on saluting the noble, non-partisan, non-ideological 
youth who made the revolution, as if  a lack of  ideology were somehow 
praiseworthy and not, instead, the result of  decades of  moribund 
politics and gagging of  the opposition. This stress on non-ideological 
youth signalled a fear of  youth politicisation, especially after political 
awareness and participation increased to levels not seen in Egypt for 
some 60 years. 
Second, as it became easier to establish political groups, dozens of  parties 
were formed, along with perhaps hundreds of  revolutionary and youth 
coalitions. Thus were the various groups that took part in the revolution 
fragmented, with the exception of  the ever-cohesive Muslim Brotherhood. 
That the Salafis and their fledgling party later won a substantial bloc of  
votes in the parliamentary elections came as a surprise to all, but they 
too soon splintered, while as a whole the Islamist movement was divided 
among several parties. In addition, most Egyptians were not involved in 
any political organisation or direct political action, but instead responded 
to competing forces’ appeals according to their own historical sensibility 
or because of  changes the revolution had made to their lives. As Richani 
notes, ‘Violence increases when the prevailing institutions fail to mediate 
among the various antagonistic forces unleashed by the socioeconomic 
and political change’ (Richani 1997: 37). The outcome of  the political 
instability and security was a spike in political and social violence unseen 
in Egypt in the past century. 
3 Towards the 2013 uprising
The political instability and lack of  security impeded attempts to revive 
the economy. A vicious circle thus developed whereby the worsening 
economy led to greater instability and lack of  security and vice-versa. 
Economic growth had fallen to around 2 per cent since January 2011, 
less than the population growth rate, which led to a decline in the 
standard of  living, with the drop being steeper and faster for the poor. 
Other problems, such as rising unemployment, exacerbated the impact 
of  poor growth. 
In addition, the state racked up a large, persistent budget deficit and a 
sizeable deficit in the balance of  payments, leading to declining foreign 
currency reserves at the Central Bank and an erosion of  the value 
of  the Egyptian pound. Foreign investments also dried up, including 
indirect investment in stock portfolios and foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and revenues from tourism plummeted as foreign tourists stayed 
away. Moreover, there were supply crises, in fuel, for example, and 
a deterioration of  basic services, including electricity blackouts and 
interruptions of  public transport, such as the railways, both of  which had 
repercussions for production and worker productivity (Al-Samhouri 2012). 
Unemployment and poverty are perhaps the two most serious 
socioeconomic issues that require clear, effective solutions because they 
have the most direct impact on the ability of  any regime or political or 
social coalition to stabilise the political situation and provide security. 
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3.1 Unemployment in Egypt: manifestations and causes
According to the quarterly CAPMAS labour force survey, by the end 
of  March 2013 unemployment stood at 13.2 per cent, with 3.6 million 
people unemployed out of  a labour force of  27.2 million. In March 
2010, by contrast, unemployment was 9.1 per cent, with 2.4 million 
unemployed. The total number of  unemployed people had increased 
by 50 per cent – 1.2 million – in just three years, leading to an 
increase in the unemployment rate from 9.1 per cent in March 2010 
to 13.2 per cent in March 2013. According to the labour survey, the 
economy was only created 157,000 jobs during 2012/13, while an 
additional 200,000 people joined the unemployment rolls during the 
same period.5 
Unemployment in Egypt has several distinct features, many of  which 
existed prior to the revolution:
 l It is concentrated among youth. Young people aged 15–29 make 
up 82 per cent of  the unemployed. Among the 20–24 age cohort, 
unemployment stands at 42.3 per cent. This is linked with the second 
feature of  unemployment.
 l Unemployment largely affects the educated. Those with an 
intermediate, above intermediate, or university education constitute 
70.7 per cent of  the unemployed. 
 l Unemployment is much higher among women (25 per cent) than 
men (9.7 per cent).
The jump in unemployment is, as noted above, attributable to low 
growth rates and depressed economic activity as investment rates 
declined after the 2011 revolution. The 2010/11 Annual Report of  the 
Central Bank (Central Bank 2012) noted a 1.8 per cent bump in GDP, 
compared to a 5.1 per cent increase in 2009/10 (ibid.) This deterioration 
in economic growth was due to the events and developments that 
accompanied the January 25 revolution, which led to a negative growth 
rate of  4.2 per cent in the third quarter (January–March 2011). As 
a result, according to CAPMAS data, unemployment increased to 
11.8 per cent by the end of  June 2011. 
While the economy saw a slight improvement the next year (2011/12), 
as growth climbed to 2.1 per cent (Central Bank 2013), the rate 
was still far too low to absorb new entrants into the labour market, 
let alone make a dent in existing unemployment. In consequence, 
unemployment rose again, from 11.8 per cent in June 2011 to 12.6 per 
cent in June 2012. Economic growth rates remained low during 
2012/13, at around 2.1 per cent, and unemployment continued to 
climb, reaching 13 per cent by the end of  2012, 13.2 per cent by March 
2013, and an estimated 13.3 per cent by the end of  the fiscal year in 
June 2013, which coincided with the end of  the rule of  Morsi and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
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3.2 Poverty in post-revolution Egypt
According to CAPMAS, the most salient features of  poverty in Egypt 
between the uprisings were that:
 l Some 25.2 per cent of  the population lived below the national poverty 
line and 4.8 per cent lived in extreme poverty (2010/11). The poverty 
line was defined as monthly per capita expenditure of  less than 
256 Egyptian pounds, or a little less than US$1.50 a day using 2010/11 
prices. This threshold was closer to capturing poverty than the extreme 
poverty line used by the World Bank, set at US$1.25 per day. In Egypt, 
extreme poverty was defined as monthly per capita expenditure of  less 
than 172 Egyptian pounds, or less than US$1 a day, which was lower 
than the international line. The high poverty line was set at per capita 
monthly expenditure of  334 Egyptian pounds, or about US$1.80 a day, 
compared to a global high poverty line of  less than US$2.25 per day. If  
the global measure is used, which includes the poor, extreme poor and 
near poor, then 42 per cent of  the population is poor. 
 l Poverty was concentrated geographically, with higher rates in 
Upper Egypt. Using the national poverty line, poverty was highest 
in Assyout governorate, where 69 per cent of  the population was 
poor. It was followed by Sohag (59 per cent), Aswan (54 per cent), 
Qena (51 per cent), Fayyoum (41 per cent), Luxor (39 per cent), Beni 
Soueif  (38 per cent), and Minya (32 per cent).
 l Unemployment was indisputably a prime cause of  this increase in 
poverty. Egypt required annual investments of  28 per cent of  GDP to 
absorb new entrants into the labour market and avoid adding to the 
pool of  existing unemployment and poverty. 
3.3 The informal sector: a source of livelihood tipping into violence
The most significant result of  the rapid increase in unemployment after 
2011 was that the unemployed turned to the informal sector, seen most 
visibly in the explosion of  street peddlers and itinerant vendors. While 
Tahrir Square was, for the revolutionaries and the world, the site of  the 
revolution, for a great many unemployed young people it represented 
a huge market and an opportunity to make a living. In the absence 
of  police, a constant source of  trouble for vendors, the square was a 
boon. According to Okasha, stability and an end to conflict with the 
police and army was not in the vendors’ interest; the revolution gave 
them room to exercise pent-up liberties and make a living without fear 
of  police harassment (Okasha 2012). In fact, the situation evolved in 
a different direction. Peddlers sprang up in the streets of  Cairo and all 
over Egypt, adapting themselves and their role to the political situation. 
Vendors first began to use violence against attempts to eject them 
from Tahrir and other squares and streets. The violence was initially 
deployed with the approval of  revolutionaries faced with attempts by the 
police and army to evacuate public squares. Violence was also at times 
seen between vendors and thugs, who attempted to collect protection 
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money, and peddlers themselves came into violent conflict over turf  in 
more than one place in Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt. 
The remarkable development was the speed with which the position of  
street vendors evolved and their flexible alliances with various parties 
depending on their interests. Initially, they joined the revolutionaries 
against the evacuation of  the square. Later, when their conditions had 
stabilised somewhat and police left them to peddle their wares in peace, 
they allied with police against revolutionaries. Vendors on July 26 Street 
confronted a march of  revolutionary Ultras and the Black Bloc on 
3 May 2013. Following clashes between the two sides, the demonstrators 
retreated to Talaat Harb Square and from there to Tahrir. 
Skirmishes had also occurred between vendors and protesters in support 
of  the judiciary on 26 April. Vendors around the High Court threw stones 
at demonstrators, accusing them of  interrupting their business. These 
are just two examples of  the attitudes of  vendors during Morsi’s tenure. 
Peddlers were also present in Raba’a and Nahda Squares during the 
occupation by the Muslim Brotherhood and their Islamist allies in June–
August 2014. After Morsi’s removal, they began to confront Brotherhood 
protesters in Cairo and several governorates, especially Daqahliya and 
Sharqiya, usually in clashes that involved weapons on both sides. 
The passage of  time and persistent lack of  security have led peddlers 
to recognise their weight and importance, and they have sought to 
establish a union to speak on their behalf  with other political forces. 
Indeed, the executive began to understand and appreciate the value of  
the violence used by street sellers – who tended to be apolitical – against 
their political enemies. ‘Solving the problem of  street sellers requires 
deliberation and humanity. Instead of  confronting them, what is needed 
is understanding, dialogue, and communication,’ Al-Youm al-Sabia 
reported Governor of  Cairo Galal al-Said as saying on 28 September. 
The same story went on to say that he had tasked the deputy governor 
for the western zone with forming a field committee to find solutions 
to deal with the street vendors and come up with ways to absorb their 
numbers in mutually satisfactory ways. 
The governor also noted that the peddlers had played a patriotic role in 
standing up to the riots by the Muslim Brotherhood during the events 
at the Fath Mosque in Ramsis (Al-Youm al-Sabia 2013b). Yet, even as 
street peddlers confronted political forces to defend their interests, they 
declared their readiness to confront any other force, including executive 
bodies, in defence of  these same interests. Al-Youm al-Sabia on 7 October 
reported that street vendors in Ezbat Abu Hashish, near the Ghamra 
Bridge in Hadayeq al-Qubba, had warned the governor and executive 
agencies in the area not to confiscate their wares on Port Said Street, 
saying ‘It’s over our dead bodies if  anyone comes near here to take our 
goods. We’re ready to fight the entire republic.’ They stressed that the 
goods were the sole source of  their livelihoods (Al-Youm al-Sabia 2013a). 
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In short, the revolution and the security vacuum gave rise to many 
activities, either in response to opportunities or to mitigate deteriorating 
economic conditions, but in either case, they were predicated on 
violence or at least the willingness and ability to use it. These activities 
were primarily of  two types: one criminal and illicit, including weapons- 
and drug-trafficking, theft and armed robbery; and the other licit, 
namely the expansion of  the informal sector, which had resulted from 
declines in investment opportunities, economic growth, and the ability 
of  the economy to create jobs in the formal sector. Political instability 
and a deteriorating economy continued to pose the greatest challenge to 
those in power, whether under the SCAF or during the tenure of  Morsi 
and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
It is not in the scope of  this article to address issues such as youth, 
sectarian or Islamist violence and their trajectories under the SCAF 
and Morsi. Instead it examines how the political economy was a factor 
in citizens’ response to the Tamarod movement6 and the protests by 
millions all over Egypt seeking to remove Morsi and the Brotherhood 
from power. 
3.4 Presidential elections and broken political promises
The first round of  the presidential election on 23 and 24 May 2012 
revealed a substantial shift in voting patterns compared to the 
parliamentary elections a year earlier. Morsi, the candidate for the 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of  the Muslim 
Brotherhood, came in first place with 5,446,460 votes (24.9 per cent), 
followed by Ahmed Shafiq with 5,338,285 votes (24.5 per cent), Hamdin 
Sabahi with 4,616,937 votes (21.1 per cent), and Abd al-Meneim Abu 
al-Futouh with 3,889,195 votes (17.8 per cent). 
The Brotherhood realised the precarious nature of  its position, given 
the very slim gap between Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq, his opponent 
in the run-off. In fact, the total votes received by liberal and leftist 
candidates, known more generally as the civil current (Hamdin Sabahi, 
Amr Moussa, Khaled Ali, Abu al-Ezz al-Hariri, Hisham al-Bastawisi, 
Ahmed Shafiq, and other marginal candidates) far outweighed those 
won by the Islamist current (Mohammed Selim al-Awa, Abd al-Meneim 
Abu al-Futouh, and Mohamed Morsi). The Brotherhood took action to 
secure sufficient votes for its candidate in the second round by making 
promises and electoral agreements with representatives of  the civil 
camp, who rejected Shafiq as a representative of  the ancien regime. 
The most prominent of  these agreements, the Fairmont agreement 
– named after the hotel where the agreement was reached – was 
concluded between Morsi and representatives of  political factions. 
According to some who were involved, the agreement was finally 
reached after seven hours of  negotiations. Perhaps the most significant 
aspect of  the agreement was its affirmation of  a national partnership 
and inclusive national project that would give a voice to the revolution’s 
goals and all segments of  Egyptian society, including women, Copts, 
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and young people. It was agreed that the presidential team and a 
national salvation government would include representatives of  all 
national trends, with the prime minister being an independent national 
figure. The newly formed government soon made it apparent, however, 
that Morsi was not meeting the terms of  the agreement as president. 
Soon after, Morsi issued a constitutional declaration on 22 November, 
which set his decrees above judicial review and immunised the Shura 
Council (upper house), in which the Brotherhood held a majority, and 
Islamist-dominated People’s Assembly (lower house). The declaration 
outraged everyone, including the president’s advisory team, which was 
formed to mollify the national forces. The declaration made it clear 
that the advisory body was simply a facade and that the president’s true 
advisers were Brotherhood members, and several non-Brotherhood 
advisers resigned. Morsi’s declaration sparked off widespread protests, 
and counter-protests by his supporters, that left two people dead and 
hundreds injured. 
A major turning point arrived when armed Brotherhood militias on 
5 December attacked protesters who were staging a sit-in in front of  the 
Ittihadiya Presidential Palace, setting off clashes in which seven people 
were shot dead and hundreds injured. The president’s supporters also 
detained several people, questioning and torturing them. The events 
at Ittihadiya set in motion a massive response over the next few days in 
various Egyptian provinces. According to estimates, more than 1 million 
took part in the demonstrations on 7 December in protest. 
Perhaps more important was the position of  the majority who were 
not directly involved in political action, but simply watched events 
unfold. As time passed, a great number of  Egyptians, particularly those 
unaffiliated to any political force, realised that the Brotherhood betrayal 
not only affected political forces that had made an agreement with the 
president, but themselves as well. Citizens faced numerous hardships in 
this period, from problems in obtaining butane canisters and diesel, to 
regular blackouts, piles of  rubbish in the streets, and acute traffic jams, 
all of  which the president had promised to resolve in his first 100 days 
in office (before he had made his constitutional declaration). Nor did 
the general citizenry feel that any of  the economic promises in the 
president’s platform had been fulfilled. 
3.5 Ambitious promises, constrained reality7
Morsi’s presidential platform had addressed all aspects of  economic, 
social, and political life in Egypt, but more than three-quarters was 
devoted to issues of  social justice and economic development. This 
reflected a society whose electorate complained of  economic problems 
and low standards of  living, and where more than 40 per cent of  the 
population lived below or near the poverty line. The platform assumed 
prominence because the Muslim Brotherhood publicised it as the plan 
of  action that would bring about a major transformation in people’s 
lives. It created enormous expectations, as people awaited the rolling 
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out of  the platform to meet their heightened aspirations. The most 
significant aspects of  the platform are outlined below.
First, the platform clearly embraced a market economy, in which the 
private sector would play the largest role in realising economic and social 
development. In a Reuters interview in October 2011 Brotherhood-
affiliated businessman Hassan Malek said that the economic policies 
pursued under Mubarak had been moving in the right direction, but 
were marred by rampant corruption and cronyism. Malek said that the 
future of  investment in Egypt depended on the private sector and skilled 
labour. He also said that he supported the decisions former minister of  
trade and industry Rashid Mohammed Rashid had made, who worked 
to liberalise industry and attract more foreign direct investment, adding 
that the government must eliminate corruption and cronyism if  it was to 
achieve development and growth (Awad 2011).
There was no problem with the presidential platform declaring its 
preference for a market economy; some may even have seen it as a good 
thing, insofar as it would entail no shake-up in the existing economic 
order that might provoke unrest or instability harmful to economic 
development and growth. The problem was that the platform offered no 
real explanation of  how Morsi would rid the economy of  corruption and 
cronyism, with the exception of  a glancing reference to ‘enforcing the law 
protecting competition and preventing monopolistic practices, to prevent 
a group of  companies or monopolies from imposing high prices for goods 
and services.’ The same reference was made elsewhere in the platform. 
Indeed, an existing law ostensibly protected competition and prevented 
monopolistic practices, but that did not prevent the rise of  monopolies 
that had distorted the market, a fact well known to all. Morsi’s platform 
gave no indication of  whether he was satisfied with the law and only 
sought to enforce it, or whether he had reservations about the law itself. 
The lack of  a clear stance on this issue in the platform may have raised 
doubts about the depth of  change the new regime was committed to. 
It appeared to be merely a matter of  bringing in a new set of  cronies 
and interests to replace the discredited clique. In turn, this did not 
constitute a genuine revolution to reshape the economic system and 
its administration, even within the framework of  a market economy. 
Instead, change was reduced to a conflict of  business elites, with a new 
set of  elites moving into favoured positions. 
For example, Hassan Malek was selected to act as a bridge between 
the business sector and the presidency. Malek formed the Egyptian 
Association for Business Development and also selected the businessmen 
who would accompany the president on his trips abroad. This provoked 
objections from some businesspeople, who believed that a new clique 
of  cronies was simply replacing the old regime’s cronies. In a workshop 
that the Carnegie Middle East Center and Partners in Development 
organised in Cairo on 8 November 2012, businessmen Mohammed Nour 
and Mohammed Qassem expressed their dissatisfaction with Malek’s 
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association, which they said was clearly involved in partisan battles, given 
its alliance with the current president. Questioning the association’s 
mission, they dismissed it as just another example of  businessmen seeking 
to trade on their connections to the ruling party for privileges for their 
industries and to marginalise competitors (Said and Al-Qita’ 2013).
Second, the platform was filled with fine-sounding but extremely 
ambitious goals. Under a heading titled ‘Objectives of  the Economic 
Program’ the platform aimed at ‘reducing current inflation levels of  
11 per cent annually to less than half  of  the annual growth rate’. With 
annual growth set at 7 per cent on average, the goal was thus to cut 
inflation to 3.5 per cent annually (or 5.5 percentage points if  the goal is to 
halve current inflation rates). The platform also strove to ‘cut the budget 
deficit by 20 per cent annually’ and ‘balance the deficit in the balance 
of  payments by the end of  2016/17’, ‘increase foreign currency reserves 
to a level that insulates the Egyptian economy against any economic 
fluctuations’, ‘reduce domestic and external debt by 15 per cent annually’, 
‘cut unemployment to less than 7 per cent by early 2016’, ‘double the 
number of  beneficiaries of  social security pensions, from 1.5 million to 
3 million by the end of  the program’, and ‘reduce poverty rates’. 
Other objectives given elsewhere in the platform included plans to 
‘increase health expenditure to 12 per cent of  GDP by the end of  
the presidential term’, to ‘affirm the state’s guarantees for full health 
insurance without a minimum burden’; to ‘raise the minimum pension 
benefit, adopt an annual increase sufficient to cover price increases, and 
set a ceiling on pensions’; and to ‘gradually double the education budget 
to bring it up to global rates and increase allocations for scientific 
research to reach 2.5 per cent of  national income’. 
The platform committed to ‘redistributing income to achieve social 
justice and guaranteeing that every person receives enough to meet the 
minimum threshold of  life’s needs by setting a minimum and maximum 
wage and changing the current wage structure to make the basic 
wage the foundation of  one’s salary and base incentives and rewards 
on performance.’ The platform did not specify the minimum and 
maximum wage levels to be adopted, however, and this in a platform 
filled with numbers and percentages and in the midst of  a real social 
debate about such levels.
While no one would disagree with such ambitious goals in principle, 
the question was how they might be realised. What policies and 
mechanisms would be adopted to meet them, especially because the 
platform set clear quantitative targets to be met in a limited timeframe? 
In fact, the platform included precious little clarification in this regard, 
especially in terms of  government policies, though when discussing the 
economic role of  the state, the platform alluded to restructuring the 
state’s role to make its two priorities fighting corruption and drafting 
economic policies (fiscal, monetary, and commercial). 
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The platform contained stark inconsistencies. In a section on fiscal policy, 
it supported ‘an incremental program to reduce the budget deficit to less 
than 6 per cent by early 2016’, which directly contradicted the target 
noted above of  slashing the deficit by 20 per cent annually. The platform’s 
proposed fiscal policy included ‘a short- to medium-term plan to rationalise 
government spending, reconsider the tax code to ensure an equitable tax 
burden, and review the subsidy system to ensure it reaches the deserving.’ 
This section of  the platform noted: ‘The most important features of  any fiscal 
policy is the attempt to create a climate that fosters a dynamic private sector 
and generates strong growth, jobs, progress, and development in Egypt.’ No 
specific tax policy was explored or adopted, however, a remarkable omission 
in a platform so full of  numbers and figures. The section only noted that: 
in terms of  revenues, tax policy must focus on activating a tax 
structure consistent with international and regional standards that 
promotes business competition and cuts tax rates for small and 
medium businesses, which will bring in more tax revenue overall. 
In the event, of  course, these goals could not be realised. The platform’s 
hopes were that preservation of  the existing tax structure (and tax 
cuts for some sectors) combined with increased domestic and foreign 
investment would increase overall economic activity, and that this 
in turn would enable the elimination of  the deficit within five years. 
The Brotherhood and FJP leaders issued statements suggesting that 
Egypt had received promises of  FDI from multinational corporations 
amounting about US$200bn over five years, or US$40bn a year, which 
exceeded the required level of  investment (US$33bn the first year). 
While campaigning in Nasr City on 6 May 2012, Morsi said that the 
government had held negotiations with several companies to bring in 
this level of  investment, and the acting presidential spokesman said on 
27 June that some US$200bn in foreign investment would be pumped 
into the economy in the coming period. But this was wholly unrealistic. 
Foreign investment flows to Egypt between 2005 and 2010 (the best 
years for FDI in Egypt) were only US$49.6bn. In fact, total FDI in 
Egypt from 1970 to 2010 was no more than US$73.1bn. That is, in four 
decades, Egypt had received only 36 per cent of  the investments it was 
ostensibly to receive in just five years. 
During Morsi’s year in office, the government made no progress towards 
any of  the major objectives cited in the platform or the target growth 
rate of  7 per cent needed to reduce unemployment and improve living 
standards. FDI inflows into Egypt from July 2012 to March 2013 
totalled US$6.9bn, falling slightly short of  the US$7.1bn in FDI in the 
same period the previous year. Assuming that the target was $30bn for 
nine months, FDI was only 23 per cent of  the target promised in the 
president’s platform. According to data from the Ministry of  Planning, 
growth reached only 2.1 per cent during Morsi’s tenure, compared to the 
target of  7 per cent. As a result, unemployment was up by 0.8 per cent 
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in late June 2013, reaching 13.3 per cent, compared to 12.5 per cent in 
June 2012, instead of  dropping 1.5 per cent as promised by the platform 
(Ministry of  Planning 2013; Central Bank of  Egypt 2014). It was not 
only these objective conditions, but also the disillusionment arising from 
unrealised promises, that underpinned Morsi’s overthrow. 
4 Conclusion
An examination of  the political economy drivers that contributed to 
people reaching a tipping point prior to the 2011 and 2013 uprisings 
shows that the economic situation continued to decline throughout this 
period. But in both instances, it was when people felt that the political 
handling of  the economic situation was so unbearable that they reached 
a tipping point. Both regimes pursued neoliberal policies. But in 2011, 
it was the increasing sense of  indignation among the middle classes 
and poor over political corruption in the management of  economic 
resources, with no prospect of  improvement, that drove people 
eventually to protest. And in 2013, it was the scale of  disappointment 
at the unmet aspirations for change, and the disconnect between the 
promises of  betterment and the dire economic situation on the ground 
that convinced people of  the need to search for an alternative. 
Mubarak pursued a neoliberal policy whose benefits were reaped by 
a small business elite. Such a policy led to an increase in poverty and 
unemployment on an unprecedented scale, and the informal sector 
became the only avenue for job opportunities, which were incompatible 
with the aspirations of  graduates of  tertiary and intermediary level 
education. These factors worked in constellation with growing political 
corruption, in particular with respect to the inheritance of  power from 
Mubarak to his son, and the practices of  the ruling party that led to the 
disenfranchisement of  the middle classes, while the poor fought – and were 
killed – lining up for bread and cooking gas, basic services deteriorated. 
The Muslim Brotherhood did not oppose Mubarak’s neoliberal policies, 
only the levels of  corruption that characterised his last years in office. 
Consequently, the Brotherhood pursued the same economic policies, but 
replaced Mubarak’s men with their own group of  businessmen who would 
endorse and support their regime. Under the Brotherhood’s rule, Morsi 
adopted policies that the opposition perceived as highly exclusionary, but 
also led to a sense of  unmet aspirations among ordinary citizens who 
were expecting improved livelihoods under the ‘Renaissance’ (Al-Nahda) 
project. Instead, they continued to experience difficulty in accessing energy 
and did not see any improvement in their economic situation. 
When leading Brotherhood member Khayrat el-Shatter announced 
that Al-Nahda was a set of  ideas open for discussion and debate rather 
than guiding an action plan for implementation, people lost trust in 
the Brotherhood’s ability and commitment to deliver on its promises. 
At that point people became responsive to the Tamarod movement’s 
petition to withdraw trust from Morsi and support the idea of  bringing 
forward the presidential election and removing him from power. 
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Notes
1 See for example www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/
five-years-on-security-and-economy and http://carnegie-mec.
org/2016/01/21/chasing-egypt-s-economic-tail/it1c 
2 See, for example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004).
3 I rely exclusively on the executive summary of  the World Bank report 
issued in June 2011 (World Bank 2011). 
4 Ibid.
5 Some claim that real unemployment far exceeds the official rate. In 
that year, 357,000 joined the ranks of  the unemployed, on top of  the 
700,000 new entrants who join the market every year. This suggests 
a clear contradiction in the data on employment in the years leading 
up to the revolution; see El-Erian (2012).
6 A youth-led movement that drew up a petition to call for an early 
presidential election on account of  the failure Morsi’s government 
to deliver on its promises, and which was one of  the movements that 
called on people to take part in a mass uprising against the Muslim 
Brotherhood regime on the occasion of  its first anniversary in office.
7 References to the content of  Morsi’s presidential platform come from 
Sobhi (2012). 
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ACAB All Cops Are Bastards
AFAD Disaster and Emergency Management Authority of  the Prime 
Minister’s Office 
AKP Justice and Development Party
CAPMAS Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
DAFI Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative Fund
FDI foreign direct investment
FJP Freedom and Justice Party
FSA Free Syrian Army
GDP gross domestic product
HDP People’s Democratic Party
IDPs internally displaced people
IIE International Institute for Education
INEE Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGOs international non-governmental organisations
IS Islamic State
KCK Group of  Communities in Kurdistan
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party
KLM Kurdish Liberation Movement
MB Muslim Brotherhood
NDP National Democratic Party
NFE non-formal education
NGO non-governmental organisation
NLG No Lost Generation
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PUK Patriotic Union of  Kurdistan
PYD Democratic Union Party
RAA Rojava Autonomous Administration
SCAF Supreme Council of  the Armed Forces 
SDF Syrian Democratic Forces
SSI State Security Investigations
TEV-DEM Movement for a Democratic Society
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees (The UN Refugee 
Agency)
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
US United States
WASH water, sanitation and hygiene
YPG Kurdish People’s Protection Units
YPJ Women’s Protection Units
YTF Youth Task Force
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